Tibet’s Past, Present and Future—What is the way Forward?

Department of Information & International Relations (DIIR)
Central Tibetan Administration
Symposium

Tibet’s Past, Present and Future—What is the Way Forward?

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Department of Information & International Relations (DIIR)
Central Tibetan Administration
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I am glad to see the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR) of Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) launch its flagship report ‘Tibet is not part of China but Middle Way remain a viable solution,’ organize a symposium on ‘Tibet’s past, present and future-what is the way forward?’ and subsequently publish the symposium proceedings.

The Chinese Government has time and again made every effort to create a heavenly image of Tibet that is out of touch with reality. The book published in three languages: Tibetan, English and Chinese seeks to present the current situation inside Tibet under the Chinese rule and share our position on these issues in order to generate objective and intellectual discussion on Tibet’s future and bring the discourse on Tibet from the margins to the mainstream.

This report will also contribute to recording the deliberations from the important book launch and the symposium for posterity.

We hope that the report will help widen the horizon of intellectual discourse and dialogue on Tibet, it’s history, it’s present status and it’s future directions.

Dr. Lobsang Sangay
Sikyong
OPENING AND BOOK LAUNCH

Welcome Address by Dhardon Sharling, Information Secretary (Equivalent) DIIR

Opening Remarks by Dr. Lobsang Sangay, Sikyong, Central Tibetan Administration

Keynote Address by Chief Guest Mani Shankar Aiyar

Address by Guest of Honour Jaya Jaitley

Vote of thanks by Sonam Norbu Dagpo, International Secretary, DIIR
Good morning everyone. Honorable Dr. Lobsang Sangay, the political leader of Central Tibetan Administration, Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar, former Minister, former Member of Parliament, strategist, thinker, writer and Ms Jaya Jaitly Ji, former politician, social activist and a very dear friend of Tibet. Mr Sonam Norbu Dagpo, the Secretary of International Relations of the Department of Information and International Relations, our very esteemed and distinguished guests, dear friends, students, and everyone. Thank you all for coming and welcome to the very special and crucial release of CTA’s report titled “Tibet is not part of China but Middle Way remains a viable solution.” The Department of Information and International Relations deem it a big honor to see people from across the spectrum, be it political leaders, thinkers, strategists, research scholars, friends of Tibet, activists, members of the press convened together in the Indian capital to talk about Tibet. I think this is a very significant moment for us, and when you talk about China, we are witnessing a gamut of events that brings to light China’s growing arrogance, I would say, the surge of Chinese hegemony, also the extension of China’s tentacles that sheds light on its high-handed dealing with a lot of issues affecting India, especially with India’s bid for membership in the NSG.

It is just last evening, I think we all saw the news of how the Chinese Foreign Ministry was actually raising objection to India for hosting His Holiness the Dalai Lama at the Rashtrapati Bhavan and basically criticizing the President, the head of the state of this democracy for meeting with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. It brought a lot of pride and comfort in us to see India respond and stand its ground and say “His Holiness the Dalai Lama is a revered spiritual guest of India and that the event was non-political.” So when
it comes to Tibet, I am sure today’s discussion will dwell on that but basically what China actually does is to paint a picture of a harmonious Tibet, of a pristine Tibet that is actually out of touch with reality and I think today’s book and the discussion thereof, is going to shed light on the true prevalent situation inside Tibet, that is repression under the Chinese occupation and what actually is the way forward and that’s what our book also deals with. So friends, without further ado, I would like to request our three very esteemed guests to release the report and Sonam Sangmo la and Kalden la will present the book to them.

Thank you very much. We now have the Political leader of CTA, Dr, Lobsang Sangay deliver the opening remarks for today’s event.

I would like to acknowledge and welcome very eminent scholar, politician and activist Mani Shankar Aiyar Ji, and Jaya Ji was asking me why did you bring me to the dais and I said you are a trusted longtime friend of Tibetan people, because whenever we were at Delhi University, whenever we wanted a speaker, we used to say “Oh, George Fernandas Ji, Jaya Jaitly Ji and Professor Sondhi.” Those days, we were talking about late 80’s and early 90’s, when martial law was imposed in Tibet, so as His Holiness the Dalai Lama says “you should always remember and keep your old friends and make new friends,” so in that sense I am very happy that Jaya Ji is here and we all know Mani Shankar Aiyar Ji visited Dharamsala. It was a moment of great pride for us as he shared his thoughts on various issues. He also visited Tibet Policy Institute, there were only I think few researchers, in the sense we have only dozen or so researchers. But a person of his prominence came and sat and shared his thoughts for more than an hour. It reflects his support, it reflects his affinity towards Tibetan people. So I want to thank both of you for gracing this occasion and as you can see from this book, the title is a
bit provocative, it says ‘Tibet is not a part of China but…there is a but…Middle Way Approach remains a viable solution.’

Because in this discourse on Tibet, we just want to make it very clear, because for over two decades we have been advocating Middle Way Approach. Sometimes the media and public in general have, I don’t want to say confusion, but some sense of dilemma as to what actually Tibetans want and then what Tibet was, because when we say we want genuine autonomy as per the Chinese law and we want genuine autonomy for Tibetan people within China, some people assume that we are asking a favor from China. What we are saying is, as far as the narrative is concerned, Tibet was an independent country. It is a fact and I think the treaty of 821 and 823 signed between Representative of Chinese Emperor and Tibetan king made it very clear that the ‘Tibetans will be happy
in the great land of Tibet, Chinese will be happy in the great land of China,’ so there is no dispute over the fact that Tibet was an independent country. So, Tibet is under occupation and Tibetans are facing repression and hence the solution we proposed is the Middle Way to seek genuine autonomy for Tibetan people.

But the historical reality has to be made very clear, hence I hope this report makes it very clear that the Tibet was an independent country and it is under occupation but as far as the future or the solution is concerned, we think the Middle Way is a viable solution. So the Middle Way essentially is to seek genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people, so that we can end repression of the Tibetan people and not seek separation from China. So that’s we want to make it clear, and in the chapters you can see, obviously, we have several chapters and I wont take much time but the second chapter is on the Reincarnation, because the Chinese government is making some claims on the reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and we just want to make it very clear that the Communist Party of China has no creditability or legitimacy as far reincarnation is concerned, particularly, the reincarnation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

This is because, look at their track record -number one: after the invasion of Tibet the Chinese Communist Party and the government destroyed 98% of the monasteries and nunneries, of 6000 plus monasteries and nunneries, 98% were destroyed. 99.99% monks and nuns were disrobed, sent to prison, sent to labor camps and many died. So when you have a track record of destroying 98% of monasteries and nunneries and disrobing and expelling 99.9% of monks and nuns, what is the basis on which you claim that I have a right to select the next Dalai Lama? Number two: they have been criticizing His Holiness the Dalai Lama by all names. On one hand we have China-expert Sinologist…but Jay you are not included in that…who says that when you want
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to deal with China, saving face is very important. So you have to be polite to Chinese, you have to be nice to Chinese, don’t say anything publicly, you have to be very polite and quite and expect some reward from them, saving face is very important for the Chinese leaders. Okay, lets accept their premises, but what about the face of Tibetan people and His Holiness the Dalai Lama? Because the Chinese government and the state media have called His Holiness the Dalai Lama “devil” and they have also call him Wolf in…you know…monk’s sheep…oh…wolf in monks clothing…not Sheep, I think…ya…so they have called that. So you call all these name to His Holiness and what about His Holiness’ face, what about the face of Tibetan people? If you want the world to respect your face then at least first respect other’s face then world will respect you.

So now they have criticized His Holiness the Dalai Lama for all these years, now they say that His Holiness the Dalai Lama should…uh…be reincarnated and they will decide the reincarnation, this simply is unacceptable. Now, sometimes His Holiness the Dalai Lama has said may be he could be the last Dalai Lama. Then the Chinese government said no no no you must come back, the reincarnation of Dalai Lama must come back. Now that clearly shows that Chinese government has no credibility or legitimacy. With the destruction of monasteries and nunneries, with expulsion of monks and nuns, they have criticized throughout their lives His Holiness and they also expect to have claims over the reincarnation over the Dalai Lama.

So we just want to make it very clear. If you go through this chapter, we have made it very clear, on the basis of history, on the basis of spiritual background, the Chinese government, particularly the Communist party has no basis, no creditability as far as recognizing the Dalai Lama is concerned and I have also said the Chinese government
claiming to recognize the next Dalai Lama is almost similar to Fidel Castro recognizing the Pope and expecting all the Catholics, to respect and accept the Pope. Fidel Castro passed away, but in the Indian context, may be Sitaram Yachury recognizing Shankar Acharya or Imam expecting all the muslims…Hindu to follow the Imam or Shakar Acharya, so there is no basis that the Chines government could make that claim.

And the third chapter is on the Tibetan plateau being the ‘water tower of Asia,’ how important it is, how vital it is. So supporting the Tibetan cause is not simply supporting Tibet and the Tibetan people, rather you are supporting whole of Asia because 1.4 billion people of Asia are dependent on the fresh water that flow from the glaciers of Tibet. And many scientists have concluded that 50% of glaciers have melted and disappeared. Now even the European geologist…. NASA have concluded that by 2100, remaining 75% of the present glaciers will melt and disappear. That will create havoc in the region, because China has 19% of the world population, but only 11 at most 12% of the fresh water, which means 7 to 8 percent, amount to 400 to 500 million Chinese are already facing the scarcity of fresh water.

Now the situation in Bangladesh is worse because lifeline of Bangladesh is Brahmaputra, which flows from Tibet. And in India the situation is worse. Pakistan is also worse. So you read in newspaper nowadays, the Indus and Sutlej River sharing between India and Pakistan, sometimes we Tibetans would like to say by the way that river starts from Tibet. So given the situation, no wonder Chinese are building dams after dams, so hence we know Chinese have already built one dam on Brahmaputra, they are building more, they are building several dams on all the major rivers, they are controlling the flow of rivers. Some people don’t understand that controlling the flow of river, it is a weapon in itself.
Number one: If you control the flow of river and it comes two weeks late for the people who depend on agriculture than it creates havoc for all the people who survive on agriculture, officially.

Number two: during wartime if they let the flow of river or the dam very rapidly, it might just wash out the entire highway and the railway line downstream and the people, the army on this [left] side. If the entire infrastructure is washed out, the supply chain will end. So in that sense, I think from the geo-strategic point of view also, the water tower, the rivers that flows from Tibet is vital.

So I think there are many reasons why Tibet is important. So at this symposium, we want to highlight the importance of Tibet, why people should know about Tibet, understand Tibet and support the cause of Tibet.

Finally, I just want to end by saying if you truly want to understand China, you have to understand the Tibetan narrative; if you don’t understand Tibetan narrative, if you don’t understand the Tibetan story, you will not understand what China is capable of. So when Tibet was occupied in 1950s, obviously we raised alarms, and at that time ‘Hindi China Bhai Bhai’ went along, we said this is not true, this will not happen, but it went along and around the world, all the countries and Asia also said- okay you got occupied, I am sorry but you are an exception. China wont treat us or do the same thing to us, but now you read the headlines; South China Sea, East China Sea, Scarborough Island, and all the neighboring countries saying ‘its happening to us,’ so what we have been saying is we told you, 50, 60 years ago, what happened to us could happen to you, and at that time you said ‘you are an exception, good luck to you, nothing doing,’…….. now its happening to you, now the discourse that you see in Taiwan and Hong Kong is,
‘we don’t want to be like Tibet, hence we want our democracy, we want our freedom in Taiwan and Hong Kong.’ In fact Tibet has become a reference point. Clearly Tibet is relevant even today, from geopolitical point of view, environmental point of view, from democracy point of view. So if you really want to understand China, you have to understand Tibet.

