FORUMDragon nightmaresApr 16th 2009[From The Economist print edition]

HERE is a
quick way to spoil a Brussels dinner party. Simply suggest that world
governance is slipping away from the G20, G7, G8 or other bodies in
which Europeans may hog up to half the seats. Then propose, with gloomy
relish, that the future belongs to the G2: newly fashionable jargon for
a putative body formed by China and America.The fear of
irrelevance haunts Euro-types, for all their public boasting about
Europe’s future might. The thought that the European Union might not
greatly interest China is especially painful. After all, the 21st
century was meant to be different. Indeed, to earlier leaders like
France’s Jacques Chirac, a rising China was welcome as another
challenge to American hegemony, ushering in a “multipolar world” in
which the EU would play a big role. If that meant kow-towing to Chinese
demands to shun Taiwan, snub the Dalai Lama or tone down criticism of
human-rights abuses, so be it. Most EU countries focused on commercial
diplomacy with China, to ensure that their leaders’ visits could end
with flashing cameras and the signing of juicy contracts.Meanwhile,
Europe’s trade deficit with China hit nearly €170 billion ($250
billion) last year. China has erected myriad barriers to European
firms, notes a scathing new audit of EU-China relations by the European
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), a think-tank. The trend is
ominous. In five years, China wants 60% of car parts in new Chinese
vehicles to be locally made. This is alarming news for Germany, the
leading European exporter to China thanks to car parts, machine tools
and other widgets.As ever, Europeans disagree over how to
respond. Some are willing to challenge China politically—for example,
Germany, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands. But they are mostly free
traders. That makes them hostile when other countries call for
protection against alleged Chinese cheating. In contrast, a block of
mostly southern and central Europeans, dubbed “accommodating
mercantilists” by the ECFR, are quick to call for anti-dumping
measures. But that makes them anxious to keep broader relations sweet
by bowing to China on political issues.The result is that
European politicians often find themselves defending unconditional
engagement with China. The usual claim is that this will slowly
transform the country into a freer, more responsible stakeholder in the
world. The secret, it is murmured, is to let Europe weave China into an
entangling web of agreements and sectoral dialogues. In 2007 no fewer
than 450 European delegations visited China. Big countries like France
and Britain add their own bilateral dialogues, not trusting the EU to
protect their interests or do the job properly. There are now six
parallel EU and national “dialogues” with China on climate change, for
example.Alas, familiarity with Europeans does not preclude
contempt. EU-China dialogues on human rights or the rule of law are a
way of tying Europeans down with process, avoiding substance. China
abruptly cancelled an EU-China summit scheduled for last December. The
astonishing snub was presented by Chinese diplomats as punishment for
France’s Nicolas Sarkozy for meeting the Dalai Lama when his country
held the rotating presidency of the EU (with other EU countries left to
take note).Chinese interest in the EU peaked in 2003, when it
looked as if the club would soon acquire a constitution, a foreign
minister and a full-time president. But the honeymoon had ended by
2006, after China failed to get the EU to lift an arms embargo imposed
after the Tiananmen Square killings of 1989. At policy seminars and
closed-door conferences, state-sponsored Chinese analysts now drip
condescension. America is a strong man and China a growing teenager,
said one at a 2008 conference in Stockholm; Europe is a “rich old guy”,
heading for his dotage. At a recent Wilton Park conference in Britain,
a Chinese academic called the EU a weak power, unprepared to challenge
American hegemony: China was not about to work with it on a new world
order.Unity meets disunityIf you wanted to
design a competitor to show up European weaknesses most painfully, you
would come up with something a lot like China. It is a centralised,
unitary state, which is patient and relentless in the pursuit of
national goals that often matter more to the Chinese than anyone else.
European governments do not even agree on what they want from China.
They are fuzzily committed to EU “values”, but will readily trample on
those in a scramble to secure jobs and cheap goods for their voters.
They do not share the same vision of trade policy, or how best to press
China on climate change. Worse, the biggest countries, especially
France, Germany and Britain, compete to be China’s favourite European
partner. This causes damage. It was mad that the British and Germans
did not rush to back Mr Sarkozy when he was bullied over the Dalai
Lama. They could easily have insisted that EU leaders meet whomsoever
they want.Yet talk of a “Chi-merican” G2 running the world is
overblown. For one thing, China will probably prefer to keep its own
global options open. For another, senior Brussels figures rightly
insist that the EU’s voice cannot be ignored in global economic
discussions. It is China’s largest trading partner, after all, with
two-way trade worth a huge €300 billion.Ideally, European
governments would be less feeble and fractious. Failing that, Europe
could set itself more modest goals. Chinese officials are reportedly
fascinated by European welfare and public-health systems, as well as by
EU product regulation. Providing a model for red-tape or welfare reform
may not be as much fun as jointly running a multipolar world. But with
its pathetic record of handling partners such as China, Europe should
welcome recognition of its relevance, however it is offered.–This column is an open discussion forum for Tibet related issues and the views expressed here does not necessarily reflect those of the Central Tibetan Administration.