Report: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 29 May 2025
Executive Summary
Section 4 of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (8 U.S.C. 1182 note) requires the Department of State to provide an annual report to Congress regarding the level of access that Chinese authorities granted to U.S. diplomats and officials, journalists, and tourists to the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan areas in China. The report must include comparisons with the level of access granted to other areas of China, between Tibetan and non-Tibetan areas in relevant provinces, to the previous reporting year, and a description of the required permits and other measures that impede travel in Tibetan areas. This reporting period covers the 2024 calendar year, with comparisons to 2023, as applicable.
Chinese government regulations and procedures that have historically impeded travel to the TAR and Tibetan areas outside the TAR for U.S. diplomats and officials, journalists, and tourists remained in place in 2024. International visitors’ travel to the TAR continued to require the approval of TAR government travel permits. No U.S. official has been able to visit the TAR since 2019. In 2024, U.S. officials made five requests for official travel to the TAR, none of which were approved. In 2023, three requests for access were made, which were also not approved. Diplomats and officials did not require a permit or prior notification to travel to Tibetan areas outside of the TAR. However, China’s security forces used conspicuous surveillance to intimidate, monitor, harass, and restrict the movements of U.S. diplomats, officials, and foreigners, including while on official or personal travel to such areas. Tibetan Americans regularly have faced restrictions on their travel to Tibetan areas. Access to these areas for journalists remained restricted and limited.
Impact of the Suspension of Operations at the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu
Due to the Chinese government’s withdrawal of consent for operation in retaliation for the United States’ withdrawal of consent for the operation of China’s Consulate General Houston, the United States suspended operations at the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu (CG Chengdu) on July 27, 2020. The TAR is now located in Embassy Beijing’s consular district, hundreds of miles further away than TAR was from CG Chengdu. The suspension of operations at CG Chengdu has severely inhibited the overall U.S. Mission’s ability to maintain access to Tibetan areas.
Differences in Access to Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan Areas
While China maintained strict access requirements for travel to the TAR, access requirements to travel to sensitive Tibetan areas in other provinces remained ambiguous. Tibetan areas, which are prefectures and counties containing historic and current Tibetan populations outside of the TAR, exist in Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces. Municipal and prefecture-level Chinese and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials often impose and administer non-uniform access restrictions to these areas, resulting in differing conditions and making it difficult to determine the rationale and timing for these restrictions.
Comparison with the Level of Access Granted to the Tibetan and Non-Tibetan Areas of China
Diplomats and other officials
In 2024, the TAR continued to be the only area of China that the government required diplomats and other foreign officials to formally request permission to visit. Diplomats could not purchase air or train tickets to enter the TAR without official approval.
While diplomats and other foreign officials did not face formal restrictions on travel to Tibetan areas outside of the TAR, Chinese officials sometimes used conspicuous surveillance to intimidate, monitor, and harass travelers to these areas.
During the 2024 reporting year, U.S. mission personnel were unable to conduct any American Citizen Services visits to the TAR because requests for visits by consular officers were not approved. No consular officer has visited the TAR since 2019. In previous years, local officials in the TAR had been responsive to consular requests to provide assistance to U.S. citizens but occasionally delayed their response to emergency access requests.
Tourists
Beijing regulations controlled travel of international visitors to the TAR for tourism, a restriction applied by no other provincial-level entity in China. In accordance with a 1989 central government regulation, international visitors, including U.S. citizens, were required to obtain an official confirmation letter issued by the TAR government, which reports to the central government in Beijing, before entering the TAR. Most tourists received such letters by booking tours through travel agencies officially registered with the Chinese government. China mandated a designated tour guide accompany international tourists while in the TAR. Foreigners rarely obtained permission to enter the TAR by road. There are also reports of increased access granted to foreign influencers and travel bloggers, some of whom Chinese state media have promoted. Authorities denied access to the TAR for many international tourists during periods the government considered politically sensitive, including the March 10 anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising against China’s invasion of Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s birthday in July.
The TAR Tourism Bureau reported that in 2023, TAR received over 55 million domestic and foreign tourists. In 2019 CG Chengdu estimated roughly 10,000 U.S. citizens visited the region. It is not known how many U.S. citizens visited the TAR in 2024, but overall U.S. numbers likely remain short of those seen in 2019.
U.S. citizens of Tibetan heritage undergo a stricter screening process than other U.S. citizens when applying for Chinese visas or travel permits to visit the TAR. Their applications are processed through the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and often require a letter from a relative or host in the Tibetan area, an in-person interview with the Chinese Embassy or Consulate officer in charge of Tibetan affairs, and submission of personal documents such as copies of naturalization certificates, birth certificates, school and work records, affidavits, and other materials. Tibetan Americans reported more frequent harassment by security officials in Tibetan areas than in other parts of China, including requirements to report to the local UFWD office where some were reportedly interrogated, threatened, and forced to download tracking software on their phones. Some members of the Tibetan American community reported they self-censored their behavior in the United States out of fear of retribution against their family members in Tibet or fear of losing future access to Tibet and threats from Chinese officials. Despite these barriers, ethnic Tibetans also reported increased access to the TAR compared to previous years, particularly for those who hold United States or European passports. This information is anecdotal, with no concrete data available on the number of visas issued to Tibetan Americans.