I was giving a talk in Mysore University, two students from Africa asked me this question. They said, “what do you make of Chinese investment in our continent?” I said did they build good roads?” They said “yes.” I said “did they build good entertainment centers,” they said “yes.” “Are they co-opting your leaders,” they said “yes.” They asked, “how did you know?” I said “that same template, blueprint was used in Tibet in 1950s, they are just duplicating or replicating it in your country.” Hence if you really want to know China, you have to know Tibet and also you have to know Dharamsala as well.

I was in Ottawa recently; I met this famous hacker or computer expert. He wants to have access to the server in Dharamsala, (CTA server) and I said “why?” Because its been concluded by a school in Toronto university that all the malware and trojans that the Chinese are sending to the big multi-billion dollar companies and Pentagon, including India actually originated in server in Dharamsala. First they sent all these malware and trojans to Dharamsala and they try to steal your things and they improvise, and then when it becomes really good, they send it around the world. So, you know, multi-billion dollar companies are spending million of dollars for cyber security and they are failing and now we want to prop up our security and they look around and they say we have to go to Dharamsala to understand Dharamsala server so that than they can defend themselves. So we don’t give our access to our servers that easily because we are also improving our own security. Hence even if you get some malware from Beijing, you should know that
it originated in Dharamsala. So Tibet is relevant, so if you want to understand China, including Chinese cyber security, you have to understand Dharamsala. Hence, Tibet is a vital issue as far as China is concerned.

So, I hope through this daylong symposium and we have great speakers lined up, you will understand Tibet little better and you will understand China little better. So with this I want to thank, obviously, the government of India and people of India, because no other government has supported Tibetan cause like India has. And no other people has support us and hosted us like the great people of this incredible India has. Thank you very much.

Dhordon Sharling

Thank you very much Dr. Lobsang Sangay. I think as Tibetans, we are really fortunate to be bestowed with the opportunity, time and again to listen to a great knowledgeable speaker like you. So thank you very much again. I would now like to invite Dr. Mani Shankar Aiyar, who is the Chief Guest for the event to deliver the keynote address.

Mani Shankar Aiyar

Thank you very much, I am still waiting for the Tibetan government-in-exile to honour me with a doctorate because until that happens, I won’t be a Doctor; I am just an ordinary Mr.

I am deeply honoured that the leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile Lobsang Sangay has kindly invited me to be with him on this occasion. I was under the impression that I would be sitting there and listening to what he has to say, so I am
a bit startled to find myself on the podium itself and invited also to speak on the occasion. But while I am startled, I am also deeply grateful. Thank you very much sir, it’s a very major honour.

What I would like to say is there are two fundamental facts about India’s relationship with Tibet and China that would inform the policy of virtually any Indian government. One of those is the India-China agreement on Tibet of 1954, which in fact, after having listened to Prime Minister Sangay seems to me to be in total conformity with the Middle Way because whatever is expressed by the Middle Way, which comes from a Tibetan mouth, is I think entirely, unless I am corrected, entirely compatible with the India-China agreement. And what we need to hope for is the conscientious implementation of the kind of autonomy that was envisaged in that India-China agreement of 1954.
And follow the principles that had been laid down there. I say this as an Indian; I don’t say this as a Tibetan. What I would say is that the Tibetans have put forward a proposal in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, that conforms so closely to what we put forward to the Chinese in the mid 50s, that is close on 60 to 70 years ago, that there is a certain harmony between what Jawaharlal Nehru thought was the right way forward in the middle of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and what the Dalai Lama is now prescribing for the 21\textsuperscript{st} century and in that sense the Middle Way document is something that needs to be very carefully studied and dealt within an objective manner rather then being summarily rejected or taken as the bottomline, with no further scope for negotiation.

Here I think what an Indian needs to recognize is that the Tibetans have stated that they are willing to negotiate these issues with the Chinese. They are willing to talk to them. There have been several rounds of talks that have already have taken place and there is no indication that this process will be interrupted. When I compare this to what we are doing with Pakistan, where we either don’t want to talk to them or when we do we disrupt the process. Then I think there is a great deal for us to learn from the Tibetan approach to China. Especially as the Tibetan approach to China, which is one of peaceful negotiation over differences, however sharp, is now similar after 1988 December when Rajiv Gandhi visited China, to the Indian approach towards China. It was not immediately then, but some six years later that it was agreed to set up a dialogue between the Indian National Security Advisor and his Chinese counterpart on how to find a solution to the border problem. And although 18 or 19 rounds have already been held and the progress is painfully slow and the outcome is really unknown and it would be easy to argue that any kind of solution would be unacceptable either to the Chinese or to the Indians or to both of us. The very fact that we are in conversation with the Chinese along with a document called ‘The Agreement on Peace and Tranquility’ at the border has
given a certain fundamental measure of stability to the India-China relationship which is reflected in the Tibet-China negotiations that have been going forward, again at the same snail’s pace and with persisting differences, certainly through the first two decades of this century. I think that puts us on a parallel track, that both Tibet and India know that China is not an easy pushover. But I think what we have done through these dialogues is to let the Chinese know that neither the Tibetans nor the Indians are an easy pushover and therefore empty military threat is not the way forward and worse still, inhumane military action is not the way forward. The way forward has to be through a process of somehow enabling the minds to meet. That is, at the present moment, holding. I see hope in this when I look back exactly one century, that after a period of unprecedented prosperity, when in 1909, a well known British intellectual called Norman Angell wrote a book in which he said war is not possible any more in Europe because our economy is so deeply interlinked that war to break out, everyone knows that its going to be a disaster and therefore knowing that it is a disaster there is no way in which sensible governments will knowingly allow themselves to go into the vortex of that particular abyss, but by the end of July 1914 it did become clear that although nobody wanted to cross the line and nobody wanted a situation to arise where there would be war and where the Kaiser Wilhelm on the 30th of July was attempting to urge the Austrians to hold back from Serbia, although it was Kaiser Wilhelm who had pushed the Austrians in the direction of invading Serbia, there was some things that couldn’t be reversed and one of them was descending to war. And the minute they descended into war it was simply…it turned out to be simply impossible for them through a process of negotiation to go back to the original position. And as it turned out World War I was a rehearsal for World War II and as a result of 50 years of continuous disaster through the first half of the 20th century, everything that Europe has achieved to run what it called a mission civilisatrice, the civilizing process of World War became a farce, people laughed, empires were folded
up and then American attempt to replace Pax Britannica with Pax Americana was also defeated largely in Vietnam and in Laos and in Cambodia and therefore we have not reached the stage where there is a much clearer perception than was the case when I was a school boy that war really is no way out and in these circumstances, His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s emphasis on non-violence is an emphasis I do not hear in Gandhi’s India. We showed the way. We were the ones who plucked the jewel in the crown from the crown. Gandhi did it in a non-violent way and the only one talking the language of the Mahatma is His Holiness the Dalai Lama and therefore the message that he is giving is not only a hint to the Chinese that let’s deal with these things non-violently, but is in fact a fundamental message to the world that war is not an option and so you either live with tension or through a process of dialogue you diffuse that tension and many in India advocate persistence and encouragement to tension in the India-China and the India-Pakistan relationship that is viable only so long as both sides perceive the alternative, the next step from the tension is to fall into the abyss. But if either side makes a mistake; a mistake of perception, a mistake of tactics, a mistake of strategy, then what rules out thereafter does not remain within one’s control. So therefore I regard the India-China Agreement of 1954 on Tibet as being compatible, entirely compatible, much in harmony with the Tibetan government-in-exile’s proposal of a Middle Way, which they have made to the Chinese and would hope that the dialogue between China and Tibet, to which we are not a party, will lead over a period of time to at least no deterioration in the status quo and with the grace of who ever is up there running our show to get to a reasonable settlement of the outstanding issues and there is simply no doubt that the outstanding issues are issues of humanitarian law, of the sovereignty and of autonomy and therefore, there will be some kind of solution founded over time and I would commend the Tibetan authorities under the leadership of His Holiness for the extraordinarily reasonable attitude that they have adopted in this regard.
The second bottomline as far as I am concerned is that in 1959, we opened our doors to you and I want to assure you that I just do not see us ever closing the doors upon you. You have been here now, some of you in Dharamsala; I met a grandchild that is of parents who had never seen Tibet, being born here. So it’s now getting on to three generations that you have been here. In all the 60 years or so that you have been here, I have never heard of any incident of a serious nature over of non-integration, or hostility between the Tibetan population resident in India and where we are now. There may be some dispute over the price of a momo somewhere but otherwise there is no trouble at all. It has been possible for us to demonstrate our millennial tradition of being able to coexist, but with celebrating that coexistence with people of different origins and that is why I feel that it’s not the world of the government of India, but a kind of civilizational tradition, which is the biggest guarantee that any fears that Tibetan community here might entertain about a possibility of either forcing you back into Tibet or asking you to leave the country is unrealistic. I was surprised on my visit to Dharamsala in April, my very first visit, to hear some voices expressing this suspicion, this apprehension, this fear and it seemed to me that it would be completely in contravention of our civilizational trends and our governmental position for any such disaster to overcome. The Tibetans living here and since now the Tibetans have spread beyond Dharamsala and Dehradun where I was brought up, to other parts of the country and I particularly meet up with some of them in Karnataka; it’s clear that there has been effective integration and this effective integration has, not in any sense, at least I hope it hasn’t, diminished the identity, the true identity of the Tibetan people, that the Tibetan people remain Tibetans, while they are here and that the Indians will not only respect and as I said, celebrate that specific Tibetan identity and if we really are to sustain our claim to being a democracy, then it is important that meetings like this take place. I mean the amount of information that appears to have been packed into the few pages of this booklet that we have just
released is truly an educational process. You know one picks up bits and pieces of information over time and somewhere in the back of my mind it gets integrated, but then demonetization comes and Tibet gets forgotten, so it’s so useful to have a booklet, just a little over a hundred pages in which everything you wanted to know about Tibet, but were afraid to ask, is comprehensively made available to you. And it’s made available in English for us, in Tibetan for the Tibetan community and in Chinese for the Chinese and I certainly would hope that your book will be a best seller in China. I have a little doubt that it will be a best seller in the Tibetan version and that there will be buyers for it in the English version, but where the message has to reach is really Beijing and as you have taken the trouble to do it, you have demonstrated that you are capable of being interlocutors with Chinese in their language and I am certain they can’t reciprocate it. They won’t be interlocutors with you in the Tibetan language but the book has come out in these three language versions is a tribute to what is happening and thank you for also bringing it in English, and one day one hopes in Hindi or Tamil or some other language. I would particularly urge that Kannada be taken up because there are such a large number of Tibetans living in Karnataka, that we need to repeatedly refresh our memories as far as people of my generation are concerned and as far as people who are now coming into the adulthood are concerned. I think this booklet would be a very useful introduction to what is after all a very complicated subject about a region that almost none of us has ever visited. I mean I would love to go to Tibet, but I am not sure when and after this meeting I am not sure if it will ever happen, but I do believe that the Chinese have the right to take this Piker’s Hall and make whatever point they wish to and this endorses the right of the Tibetan government to have this what during Vietnam war in America used to be called ‘Teach ins.’ I look upon this as a ‘Teach ins; I look upon my own presence as a student in this ‘Teach ins; I have nothing very constructive or new to offer but I am very very honored that the Tibetan community in
Delhi, particularly Dhardon keeps regularly in touch with me. I am flattered, yes, much more than that touched that the Tibetan community thinks of me as a friend and invites me frequently to their functions. I am not a very spiritual man myself, but on political and cultural issues, I think there can be a link, there can be a continued conversation and I hope a constructive conversation. I can’t claim to be the kind of activist that Jaya is. Jaya is on the streets and I am on the platforms and I think we can complement each other. We were in college together many many decades ago. And so I am glad to see that a complementarity has been established then and continues now and whatever our other political differences, I think on the issue of Tibet there is fair measure of concurrence between her point of view and mine. If it were exactly the same then I’d start wondering about our democracy; a democracy necessarily involves differences but differences that should not translate into non-communication and that was why I was very unhappy, I am very unhappy with our Pakistan policy because its based on non-communication. And I used to be unhappy with our China policy because there was no communication till about 1988 and after that although it is taking ages and it’s easier to be a pessimist and than an optimist, the fact that we are in dialogue with China gives it a measure of stability, so there are in fact twin tracts: there is the Tibet-China dialogue, which is between Tibet and China and there is the India-China dialogue, which is between the India and China and although there are parallel tracks not dealing with the same subject, at the end of the day, as some kind of conclusion or consensus is reached, then the one track will be reinforcing the other and that I think, in itself justifies the invitation that you have kindly given me and the great honor that I feel that having accepted it, being here during the rest of the day. Of course all of us are going to get much further enlightened.

