Shishir Gupta for Hindustan Times. Read the original article here.
While both India and China, through their foreign ministers have decided to disengage from Ladakh, the exercise is very complicated and will take time despite the best efforts of both the Corps Commanders.
For the past 58 years, the Chinese propaganda machine, or psychological warfare machine, has used the 1962 border conflict to put the Indian Army on the defensive and convey to the nation at large that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is vastly superior to its Indian counterpart on the battlefield.
It is the same mindset that made PLA transgress the Finger 4 mountainous spur on the north banks of Pangong Tso as well as breach the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Galwan. The Chinese hubris, however, took a hit at both Galwan as well as on both banks of the lake, with the Indian Army occupying dominant positions and in fact threatening the PLA garrison at Moldo across the Spanggur Gap in Chushul sector.
Caught unawares by the Indian Army August 29-30 manoeuvres, a miffed PLA decided to place an anti-aircraft gun on Black Top, south of Pangang Tso and rolled out the main battle tanks to scare the Indians. The PLA propaganda machine is a screaming war with India, without realizing that the tools of present-day war are standoff weapons and not World War II machines like tanks.
While both India and China, through their foreign ministers have decided to disengage from Ladakh, the exercise is very complicated and will take time despite the best efforts of both the Corps Commanders. The disengagement has to be done in such a fashion that it gives mutual security and not a chance to the incorrigible PLA to occupy positions vacated by the Indian Army due to better border infrastructure and logistics. The best option available is status quo ante as existed in early April and anything less than that is an exercise in obfuscation.
While the Chinese harp about India’s 1962 loss, the fact is that the present Indian Army does not fight with .303 Lee Enfield bolt action rifles, light machine guns, three-inch mortars and light tanks. A transparent battlefield in Ladakh will surely tell the Chinese ruler in Beijing that the Indian troop deployment north and south of Pangong Tso is more than the total deployed during the 1962 war.
Top Indian diplomats and military commanders are clear that the war, if forced by the PLA, will lead to more casualties on both sides in the first 15 minutes than the entire 1962 war due to standoff weapons, laser-guided bombs and beyond visual range, missiles deployed by both sides.