Journalists
Beijing heavily restricted and controlled access for U.S. journalists to the TAR. Chinese regulations did not regularly require international journalists to obtain prior permission to travel to any part of the country other than the TAR. The government has rejected the vast majority of U.S. journalists’ requests to visit and report from the TAR, according to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC), the professional organization for the international press corps based in China. When the Chinese government granted access, security officials monitored and controlled these journalists’ movements at all times. According to the FCCC’s 2023 annual report, only one foreign journalist was granted permission to travel to the TAR. In lieu of individual permits, the government relied on organized group tours of the region for registered reporters selected by Chinese authorities.
When U.S. journalists gained access to Tibetan areas, the Chinese government further suppressed their ability to report about Tibet by intimidating and preventing Chinese nationals from interacting with them. By hosting group tours, the government has been able to cite increased numbers and greater access to the region while maintaining strict control over the information conveyed.
Comparison Between Levels of Access for Tibetan and Non-Tibetan Areas
Diplomats and other officials
U.S. diplomats and other officials did not have to apply to travel to Tibetan areas outside of the TAR, though sometimes access to specific areas would be blocked and official meetings with local government, religious, and community leaders required local Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) permission, as was common practice in many localities throughout China. Chinese security personnel have used conspicuous monitoring to intimidate those traveling to Tibetan areas outside of the TAR. Government-designated minders have followed diplomats and officials, prevented them from meeting or speaking with local contacts, questioned them, and restricted their movement. Official access to monasteries in Tibetan areas of Kardze (Chinese: Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) and Ngaba (Chinese: Aba) TAP, both in Sichuan province, remained limited. During visits in recent years to Tibetan areas in Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces, local authorities have surveilled U.S. diplomats and in several instances, prohibited them from entering certain monasteries, blocked off specific roads, prevented them from having meetings or conversations with local interlocutors, and monitored their conversations.
Tourists
International tourists sometimes faced restrictions traveling to Tibetan areas outside the TAR. Some particularly sensitive areas, including areas with prominent monasteries or those with histories of protest activities, such as Ngaba (which saw a number of self-immolations following the 2008 uprising), restrict international tourists’ access.
Journalists
Although journalists were permitted to travel to areas outside the TAR with significant Tibetan populations, they have been subjected to invasive surveillance, physically blocked from certain areas, and intimidated by the government. According to the FCCC’s 2023 annual report, foreign journalists experienced harassment while reporting in Tibetan areas outside the TAR. The Economist journalists described constant police surveillance during July 2024 travel to a Tibetan area of Qinghai to report on boarding schools for Tibetan students.
Comparison of the Level of Access Between 2024 and 2023
Diplomats and other officials
Access to Tibetans did not improve in 2024. China arranged tours of foreign diplomats and held events in the TAR, but such arrangements are strictly arranged and managed by the government and are designed to prevent meaningful interaction with the people of the TAR.
Journalists
The FCCC’s 2023 annual report noted that access to the TAR remains officially restricted for foreign journalists. Reporters must apply to the government for special permission or join a press tour organized by China’s State Council or Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Only one journalist was granted permission in 2023.
Required Permits and Other Measures Impeding Freedom to Travel in Tibetan Areas
In addition to the permits and other restrictions described above, visitors whose requests for a Tibet travel permit the Chinese government approved in previous years have faced additional access barriers once in the TAR. According to travel agents operating in the TAR, the Tibet travel permit did not allow visits to all areas within the TAR. Some areas were generally closed to visitors and required supplemental permission from the TAR Public Security Bureau. Tourists planning to visit certain border areas, such as Mount Everest, also required a military area entry permit from the Military Affairs Office and a foreign affairs permit from the TAR FAO.
The Chinese government did not disclose its decision-making process for granting permission to travel to the TAR, nor did it share the names of officials involved in issuing travel permits to U.S. citizens to visit the TAR.
Historically, Beijing authorities assessed each U.S. official request to visit the TAR on a case-by-case basis. The TAR FAO generally required a diplomatic note for any official visit, accompanied by a list of trip attendees. Once the TAR government received a request, it reportedly informed a foreign affairs leading committee, consisting of representatives at the prefectural, provincial, and central levels from the UFWD, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Public Security, People’s Liberation Army, and MFA. This committee reviewed requests, although frequently, no specific response was provided.