Thank you very much and long live Tibetan autonomy.
Thank you very much Mr. Mani Shankar Aiyar for sharing your deep knowledge about issues informing the triad relationship between Tibet, India and China. We are really time and again charmed by your sharp fluency on all matters affecting global political affairs. Thank you once again. It’s an honour for us to have you here amidst us and I really think there will be a long-standing professional equation and friendship with you and I think we only stand to benefit from that. Now we would like to invite Ms. Jaya Jaitly Ji. As I said in my introduction, a very dear friend of Tibet, who stood by us through highs and lows of life. We really owe a debt of gratitude to you for being one of our strongest friend, an all-weather-friendly friend. Ms. Jaya Jaitly I would like to invite you and say a few words about the occasion.

Dr. Sangay, friends from Tibet, Indians, all those on the platform, especially Mani, my old friend who has revealed that we were in college more or less the same time and you can see why he is on the platform and I am still on the streets. He is far more erudite and articulate and obviously deserves to be on platforms. I, yes, I have remained as an activist and yes, a very old friend, old both in age and in time. I will go back a little bit to this activism, just to remember because we were in the same hall as when George Fernandes whom although, again, Mani and George Sahib have been an opposite sides in parliament. I think they have a good friendship and respect for each other. George sahib was the one who threw me into the ocean of activism and politics, otherwise I was just a government servant’s wife, who would like handicrafts and creative things, but then when you are concerned about the world around you, you have to become an activist.
It’s easy to sit at home and comment from your chairs. It was in April ’89, George sahib had gone for a conference abroad which was organized by Petra Kelly and Gurt Bestian, both of course who are no longer alive. They held this conference on Tibet in Europe and I remember George sahib coming back in April and saying we are going to organize international conference on Tibet. Now do it. I had never organized any conference before and there was me planning; from the safety pins that would go on the badges to international visitors coming, sending out the invitations, arranging for them and arranging this hall and we invited everybody from every side of the political spectrum, including Gyani Zail Singh, and I remember the conference, the morning it was to start, we were wondering whether there would be any publicity and at that time His Holiness was pretty isolated in the west and it was only fierce activist like Petra Kelly and others who would ever speak up for him and organize a conference, but they
were considered the fringe of mainstream politics. And that morning, the previous night, we’d wondered whether anyone would get to know what we were doing and the next morning, the headlines in the newspaper was “Government ask Gyani Zail Singh not to attend the conference.” So that was a big thrill for us, because that made news and of course Gyani Zail Singh came and so all the media came. Since the media likes controversy and Gyani Zail Singh came and he said “people’s right and human rights go above any kind of rights” and it was very important for us. We had leaders from Nepal, all over Europe and it was a fantastic conference where George Sahib particularly felt that after Jaya Prakash Narayan support of the Tibetan cause, India has also gone to sleep; we had gone through 1962, we had gone through all kind of things and India was not doing what it should, but of course from then till now, we are here with open arms as Mani said there is no question of ever any hostility between us or any lack of warmth between us and while we have adopted you as our full-time brothers and sisters, I still have that little feeling inside that I wish you could go back to your own country in freedom. So, I can’t say India is open to you forever, I wish your own country were open to you better then India has been open to you. Now why has India been quite because, I think, and a great salute to the Tibetan community and its leadership, and particularly His Holiness that as you have truly, again as Mani referred to, followed the path of non-violence. But then our talks today in the later part of the day is going to be about the future. And when you look at everything that’s happening in the world, who are the people being paid attention to? The violence in Syria, the violence between Palestine and Israel, the violence everywhere in the world, whether it’s Ukraine or anywhere else, people who are violent are noticed and heard and the fact that His Holiness’ leadership has seen that there has been no violence at all is the biggest honor that he and the Tibetan people could give to Gandhi ji and his policy of non-violence. I think Indians, and I have said this very often from your platforms,
Indians have not honoured it as well as you have, but when is the world going to take the note that nonviolence is what really matters. 700,000 people killed in Syrian war, whether Allepo is free or under control is still not known. It depends upon each person’s story. So here we are with this book telling the Tibetan story. But this story is something I don’t really need to read this book because I have heard this many many times. Everywhere we are on a platform together; it’s the same things. Right from 1989 and the conference here, scholars have said all the same thing. Perhaps now the emphasis is more on the water and ecology, because the worry of water is now looming in front of every one in this world. People are realizing that if the Chinese block the Bharmaputra, what will Assam and neighbouring North Eastern states do? If India threatens Pakistan by blocking the waters of Indus, what will Pakistan, the people and humanity do? So, water has become such an important thing, it makes one realize if this is why, China doesn’t really care about people. It cares about power, dominance through, yes, land, water, trade and everything else. But when we look at the future, what I want to hear discuss later today is, now we have a new person becoming the most powerful leader of the free world, Donald Trump. What is his deal going to be with India? Tibet, while it was in isolation from people’s minds politically, it is still part of the globalized world, where people are playing chess and trying to see where can they get their king or queen going forward. How do they push something aside and push their interest forward first. What will happen in this China, India, new America Donald Trump axis? Who will nod to who, who will support who? Or will everyone stick to their positions of self-interest and what happens to Tibet in that? These are issues, I think, that need to be discussed, because the biggest leaders of the non-free world is not only not letting their people to be free, they are not only not letting the Tibetans be free, they are dictating to us what we should do, who we should invite to the Rashtrapati Bhawan. So why should India listen to the leader of the largest un-
free country. Can we not say Tibet is not a part of China? So please don’t tell us what to do with the Tibetans. Could we not give this as an answer to the Chinese protest about His Holiness going to the Rashtrapati Bhawan. They call Rasrapati Bhavan the Presidential palace. May be they think in terms of palaces and kingdoms but India is a democracy where people are free and the government as well as the President of India is free to call whomever he wants. Of course India gives a standard reply that it was not a political programme, he was not invited as a political person, he is a revered political leader, but for the Chinese, everything is political. They are selling you a little plastic Ganesha for Ganeshchaturthi and it is political; if His Holiness goes to Arunachal, it is political; when Dr. Manmohan Singh was planning to go to Arunachal, they objected even then. So, who are they to object to what we do in our own country and here I want to slot this whole thought into what is going to happen between the leaders of the biggest democratic country in the free world as they call themselves and the biggest leader of the un-free world and India and Tibet will certainly have to look at their positions in this and join forces with those who believe in that freedom and democracy. So there again I would like to say that from here and from this platform we should all say ‘Tibet is not a part of China and therefor we will support Tibet in all its aspirations.’ Thank you.

Dhardon Sharling

Thank you very much Jaya Ji for your heart-warming message. It’s always a pleasure listening to you and two of the important things you raised were: Tibet in the Trump era and also about India’s role. I just wanted to inform the audience in here that, yesterday our political leader, Dr. Lobsang Sangay spoke to the press in the lead up to today’s crucial book release and Reuters published a story last night and its titled
‘Tibetan leader urges Trump to confront China on rights.’ And Tribune published a story early this morning at 1 a.m.; ‘Prime Minister-in-exile appeals to Modi to raise Tibet issue.’ One of the interesting things I heard were the quotes that were used by our political leader, Dr. Lobsang Sangay who said- “India is already doing the most for the Tibetan people, but we request the Indian government to speak quite strongly on the issue of Tibet because India has the legitimacy, the privilege, the ability to really speak on the issue because the largest number of Tibetans in exile are in India.” So I think that pretty much sums up what both Mr. Mani and Ms. Jaya were talking about, what India means to us and as Mani ji said the door is always open. I would always say the Tibetan soul survive and thrives on the Indian soil. So if there is no Indian soil for us, God knows what would happen to the Tibetan soul and spirit and that’s what India mean to us and I don’t think words alone can express that. Thank you both Mr. Mani ji and Ms. Jaya ji.
I have the privilege of thanking all the distinguished guests, media and friends for coming to the launch of the book, ‘Tibet is not a Part of China, but the Middle Way Approach Remains a Viable Solution.’ First of all I would like to thank Dr. Lobsang Sangay, our political leader for coming here at this book launch of the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR), despite his busy schedule. I would like to thank Mr. Mani Shankar Aiyar and Jayaji for accepting our request to be the chief guests of the book launch. We have all been enlightened by Mr. Aiyar’s views on Tibet and India’s position when India and China signed an agreement on Tibet in 1954.

Jaya ji is a very old friend of the Tibetans. Her reference to the international conference on Tibet which was organized by Mr. George Fernandes in 1989 is still fresh in my mind. This is the same venue where that conference took place. At that time I was a young
Tibetan official assisting in the organizing of the conference. India’s former President Giani Zail Singh was invited as the chief guest and when the meeting was about to start, George Saheb received a call from Giani Zail Singh’s office saying that he was indisposed. However, after 15 minutes, Giani ji came and spoke to the international delegates at the conference. I have fond memories of how Jaya ji and George Saheb worked tirelessly for the Tibetan cause for the past many years. They also organized the first ‘World Parliamentarians’ Convention on Tibet’ in Delhi which led to many similar conferences in different parts of the world. Currently we have Parliamentary Groups for Tibet in numerous countries around the world. Many of the international Tibet initiatives that existed today have begun from India and we remain grateful to India and its leaders.

Now I would like to request Dr. Lobsang Sangay to present a souvenir to Mr. Mani Shanker Aiyar ji and Jaya ji on behalf of the Department of Information and International Relations in appreciation for being the chief guests for our event today.

I would also like to thank all the distinguished guests, Tibetan scholars from Jawaharlal Nehru University and Delhi University and the media for joining us in this occasion.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank and acknowledge all those involved in bringing about this book, ‘Tibet is not a Part of China, but the Middle Way Approach Remains a Viable Solution.’ This book comes in three versions: Tibetan, English and Chinese. The original Tibetan version was written and edited by Mr. Kunga Tashi, Chinese Liaison Officer at the Office of Tibet, Washington D.C, Mr. Sonam Dorjee, former Head of China Desk of DIIR, Mr. Tenzin Dedhen, Head of China Desk and Mr. Ngawang Thogmed, Editor of Sheja.
The English version was translated and edited by Mr. Dhondup Gyalpo, Secretary, Office of Tibet, Taiwan, Mr. Tenpa Gyaltsen, Director, Environment and Development Desk at the Tibet Policy Institute, Mr. Sherab Woeser and Mr. Tenzin Dasel from the Tibet Policy Institute.

The Chinese version was translated and edited by Mr. Dawa Tsering, Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in Taiwan, Mr. Sonam Dorjee, Mr Kunga Tashi and Mr. Tenzin Dedhen. Mr. Thubten Samphel, Director, the Tibet Policy Institute and Mr. Tashi Dhondup, former staff of DIIR and now a volunteer at the Tibet Corps edited the final version.

All the writers, translators and editors spent countless hours in producing the finished version of this book. I once again thank you all for making the launch of this book possible.

I also invite you all to the symposium on “Tibet’s Past, Present and Future; and What is the Way Forward” after this session.

Thank you very much.
PLENARY ONE

PAST: THE HISTORICAL STATUS OF TIBET AND CHINA

– Relations between independent Tibet and India (1947-1962)
CLAUDE ARPI, Historian and Tibetologist

– Current developments in Tibet and China – its implications for India
JAYADEVA RANADE, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy

– Moderator, Sonam Norbu Dagpo, International Secretary, DIIR
Sonam Norbu Dagpo

The symposium is on ‘Tibet Past, Present and Future – What is the Way Forward?’ So we are going to have a session on the historical status of Tibet and China. We are all aware that His Holiness the Dalai Lama always say that when China says Tibet was always a part of China, so that is Chinese position but at the same time as we argued this morning Tibet was an independent country historically and His Holiness has also said that we cannot distort history and that the historical truth of Tibet can be left to the historians to find out. We cannot bring back history and as for the future, we are not seeking independence for the Tibetan people.

Today the topic is historical status of Tibet and China and we have two very distinguished panelists - Mr Claude Arpi and Mr. Jayadeva Ranade. First of all I would like to ask Claude Arpi, a very old friend and a Tibetologist to speak on the relation between independent Tibet and China from 1947 to 1962. Now I would like to share you a brief bio of Claude Apri.

Claude Arpi is an Overseas Citizen of India born in 1949 in Angoulême, France. For the past 42 years he has settled in South India. He is the author of the following books-The Fate of Tibet, Tibet, le pays sacrifié, & Dark Shall be the Night: The Karma of Tibet, Born in Sin the Panchsheel Agreement and Glimpses on the History of Tibet.

He has been regularly writing on Tibet, China, India, border and military issues and Indo-French relations for Rediff.com, DNA, The Pioneer, The Statesman, Asian Age, Geopolitics, The Diplomatist, etc.

He is a member of the Editorial Board of the Indian Defence Review to which he regularly contributes.
So as I said, he is a distinguished Tibetologist and an old friend of the Tibet and he will give you a rare insight on relations between independent Tibet and China from 1947 to 1962.

First of all, I would like to thank the Tibetan government-in-exile for inviting me to speak at this Conference “Tibet’s Past, Present and Future- What is the Way Forward?”

My task is relatively easy because I am going to speak about the past; ‘the way forward’, the theme of this conference is a bit trickier. I am therefore happy to stick myself to the past.
I would like to show you a picture which was part of an exhibition that I prepared in collaboration with the CTA (it was later published as a book titled *Glimpses on the History of Tibet*).

This panel is one of the 25 panels of the exhibition; it shows “what is an independent nation.”

Before 1950, Tibet had its own currency, its own flag, its own stamps, its own medals and its own passport and perhaps more importantly, Tibet had its own Ministry of External Affairs, then called ‘Foreign Bureau.’ It was this Bureau which dealt directly the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and this, till the mid-1950s.

In September 1989, China’s State Council published a White Paper (WP) “On the Ownership of Tibet.” I still remember that, at that time, Sonam Dagpo la’s colleague, Tenzin P. Atisha gave a detailed rebuttal to the Chinese arguments.

*(Please see image on page 37)*

The WP spoke of ‘an alliance between two nations’: “In Lhasa, the statue of the Tang Princess Wen Cheng, who married the Tubo [Tibet] Tsampo, King of Tibet, in 641, is still enshrined and worshiped in the Potala Palace. The Tang-Tubo Alliance Monument marking the meeting for this purpose between Tang and Tubo erected in 823 still stands in the square in front of the Jokhang Monastery.”

When the WP mentioned the relations between Tang dynasty of China and Tibet, it spoke of an ‘alliance.’
Just now the Sikyong mentioned the stone pillar (or doring) in front of the Central Cathedral (Tsuglagkhang) in Lhasa. What is written on this pillar?

It states: “Tibet and China should abide by the frontier of which they are now in occupation. Between the two countries no smoke, no dust, shall be seen. There should be no alarm and the very word enemy should not be spoken. The solemn agreement has been established at the great epoch when Tibetans should be in the land of Tibet and Chinese in the land of China.” This was in 821 AD. This pillar still exists today. A few years ago, the Chinese government, which wants to attract millions of the Chinese tourists to Tibet, renovated the doring. It is there for everyone to see.

The main argument in the Chinese WP is the following: since the Yuan dynasty, the Tibetan empire has been incorporated in the Chinese Empire; therefore whatever has been part of the Yuan Empire in the past belongs to China today. Beijing
Tibet’s Past, Present and Future–What is the Way Forward?

forgets to mention that the Yuan Empire was not Chinese but Mongol. The WP says: “In the mid-13th century, Tibet was officially incorporated into the territory of China’s Yuan Dynasty. Since then, although China experienced several dynastic changes, Tibet has remained under the jurisdiction of the central government of China.”

Today, China goes one step further from its ‘1989 ownership’; the propaganda says that from ‘immemorial time’ Tibet has been part of China. It is obviously untrue.

Another argument is used: in the past, the Chinese emperor gave titles and awards to some Tibetan lamas and rulers; this is true, but it has nothing to do with ‘ownership.’

Simply because a State gives a title does not make the recipient of the title or award, a citizen of this State and even less the entire State does not come under the sovereignty of the State which has given the ‘title.’ The fact that Nelson Mandela received the Bharat Ratna award, does not imply that South Africa is ‘owned’ by India. This is a ridiculously childish argument.

AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES
From the 17th century onwards, the Tibetan State had a series of treaties with its neighbours.
I list here a few of them:
  • Treaty between Tibet and Bashahr – 1681
  • Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet – 1684

1 For the text of the treaties, see: http://www.claudearpi.net/treaties-with-tibet
2 It starts thus: “The Drukpa (red sect) Omniscient Lama, named Mee-pham-wang-po, who in his for-
Agreement between Nepal and Tibet -1788
Agreement between Ladakh and Tibet – 1842
Agreement between Tibet and Kashmir – 1852
Treaty between Tibet and Nepal – 1856
The Convention of Chefoo – 1876
Convention relating to Burmah and Thibet – 1886

The first agreement specifically intended to regulate the relations between British India and Tibet was signed in 1890, it was called: “Convention between Great Britain and China.”

mer incarnations had always been the patron Lama of the kings of Ladak(h) from generation to generation, was sent from Lhasa to Tashi-gang, to arrange the conditions.”
3 It states that “Nepal agreed to withdraw from the border area of Tibet that it had seized during the war and to recognize the validity of the former boundary (though it retained the right to administer half of the town of Kuti granted to Raja Pratap Malla of Kathmandu 140 years earlier).”
4 Shri Khalsaji Apsarani Shri Maharajali; Lhasa representative Kalon Surkhang investigator Dapon Peshi, commander of forces; Balana, the representative of Gulam Kahandin; and the interpreter Amir Shah, have written this letter after sitting together.
5 This is dated the third day of the month of the Water Bull Year (apparently 1852). The Ladakhis refusing to supply the Tibetan Government trader Kelsang Gyurme with the usual transport animals on account of the decreased tea trade.
6 It starts thus: “Treaty of Peace, consisting of ten Articles, between the States of Gurkha and Tibet (Bhote), settled and concluded by us, the Chief Sardars, Bharadars, and Lamas of both Governments, whose signatures and seals are attached below…”
7 An extract: “Her Majesty’s Government having it in contemplation to send a mission of exploration next year, by way of Peking, through Kansuh and Kokonor, or by way of Szechuen to Thibet, and thence to India, the Tsungli Yamen, having due regard to the circumstances…”
8 It says: “Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances, by the Chinese Government, has shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Thibet provided for in the separate article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission forthwith…”
It starts with: “Whereas Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding.”

Three years later, Trade Regulations were agreed upon between Tibet and the British India. The treaty\(^9\) dealing with Sikkim, was signed in Darjeeling on December 5, 1893.

**A CONSTITUTIONAL FICTION**

Unfortunately, Tibet was not informed about it as it had been negotiated directly between China and British India. The British, being good politicians realized immediately that to sign an agreement without the participation of the Tibetans would not work. As a result, the Viceroy tried to contact Lhasa, but as no answer from the Dalai Lama’s government was forthcoming, Curzon send a Mission to Lhasa to find out the reality on the ground.

In a note to London, Lord Curzon asserted: “In our view, the attempt to come to terms with Tibet through the agency of China has invariably proved, a failure in the past, because of the intervention of this third party between Tibet and ourselves. We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a political affectation which has been maintained because of its convenience to both parties.”

The Viceroy concluded his note: “In our view, any country or Government, or Empire has a right to protect its own interests and if those interests are seriously imperiled, as

\(^9\) Regulations regarding Trade, Communication, and Pasturage, to be appended to the Convention between Great Britain and China of March 17, 1890, relative to Sikkim and Tibet.
we hold ours to be in Tibet, we hold that the first law of national existence, which is self-preservation, compels us to take such steps as will avert these dangers and place our security upon an assured and impregnable footing.”

It is how Curzon decided to send a young colonel (later Sir Francis Younghusband) to Tibet. Soon after, the Tibetan Army was smashed in Tuna, north of the Sikkim border and ultimately Younghusband and his men entered Lhasa in July of 1904.

The first Convention between a Western power, British India and the Tibetan Government was signed; it was the Lhasa Convention of 1904. During the talks in Lhasa, the Chinese were nowhere to be seen, they did not participate, though some paintings published in *Illustration* magazine showed Chinese representatives attending the formal signature ceremony. They were mere witnesses. A few months later, China started protesting.

**THE PETTY TREATY GAME**

One often speaks of the Great Game, but the British started playing a Petty Game, signing agreements with China and Russia without referring to the aggrieved party, in this case, Tibet.

To balance the 1904 Convention, London entered into an agreement with China in 1906, Tibet was not even informed; signed in Peking on April 27 1906, it is known as the “Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet.” It says: “the Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.”
A year later, the Crown took care of the Russian interests; “The Convention between Great Britain and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet” was signed in St. Petersburg on August 31, 1907. The purpose of the Agreement was to “to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia.” Regarding Tibet, it was agreed that the British Government and Russia would recognize “the suzerain rights of China in Thibet.” Both parties engaged “to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration.” This too didn’t work; Tibet was for all purpose independent.

In 1908, Lord Minto, the new Viceroy realized this and called Chinese and Tibetan delegates to Calcutta. While the Chinese and the Indian plenipotentiaries were the full-fledged representatives, the Tibetan was just a ‘delegate.’ However for the first time since 1904, the Tibetans were represented.

It resulted in an “Agreement between Great Britain, China on Tibet amending Trade Regulations in Tibet of December 5, 1893”; it was signed in Calcutta on April 20, 1908. It acknowledged: “the High Authorities of Tibet have named as their fully authorised representative to act under the directions of Chang Tachen [Chinese representative] and take part in the negotiations, the Tsarong Shape, Wang Chuk [Wangchuk] Gyalpo.”

British soon realized that too would not be sustainable as Tibet was running its own affairs and there was no Chinese troops in Tibet.

In the 19th century, an Amban, an ambassador/representative of the Manchu Court, had been from time to time posted in Lhasa. Today, China retrospectively says that it was not an Ambassador and it was a Governor ordering the Tibetans around, but it was not
the fact. It had become clear to the British that the three parties should sit together as equal to sort out the issue; it is what they did for several months in Simla in the Winter of 1913.

THE SIMLA CONVENTION
The tripartite talks resulted in the Simla Convention though initialed by Ivan Chen, the Chinese representative, it was not later ratified by China. But in the process, the border between the North East Frontier agency (NEFA)\(^\text{10}\), and Tibet was defined. This is the famous McMahon Line.

The British negotiator was Sir McMahon, the then Foreign Secretary; the Tibetan plenipotentiary was Lochen Shatra, the Tibetan Prime Minister. China was not involved in defining the border between India and Tibet, simply because China was nowhere near the NEFA at that time;

The talks in Simla eventually failed over a disagreement between China and Tibet on the Sino-Tibet border, China had nothing to say about the Indo-Tibet border.

1943: CLARIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF TIBET
Let us jump to 1943, Dr. T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister of China asked the British, what the British Crown’s legal view on Tibet was. This forced the British to clarify their position; London then sent a long note to Dr Soong stating: “Since the Chinese Revolution of 1911, when Chinese forces were withdrawn from Tibet, Tibet has enjoyed de facto independence. She has ever since regarded herself as in practice completely autonomous and has opposed Chinese attempts to reassert control.”

\(^{10}\) Today Arunachal Pradesh.
It continues: “Since 1911, repeated attempts have been made to bring about an accord between China and Tibet. It seemed likely that agreement could be found on the basis that Tibet should be autonomous under the nominal suzerainty of China, and this was the basis of the draft tripartite (Chinese-Tibetan-British) convention of 1914 which was initialled by the Chinese representative but was not ratified by the Chinese Government.”
This was the British position in 1943.

On December 14, 1949, during a debate in the Parliament, the British Government, when asked to clarify again its views on Tibet, it reiterated the same position.

A member asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs “if he will publish in the Official Report [of the house] the terms of the Letter and the accompanying Memorandum, sent in 1943 by His Majesty’s Government to the Chinese Government on the subject of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet”, the Secretary of State replied in the affirmative. It was therefore the official position of the British Government two months after the Communist Party had taken over China.

The next archival image shows a note from the High Commissioner in Delhi who informs London that he passed the same note to K.P.S. Menon, the Foreign Secretary Menon thought that “such publicity is good.”

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11 Grandfather of the former National Security Advisor and Foreign Secretary, Shivshankar Menon.
1947: INDIA BECOMES INDEPENDENT

On August 15, 1947, India became independent

A month before the transfer of power, the Government of India sent a cable to London noting that “the Government of India would be glad to have an assurance that it is the intention of the Government of Tibet to continue relation on the existing basis until new agreement is reached on matters that either party may wish to take up.”

Very foolishly or probably ignorant of international conventions, Lhasa refused to answer this communication for nearly one year - between July 1947 and June 13, 1948 – and this despite the fact that Hugh Richardson, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, tried hard to convince the Tibetan government of the necessity to give a proper answer.

Finally after 11 months, Lhasa acknowledged the continuation of the treaties between India and Tibet, particularly the 1914 Simla Convention and the McMahon Line. Lhasa was living in their own world and very few in Tibet realized the implications of not having a treaty relation with India; it made Nehru very upset and we can understand why.

A year after Lhasa had agreed to its treaty relation with India, Mao Zedong came in power in China (October 1, 1949); two months later, on December 31, 1949, Nehru decided to hurriedly recognize Communist China against the advice of Sardar Patel.

The next day, Xinhua announced that Communist China’s objectives for the Year 1950 was the ‘Liberation’ of Tibet, Formosa and the Hainan Island.
In India, people were wondering what this ‘liberation’ was about; Prime Minister Nehru even said in the Parliament that he couldn’t understand from what Tibet needed to be liberated.

But for Mao Zedong, the Liberation was a clear concept: it needed to be done for geographic and strategic reasons; the Tibetan plateau dominated South Asia and the takeover of Tibet was a first step to dominate India.

The ‘Liberation’ started in October 1950 when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the river Upper Yangtze (Drichu) river and took over the entire Kham province.

From the first start, Mao Zedong planned the military operations in two phases: first the PLA entered Chamdo, in the Eastern Kham and in a second stage, the PLA would walk to Lhasa. Between the two, the Communists needed an agreement of the Tibetans as they wanted the ‘Liberation’ to be ‘peaceful.’

THE 17-POINT AGREEMENT

The Governor of Chamdo, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, who had been made prisoner of war by the PLA, was taken to Beijing to head the Tibetan delegation.

It was probably the first time in the history that a prisoner of war became the head of the negotiating delegation. The Tibetan delegates had hardly any contact with

12 Mao Zedong cabled the CPC Southwest and Northwest Bureaus on August 23: “If our army can capture Chamdo in October, this will urge the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing for negotiation for peaceful settlement.” (CPC Chronicles on Tibet 1949-1966, P.13). The fighting in Chamdo was aimed at winning the possibility for the peaceful negotiation for the settlement of the Tibetan issue, admitted the Communists.
Yatung, which was the temporary seat of the Tibetan Government, as His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and his government had taken refuge in the Chumbi Valley, near Sikkim.

In Beijing, Ngabo and his colleagues signed the 17 Point Agreement ‘under duress’ on May 23, 1951.

China however never implemented the letter and spirit of the Agreement.

During the first week of September 1951, the PLA entered Lhasa; it marked the beginning of the occupation of Tibet.

THE INDIAN SIDE

Within the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi, there were many dissenting voices realizing that if India loses Tibet, it will lose a peaceful border.

Indeed, the occupation of Tibet had grave implications not only for the Tibetans, but for India too, in particular for the border in NEFA, i.e. the McMahon Line, as well as the border in today’s Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, and Ladakh (which includes the Aksai Chin).

Those who realized the danger for India were Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth, Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer in Sikkim dealing with Tibet, Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim, and Sumul Sinha, the head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa.

13 Known as the Central sector.
14 Known as the Western sector of the border.
Let us not forget that from 1947 to 1952, India had a full-fledged mission in Lhasa, Tibet. India considered for all purposes, Tibet as an independent State and hundreds of cables, telegrams and dispatches, were exchanged between Lhasa, Gangtok (Office of the the Political Officer) and the Ministry in Delhi. Till mid-1952, the correspondence regarding Tibetan affairs was not routed via the Indian Embassy in Beijing; the Ambassador was not in the picture. Sumul Sinha, the Consul General in Lhasa believed that ‘India should not drop Tibet, because it would have implications for India.’ Of course, he knew that it would have consequences for Tibet too.

Today the Government of India is still very jealous of its historical records which have never been declassified. I am hopeful that one day one will be able to access these documents; it will show that Tibet was independent till 1952.

When one looks at the yearly reports published the Ministry of External Affairs from 1947 to 1951; Lhasa had a full-fledged mission status like Paris, Geneva or Cairo. Only when it became a Consulate General, it had to depend on the Beijing embassy.

K.M. Panikkar, the Indian ambassador was enamoured of China, so much so that Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai called Panikkar the ‘Ambassador of China.’

The tragedy was that he had direct access with Nehru; it happened again in 1962, one Corps Commander could directly write to the Prime Minister with all the tragic consequences that we know. In both cases, the entire hierarchy was over-passed.

Bajpai strongly disapproved the policies and actions of Panikkar; further as I mentioned in my book *The Karma of Tibet*, Sardar Patel who shared visews similar
to Bajai and Dayal, passed away on December 15, 1950, just two months after the fall of Chamdo. In my *Karma of Tibet*, I argued that if Sardar Patel had lived longer, the fate of Tibet would have perhaps been different. But history cannot be replayed.

On November 7, 1950, the then Deputy Prime Minister wrote to the Prime Minister, asking for a Cabinet meeting to discuss Tibet. In his prophetic letter, Patel listed several strategic implications for India, would Delhi decide to abandon Tibet. Patel’s letter was probably drafted by Bajpai who was deeply upset by the turn of events.

Another action of Panikkar had disastrous consequences. He changed the word ‘suzerainty’ into ‘sovereignty’ in a note to the Communist regime in August 1950; he was communicating India’s position on Tibet to Beijing. I personally believe that he did it on purpose; for two months, Panikkar refused to rectify his ‘mistake’; it had a tremendous impact for the Independence of Tibet. China became the ‘sovereign’ of Tibet.

Year 1952 was a turning point, but the last nail in the coffin was planted in 1954 with the signature of the Panchsheel Agreement. In my book *Born in Sin*, I used the description of Acharya J.B. Kirpalani in the Parliament to describe the accord. I can say today that when I wrote this book, more than ten years ago, I did not realized, how much the Agreement was ‘born in sin.’

Despite the nice preamble, the five principles of peaceful co-existence had nothing to do with the content of the Agreement.

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15 The Agreement dealt mainly with Trade and Pilgrimage between Tibet and India.
THE LOST HIMALAYAN CONNECTION

Today, if you look at centuries of relations between Tibet and India, you can see that the entire Himalayan belt: Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, what is today Uttarakhand has been economically and culturally closely connected with Tibet.

His Holiness often speaks of the Nalanda Tradition which has come to Tibet through these passes, but this is not all. If you go to Kumaon, Garhwal, Kinnaur, or Ladakh, you will discover that these areas had flourishing trade relations with Tibet, which were destroyed by the Panchsheel Agreement, one reason is that it formalized something which had been natural and also because the Indo-Tibet relations had become the Sino-Indian relations.

Like for the 17-Point Agreement with Tibet, the Panchsheel Agreement was never implemented by China. In fact, soon after the signature, the Communists started making it more and more difficult for the Indian traders to visit Tibet and the PLA begun intruding on India’s territory.

India had three trade agencies: one in Yatung, one in Gyantse and one in Gartok (in Ngari province of Western Tibet). While Ngari mainly dealt with Uttarakhand passes such as Mani, Niti, Lipulekh, Dharma and Shipki-la in Himachal Pradesh, the trade to Yatung and Gyantse transited via the Chumbi Valley (the two passes leading to India were Jelep-la and Nathu-la).

For ages, the entire Himalayan belt bloomed due of its relation with Tibet and progressively between 1954 and 1962, this relation started dying. The Chinese begun asking people to have duly-stamped visas; they were questioned where they were
going; even the Indian Trade Agents who had a diplomatic status were frisked by the PLA before entering the trade agencies.

The last Consulate General in Lhasa between 1961 to 1962, Ambassador Arvind Dev once told me that while posted for fifteen months in Lhasa, he was not allowed by Chinese authorities to come out of the compound of Dekyila, where the Consulate was located. Can you imagine what would happen if the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi would not be allowed to come out of his embassy and to visit any places in India? This brings another point, can one trust China? It is true that the 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013 border agreements make the relations between Indian and China less chaotic. It is also true that nobody has been killed on the Indo-Tibet border unlike on the borders with Pakistan. But while China speaks about “One Belt and One Road,” the entire Himalaya with its traditional trading routes, remains hermatically closed. Is China today ready to re-open these roads?

SOME CONCLUSIONS
Before concluding, I would like to read from the 1952 annual report from the Indian Mission, A.K. Sen had then just taken over from Sinha. He wrote, “The year 1952 follow a trail of Chinese consolidation in (Tibet: indegenious, relentless and determined.) General Jang Ji Wu [Zhang Jingwu], the representative of the Central Committee of the People’s Government of China applied himself as the trade bearer to affect the implementation of the Sino Tibetan Agreement after he arrived in Lhasa towards the third quarter of 1951. Following the official notification in January 1952 with the Tibetan Government accepting the agreement because we forget that at that time it was signed under duress in Bejing but it was later on accepted by the Tsongdue-the General Assembly. So I reopen the quote again. …The Chinese show sign of slowing down the tempo of their push.
It could afford the humor, the Tibetan regard them with lavish entitlement. This results in the ruthlessness which was short lived. Two ministers were there to flout openly the “benevolent Chinese Mission” in Tibet where he moved… with an arrogant exhibition of force. These have solely disillusioned Tibetan government as in to carry out with the most pathetic attempt at preserving dignity and grace.”

Thus wrote the Indian representative in Lhasa. At that time, the Chinese offered large amounts of money to the big monasteries around Lhasa, a lot of these silver dollars that they had brought with them; it helped them to dose off the resistance. With the signature of the Panchsheel Agreement, China formalized their occupation of Tibet by taking India on board; by accepting that Tibet was part of China, Delhi became one of the players of the tragedy.

I want to give a last example: Gyantse witnessed terrible floods in July 1954; the entire Indian trade agency was washed away as well as the buildings hosting the Indian military escort. Let us not forget that India had a military escort (of the Jats regiment) posted in Gyantse and a small detachment in Yatung. Despite the 1954 Agreement, China never accepted to rebuild the Agency.

Between 1954 and 1962 the Indian Trade Agent in Gyantse had to live in a small rented house; it was a way to insult the Indian diplomats; China knew that. In Yatung, the ITA (Indian Trade Agent) lived in India House, a beautiful cottage (where Prime Minister Nehru spent two nights in 1958), it was also destroyed to erase the past of the Indian presence in Tibet. The rest is history.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama visited India in 1956-57; while many in his entourage wanted him to stay in India, His Holiness was keen to find a compromise with Premier Zhou Enlai, who also visited Delhi a couple of times in order to convince Nehru to send back His Holiness to Tibet. Eventually His Holiness decided to go back and give a last chance to Communist China to change its ways, but this didn’t happen and in March 1959, he had to take refuge in India.

I am very happy that the Government-in-exile has taken the initiative of this Symposium; the title of your new publication is very true and everyone should know about it. I have no clue about what the future will be, but we should not forget the past. The people in India should know that India had very important presence first through her Mission in Lhasa and later on through the Consulate General and her three Trade Agencies.

Unfortunately after 1962, everything was closed. I hope that the trade and pilgrimage will soon restart again as in the past. And why not having a branch of the ‘One Road One Belt’ going through the Himalayan passes. It would greatly benefit Tibetans and inhabitants of Himalayan Belt. Why can’t the relation between India and Tibet flourish again?

Thank you.
Plenary I– Past: The Historical Status Of Tibet And China

Sonam Norbu Dagpo

Thank you Mr. Claude Apri.

Our next speaker, Mr Jayadeva Ranade will present on the topic: Current developments in Tibet and China – its implications for India.

Mr Ranade is a very distinguished scholar on China. He is the President of the ‘Centre for China Analysis and Strategy.’ He is a former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India and was a Member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). He is also a Member of the Core Group on China of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), a distinguished fellow at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi and a distinguished fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi. He is listed as an expert by the Mumbai-based think-tank, ‘Gateway House.’

Mr. Jayadeva Ranade retired as Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India in August 2008. He has specialized for over 35 years in the analysis of developments in, and relating to, China and East Asia, and strategic analysis of issues relating to defence, national security and economy. He has prepared and finalized reports and briefs, including political and risk analysis, on sensitive issues for the highest echelons in Government.

He earned a diploma in Advanced Proficiency in Chinese after a 2-year study programme in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and completed an intensive Introductory Course in Mandarin and a diploma in Mandarin from the University of Hong Kong.
In the course of his 35-year career, Mr. Jayadeva Ranade has been posted in Indian Diplomatic Missions located in areas strategically important for India including Hong Kong, Beijing and as Minister in Washington D.C.

Mr. Ranade has authored the book ‘China Unveiled: Insights into Chinese Strategic Thinking,’ released in January 2013. He regularly contributes articles relating to China and East Asia in mainstream national newspapers like the Hindustan Times, New Indian Express, Sunday Guardian, Open and Rediff in addition to writing on defence and strategic issues for other publications. Chapters contributed by him on specialized aspects relating to China have been published in thirteen books. He has been invited to speak at international conferences on China and has given talks at institutions in India. He is often requested by national Television channels to comment on issues relating mainly to China, Tibet and Tibetan affairs and security issues.

Now he is going to speak on Current developments in Tibet and China – its implications for India.

**Jayadeva Ranade**

Good Afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have been asked to speak on the contemporary situation inside China and Tibet and the implication for India. So, let me start with China and state that what we are now witnessing is actually a hardening of the Chinese state and this process has accelerated since November 2012 after the 18th Party Congress. There was a background to why this happened and that was the disturbed internal political situation in China in the years leading up to the 18th Party Congress, particularly in 2011 and 2012. That was the time when the Chinese did not have a veteran leader, a ‘Long Marcher,’ who was in a position to select the next generation leader. It was a decision that had to be taken by the last
person anointed as such, as a leader by one of the Long Marchers that is Hu Jintao and the veteran colleagues who were with him in Beijing at that point in time. There was also, very unusually, a competition among the various Politburo members and Party Secretaries for getting themselves a slot in the Politburo Standing Committee and the Politburo. It was almost like, if I may say, a U.S. style election campaign, with each one putting out his agenda, with people trying to compete with each other and be labeled as ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ within the Chinese Communist Party’s Constitution. But, in the process, what did happen was that one of the Politburo members Bo Xilai, who was also incidentally elder to Xi Jinping in school, he made a bid for becoming a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. In order to fulfill his ambition, he strayed from the normal path and began creating lobbies inside the public security apparatus of the country and Party, inside the People’s Liberation Army and within the Propaganda Department.
of the Chinese Communist Party. This was unprecedented and naturally it threatened the ‘Party Centre’ as it were. At that same time his Police Chief/Public security Chief in the Municipality of Chongqing, a handpicked man, whom he had brought from his previous posting to Chongqing, somehow got manipulated by the central authorities in Beijing. And he started an investigation into murder of a British national, which took place around that time a British National who was very closely involved with Bo Xilai’s wife. Rumors had it that he was her lover; in any case he was a financier or money launderer. So there were a lot of investigations there but when he briefed Bo Xilai on what he was doing, something happened, matters went out of script and he fled Chongqing and sought sanctuary in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu and that really shook the Chinese Communist Party’s top echelons. It was very obviously for them, in their minds, a case of Western Intelligence agencies having penetrated the Chinese Party’s nomenklatura.

Wang Lijun was at the level of a Vice Minister at the centre. That was his rank and for him to go and seek shelter in the US consulate, stay there for over 24 hours before it was denied, was extremely unusual. It was denied only because Xi Jinping was to visit USA very soon thereafter and America didn’t want to spoil that relationship. So he was sent out from the consulate. He was, in fact, escorted to Beijing by a Vice Minister from the Ministry of Public Security who came. But this shook the Chinese Communist Party establishment and at the 18th Party Congress, that took place in November that year, Xi Jinping was given a clear mandate to straighten things out which also explains how for the first time in 30 year she was designated at the same time, as only the Party Chief but also the Chairman of the Military Commission and President of China. Xi Jinping set about firstly cleansing the Party, secondly tackling the ostentatious life styles of Party, Government and Military cadres and thirdly, trying to root out corruption, which the public was extremely annoyed about.
One of the first decisions he took was to convene an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission within days of taking over, where he told them that political reliability would be the key criteria for their promotions.

Second, he ushered in an austerity campaign to stop ostentation within the Government, Party and Military and that was one “soup and four dishes,” something that Dr. Lobsang Sangay just talked about.

Mind you, that campaign of his which continues till today, hit the Chinese economy and resulted in a 2 to 4 per cent loss in GDP but it has continued.

The third thing he did was to proceed against corruption and here he activated and energized the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, which is the Party’s anti-corruption watchdog body. The Chairman, Wang Qishan, was his old school buddy and close friend, and is also a member of the Politburo Standing Committee -- and he got after the senior fish in the Party apparatus. What Xi Jinping and Wang Qishan did was to target the “big tigers” in the Party and, by September this year (2016), it was officially announced that 165 officials of the rank of Vice Minister and above in the Party, in the Government and in the State-owned Enterprises had been charged and placed under investigation. Now, “under investigation” in the Chinese context means suspension, no salary and basically house imprisonment. The punishments range from life in prison, which is different from life imprisonment because there is no relief. It’s life in prison or death.

At the 3rd Plenum in October 2013, Xi Jinping brought the PLA within the purview of Central Discipline Inspection Commission and by September 2016, 86 officers of the rank of Major General and above had been placed under investigation. There were
a whole lot of junior officials too and by last count 40 per cent of the PLA’s officer corps is facing corruption charges. So, that is the manner in which Xi Jinping tried to cleanse the system. He used two basic drivers. The first was ideology and second was nationalism and we see that at play in almost every facet of Chinese society today. The second thing that Xi Jinping did was start tightening internal controls and since the time of the 18th Party Congress, we noticed stricter controls on the Party propaganda apparatus in the country that means all newspapers, official websites etc., Controls on the social media were also being brought in. There was a lot of censorship which had been introduced. It was a subtle form of controlling the narrative. The other thing that the authorities did was attack the schools, liberal institutions and academic institutions. There has been a persistent feeling in the Chinese Communist Party’s top echelons, particularly since the 18th Party Congress, that the West is trying to infiltrate them and bring about a collapse of the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on power and they are trying to resist that. So what the Chinese Communist leaders have done is they have expanded party surveillance across all these institutions and today in fact, as of the last two months, there is now a Party presence including in primary schools. According to them, the objective is to mould young minds. There is also a campaign which has been going on to weed out books which are deemed to be too liberal from the college and educational institute libraries and college teachers and school teachers are now being monitored to determine whether they are politically reliable or they were leaning too far towards the liberalism of the West. So this is the kind of climate that he has ushered in.

There is something else which is also on the way. In fact, pilot programs have already started and the date when they expect this to be enforced throughout China is 2018. This is the Social Credit Management System. It is, as the Chinese say, a “System
designed to let a Good Chinese Citizen, Walk Under the Heaven Safely.” Now what this means is essentially the collection of Big Data and assessment of the individual Chinese. It is also intended to expand and include, within its ambit, foreigners working inside China. What this basically means is to get an assessment of the individual from his peer, from his juniors, from his seniors, from his friends, from his family members, from his credit card spending habits etc. and award him a social credit point. So, let’s say a good citizen has the least ‘bad’ points, so he is given 3 points, which entitles him to certain facilities. If the points slip, say the citizen gets 7 points in the scale of 10, his travel will be regulated, he may not be able to travel, and the state will determine whether he can travel by hard class or first class, whether he can fly etc. So there are these restrictions that are coming, including which schools his children can go to and what kind of job he or his wife can have. So it’s total control, and they expect the whole of China to be blanketed by this by 2020. This is the kind of system that is being brought in, in addition to of course the other public security controls throughout China.

Xi Jinping, while he is doing this, has been concentrating power in himself and today he heads virtually all the key central leading small groups. He is incharge of national security, cyber security, foreign policy, economic affairs and the military. With this he is the most powerful man in China today, and not only that, he holds the maximum number of formal titles than any other leader of the Chinese Communist Party till date. The last title being that of the Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army which is an operational rank that he has also acquired. So at the 6th Plenum that was held just two months ago and which is a run upto the 19th Party Congress due to held next year, Xi Jinping was designated the ‘centre’ or the core of the Party Centre. This was the title that had eluded him till now. It is a title which eluded Hu Jintao, thanks to
opposition by Jiang Zemin, but he now has that. But more important than just this title is the endorsement by the 6th Party Plenum of all the tough policies that Xi Jinping has been implementing till now. In other words, it is an endorsement by the Party veterans and other senior Party members of the policies that Xi Jinping has brought in and which he is pushing. So when we talk about Xi Jinping’s position being weakened or his authority being questioned, I would suggest that yes, there is probably some degree of questioning, but nowhere near enough to threaten Xi Jinping’s hold on power. What Xi Jinping is trying to do now is fill up approximately 100 vacancies in the Central Committee, that I calculate will come up at the 19th Party Congress, with his own people. Obviously he is not going to succeed, there are going to be trade offs but he is trying to pack in his own people particularly in the Politburo Standing Committee where there are going to be five vacancies.

And this brings me to one interesting point which I will just mention as an indicator of the authority that Xi Jinping has accumulated and which is the persistent rumor coming out of Beijing for at least the last seven to eight months that Wang Qishan is likely to continue in the Politburo Standing Committee. He is at the retirement age but he is likely to continue. There are two combinations that people talk of, one is he continues as the Chairman of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission which means spearheading the campaign against corruption, and the second is that he takes over as Premier and Li Keqiang, the present Premier is moved to chair the National People’s Congress. Whatever it is, if this happens it clears the way for Xi Jinping to continue for yet another term and here I should just mention that Xi Jinping’s acolytes have already started talking about the new 30-year era that has been ushered in by Xi Jinping. The first being that of Mao, second of Deng and now of Xi Jinping. So this is the scenario that you see in China today -- a hardening of the state and, I would say, continually becoming even harder.
In Tibet also we see the reflection of the hardening of the state; we see the policies of Chen Quanguo, the previous Party Secretary. He laid the groundwork for very tight security controls inside Tibet and established what is called the ‘Iron Grid’ System where within three minutes of the occurrence of an incident, the public security authorities reach the spot. So it’s a very tight control that he already has established. There are also controls on electronics, telephones, internet etc. There is additionally a system of Party surveillance across the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Infact under Chen Quanguo, all the 5400-plus villages in the TAR region have a Party representative. Not only that, they have also sent out teams and positioned over 21,000 Chinese Communist Party officials in each of the villages. They have started a campaign for one year now of trying to recruit a member of the village to the Chinese Communist Party each year. I don’t believe that they have reached the target yet but they are trying to push ahead with that target. The security budget for Tibet has also been increased and last year it was 54 per cent higher than the previous year with an average rise of 28 per cent each year. So there is really a tightening of the process going on. Chen Quanguo’s work has been recognized, if I may say, by Beijing and he has now moved to another very tough autonomous region -- a neighboring one -- of Xinjiang. He has now started implementing this ‘iron grid’ system in Xinjiang. He is likely to be, in my reckoning, a Politburo Member atleast at the 19th Party Congress.

But interestingly, China has started changing tack on Tibet. They have begun focusing more on propaganda initiatives, which is why the teams of Tibetan officials going abroad, to propagate the Tibetan point of view and to propagate the benefits that have come to Tibet from Chinese occupation, continue. The new Party Secretary of Tibet, Wu Yingjie is someone who understands Tibetans, if I may say, who has grown up there from a very, very young age and has spent his entire life there. While he maintains
a very tough line on the Dalai Lama and Dalai Lama’s so called splittist activities, he is also pushing a ‘softer’ approach in Tibet by stressing propaganda and economic benefits rather than security. But make no mistake, the security measures remain in place. As you are all aware a senior member of the Central Party School mentioned in 2013 that the monks and nuns are considered to be the real “trouble makers” in Tibet by the Chinese leadership and so they remain a target and the Chinese are trying to win them over through different methods: through promising them government jobs but within the monastery, promising them salaries and promising them pensions including promotions. They are apparently able to recruit quite a few people. There are other controls also, that have been put in place, to control the thought processes of monks and nuns which is that all monasteries now have a television of course only CCTV, they have newspapers coming to them which is the People’s Daily, and they have the photographs of the three leaders on their walls. So there are very tight controls being brought into Tibet. There has been a visible impact with the drop in the number of self-immolations in the last some months. There was one, of course, earlier this month, but otherwise there has been a drop. I think the Chinese must be regulating things even more; details about which we are not aware. But this is the scenario that I see happening across the board. There have been continued efforts to mine minerals inside Tibet, to build roads and rail and here of course the PLA is very closely involved because without their approval no rail or road project is cleared. So they are working hand-in-hand with the Civil Affairs Department of TAR.

I come to the last point, which is the implications for India. When we talk about the implications for India, of course there are. It is not directly linked with what is happening inside Tibet but it is linked with Tibet itself. I mean the boundaries of Tibet are our boundaries; we have boundaries with China for the first time only after
their occupation of Tibet and the Chinese are using this and this is something that we do need to keep in mind all the time. When they advanced their claim on Arunachal Pradesh and on Tawang formally in 2007, they began describing Arunachal Pradesh as “southern Tibet.” They have also said in official meetings that this claim is something that China has to advance because they have to keep in mind the sensibilities of the Tibetan people. In May 2013, the Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily) which is the authoritative newspaper of the 89 million strong Chinese Communist Youth League and very influential, advanced a claim on Ladakh and said that Ladakh had actually been under Chinese rule since the time of the Yuan dynasty. It has a lot in common with the Tibetan people, culture, religion etc and they wound up calling it “little Tibet.” So we have a close association with Tibet; we have the territorial issue with China of “southern Tibet” and “little Tibet” according to the Chinese. So this is something that is going to cause problems for us. The second is, as I mentioned, the hardening of the Chinese state. Hardening also means an inflexibility in negotiation, an inflexibility in compromise and as the Chinese have said, just three days ago, to U.S. President-elect Donald Trump -- territorial integrity and sovereignty are not negotiable. I think that does have definite implications for us.

I will not go into the other problems that India and China have: with expanding Chinese territorial claims on India: with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor having in effect accepted and trying to legitimate Pakistan’s occupation of POK, Gilgit and Baltistan areas that are Indian territory. China deciding that they are going to back Pakistan and China being less sensitive to India’s interests. I will conclude only by saying that the new military reorganization and restructuring that the Chinese have done and the creation of the West Zone of the PLA, which is across our borders and combines the Lanzhou and Chengdu military regions is also something that concerns
us. You would all be aware that there was a very large Chinese PLA exercise which has been conducted last week and for the first time that was centered on the South Xinjiang Military District which is a part of this West Zone, which is also the military headquarters of the forces that conducted the intrusions in the Depsang Plains in April 2013 and in Chumar in September 2014 during Xi Jinping’s visit. The number of aircraft and helicopters used by them this time have exceeded what they have ever used. So they are gearing up. At the least they are sending a signal. So these are the things that we do take into account and I think the implications for India are very clear. It’s not just something academic, but it’s very real.

With that, I thank you.

Sonam Norbu Dagpo

Thank you very much Mr Ranade. His presentation was excellent, an analysis of the present Chinese leadership. Today in China under Xi Jinping’s leadership, in the name of fighting corruption and rule of law, all the powers have been consolidated on one person, that is Xi Jinping and that has implications not only for Tibet but also for India as well. Some of the things that he has mentioned about the boundary between Tibet and India, all these have implications as Mr. Claude Arpi has rightly mentioned about the historical status of Tibet, the various treaties and also the pillars. He also talked about the Shimla convention. When we talk about boundary between Tibet and India we need to revisit the Shimla convention of 1914.

Now China is claiming Arunachal Pradesh as southern Tibet but then we have to go back to Shimla convention where independent Tibet and British India signed an
agreement, which is now called as McMahon line. So the Tibetan position is that Tibetans have signed the McMahon line between British India and Tibet when Tibet was independent and we believe that this boundary has been signed and we even recognize this today. Although Chinese doesn’t recognize it but it is important when addressing the issue of Tibet that we must first find out the real historical status of Tibet and that will really help in understanding the boundary between India and Tibet.

Another important thing you mentioned about is the grid system in Tibet. Xi Jinping has taken control of more levels of power than any leader since Mao Zedong. Because of his concentration of power it has implications, as you clearly mentioned the situation in Tibet has not improved, the human rights situation is still very grim. So it has not at all improved the situation in Tibet and that has implications on India also.

For China, as you correctly mentioned, sovereignty and territorial integrity is not negotiable and is a core issue. Under this banner, they try to expand territories – they claim large chunks of land in India as well as other areas in South China Sea. They call it territorial parts of China, a non-negotiable core issue. First of all what they are trying to do is bring out the concept of their territory. What we see today is the result produced by the kind of Chinese position consistent for ten to fifteen years and now they are claiming for it like One China Policy.

In the past when China tried to establish their diplomatic relations with different countries they asked them to accept One China Policy which is basically a position on Taiwan, which is Republic of China. Now they are trying to bring this position on Tibet also. If you’re inviting His Holiness the Dalai Lama to a political event then you are
labeled as going against One China Policy. But in reality it is important to understand that One China Policy does not have implications for Tibet and it is only between Taiwan and China.

Although His Holiness has already devolved his political responsibility to the elected Tibetan leadership but the Chinese continue to call him a splittist and as some of our friends mentioned, His Holiness being invited to Rashtrapati Bhavan is being accused by the Chinese government.

In reality, the One China Policy does not apply to Tibet but unfortunately Chinese are trying to create that impression and I think many of the countries tend to accept that. So without taking much time I would like to thank again, Mr Claude Arpi and Jayadeve Ranade.
PLENARY TWO

PRESENT: PRESENT SITUATION IN TIBET UNDER CHINESE OCCUPATION

– Tibet’s environment and its impact on Asia
Prof. Brahma Chellany, Centre for Policy Research

– Current human rights situation inside Tibet and the case of Larung Gar
Kate Saunders, International Campaign for Tibet

– Moderator, Kalden Tsomo, UN & EUHR Desk, DIIR
Kalden Tsomo

May we begin the second session of the day. I am delighted to welcome every one of you to the second plenary session that is on the present situation inside Tibet under the Chinese rule. We are honoured to have two most able and qualified speakers to speak on ‘Tibet’s Environment and its Impact on Asia’ by Professor Brahma Chellaney, who will speak first and then second, we will have ‘Present Human Rights Situation inside Tibet and the Case of Larung Gar’ by Kate Saunders.

Each panelist will speak for not more than 20 minutes and hopefully we could open the floor for a Q&A session. Let me briefly introduce our first speaker Professor Brahma Chellaney. Professor Chellaney is one of India’s most respected strategist and policy analysts. He is professor at Center for Policy Research an independent think-tank based in Delhi. Professor served at the policy advisory group, headed by the foreign minister of India and has also been an advisor to India’s National Security Council. Dr. Chellaney has published numerous articles and numbers of book such as Water, Peace and Confronting the Global Water Crisis, Water: Asia’s New Battleground, Asian Juggernaut: the rise of China, India and Japan. In short, Professor Chellaney is one of the leading international scholars on Asian strategic issues. So, Professor the floor is yours now. Thank you.

Thank you, an ideal speaker after lunch should be someone who can deliver a light presentation, full of jokes. Unfortunately, the organizers have chosen the wrong speaker. Also the subject for this afternoon is a very serious one and a depressing one. If Kate wants to present a more upbeat assessment, I will be happy to see to her, but,
you know, my presentation is going to be a bit depressing in terms of the bigger picture in Tibet and its implications for Asia and for the entire northern hemisphere. There are two critical issues relating to Tibet: one is Tibet’s political future and the other is Tibet’s environmental future. Tibet’s political future, of course, is a crucial issue for Tibetans and for the survival of Tibetan culture. In a way, Tibet’s political future is linked to China’s own political future, because what happens in China will very much shape Tibet’s own political destiny. In contrast, Tibet’s environmental issue is even a bigger issue. The environmental future of Tibet is a bigger issue, because it’s an issue not just for Tibetans and the Chinese, rather, it’s an issue for people across Asia and for people in other continents of the northern hemisphere, why, because of the central role Tibet plays, in shaping climatic weather and rainfall patterns in Asia and in influencing
atmospheric general circulation across the entire Northern hemisphere. What is atmospheric general circulation? It’s a system of winds that helps transport warm air from the equator to higher latitudes, creating different climatic zones in the process. Tibet illustrates how human impacts on the environment, including in the form of depleted natural resources and degraded ecosystems are potentially threatening regional and international security. The future of our planet hinges on sustainable development. There are several historical examples of societies fitly undermining their ecological security, with a result in equal/eco meltdown triggering their downfall. Two examples come to mind: one was the early Sumerian Civilization that emerge in the lower basin of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, in what is now Iraq and the other case was central America’s Maya Civilization. In both cases, serious ecological degradation stunted food production setting the stage for downfall of these civilizations. A case of this background, let us see what China is doing on the Tibetan plateau. First let us not forget that the Tibetan plateau is the world’s highest and largest plateau. It’s bigger than India. In fact it’s nearly two-third the size of the European continent. It has the world’s largest concentration of tall mountains. The world’s tallest mountain peaks above 8000 meters are all located in the great Himalayan range, three-fourths of which falls in Tibet. Less than one-fourth of the Himalayas are in India. Most of you know that Tibet is the water tower of Asia, supplying fresh water to multiple countries, stretching form Afghanistan on one hand to Vietnam on the other end, as well as to Mainland China. Less known is the fact that the Tibetan plateau is also a treasure trove of minerals, including precious metals like gold and silver. Tibet is the world’s number one producer of lithium. There is little Tibet in our cell phones, because all our cellphones run on lithium batteries, so there is little Tibet that we carry with us, that lithium has come from Tibet. Tibet also has China’s largest deposits of ten different metals. China has turned this resource-rich plateau into the center of its mining and
dam building activities. And these activities are being carried out in remote, high-altitude, ecological-sensitive areas of the Tibetan plateau. Take water: by gobbling up the Tibetan plateau, China changed the water map of an entire continent. The water map of Asia changed in one stroke, with the annexation of the Tibetan plateau. China became the cross-border supplier of water to more countries than any other upstream riparian power in the world. There are several upstream riparian powers in the world. For example Canada is dominant in North America. Brazil is the riparian power of South America. But no riparian power in the world has the riparian cloud and leverage that China has visa-a-vis its downstream neighbors. China has eighteen riparian neighbors. So China has this unique advantage today, thanks to its annexation of the Tibetan plateau. The Tibetan plateau is the largest repository of fresh water after the two poles. But whereas the fresh water in the polar ice-caps is all locked up. After all it’s all locked up in the form of ice. Much of the water, not all of the water, on the Tibetan plateau is accessible and flows naturally into rivers, streams and other water courses. As you may know Tibet is also called the third pole. Because it has the largest perennial ice mass after the two poles. Today the over exploitation and degradation of Tibet’s natural resources is contributing to an environmental crisis. The environmental crisis in turn is contributing to climate change across Asia. In other words Tibet symbolises the three crises that Asia confronts today; a natural resources crisis, an environmental crisis and a climate crisis. These three crises are interlinked and potentially pose a threat to Asia’s future. Tibet is called the roof of the world; not only because its the world’s highest plateau but also because it rises up to the middle of the troposphere. The troposphere is the lowest and the most dense layer of the atmosphere. You can imagine the height of the Tibetan plateau, how tall that plateau is that it rises to the middle of the troposphere. With its towering height and its unique features, the Tibetan plateau shapes and influences, as explained, climatic patterns and atmospheric
general circulation across the northern hemisphere. In other words, the ecological well-being not just of Asia but even of Europe and North America is very much at stake because the reckless environmental degradation that we are witnessing on the Tibetan plateau has a bearing on the well-being of Europe and North America as well. Most significant is the fact that Tibet is Asia’s principal rainmaker and plays a central role in the Asian hydrological cycle. How? It does that in different ways both in summer and winter. In the summer, Tibet serves as a high elevation heat pump drawing into the hinterland monsoonal currents from the East China Sea, South China Sea, from the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. That’s how the monsoons occur. Tibet’s rocky and lofty terrain heats up easily in the summer and attracts monsoonal currents from different directions from the oceans. Monsoons, as you may know, are an Asian phenomenal. Other parts of the world do not get monsoons. And the monsoons of Asia stretch from the Korean peninsula all the way to Omar. This entire region of Asia gets monsoonal rains. In winter, Tibet plays a very different role. It deflects the cold jet stream to the high Himalayas in a wave like pattern, thus creating very heavy snowfall in the upper reaches. In other words as scientific study show, in winter, Tibet is a heat sink and it turns into a heat source in the summer starting from late spring extending to early fall; that’s when Tibet is a heat source producing a thermal effect to draw in, to attract monsoonal current from the different oceans. But for the role of Tibet Delhi would not get any rain. In fact the entire northern India except for the river valleys would be a desert. So Tibetan plateau plays a unique role in Asia’s hydrology and plays a unique role in facilitating rainfall and the monsoons. Linked to this phenomenon is an interesting fact. If you look at the map of Tibet, Tibet’s water rich regions are all located in the southern realm and in the south eastern belt. Rest of Tibet is arid or semi-arid. All the great rivers of Asia, the ten great rivers of Asia, that originate on the Tibetan plateau, originate in the southern and southeastern realm of the Tibetan plateau.
Why is that so? One factor only, the Himalayan range. The great Himalayan range blocks the movement of the monsoonal currents further upwards. So all the Himalayan slopes facing southwards and southeastwards gets very heavy and widespread rainfall. And the areas beyond the great Himalayan range get very scanty rainfall. So it is in this particular belt you have Tibet’s water resources concentrated. The 1800-high altitude glaciers in the Himalayas, at least three fourth of them are located on the Tibetan plateau. Now unfortunately, the Tibetan plateau is warming at a rate almost twice as fast as rest of the world. This is contributing to glacial recession. The retreat of glaciers and to the accelerated thawing of permafrost in Tibet. Permafrost is permanently frozen ground. There are vast grounds in Tibet that are permanently frozen. Thanks to this accelerated global warming; there is a thawing of permafrost that is being witnessed on the Tibetan plateau. Permafrost, especially high altitude permafrost helps to trap and store subsoil water which is a source for Tibet’s numerous lakes, wetlands and mountain springs. So when you have this accelerated thawing of permafrost and other effects of global warming, it carries important implications for the hydrologic cycle. The magnitude of glacial attrition, according to several scientific studies, is the greatest in the eastern Himalayas and the smallest in the western Himalayas, where the Karakoram Range is located. This is because the human impacts are greater in the east. China’s frenzied mining and dam building activities for example are concentrated in the southeastern part of the Tibetan plateau. China has already completed six mega dams on the Mekong and is building or planning to build fourteen more. A number of the great rivers of Asia especially the Brahmaputra, the Salween which flows into Myanmar in along with border of Thailand and Myanmar and the Indus have very high dependency on glacial and snowbelt from late spring to sustain their flows. And thus are very vulnerable to climate change driven shifts.
To conclude Tibet’s unique features and role, its endangered endemic species and its fragile ecosystems make it more vulnerable to the effects of global warming than any other part of our planet. Scientifically Tibet is seen as both a driver and amplifier of global warming. Because of its elevation, it heats up very quickly and therefore its a driver of global warming, also tends to amplify the effects of global warming. In fact the effects of global warming today are more visible on the Tibetan plateau than even in the north and south poles. This partly reflects the fact that the Tibetan plateau has an exceptionally high elevation. But the faster warming that we are witnessing has important implications for Asia’s hydrological cycle and carries implications also for climate security and climate stability beyond Asia, to Europe and North America. In light of all these it is apparent that there is a need for greater international attention on the environmental crisis haunting the Tibetan plateau. The ecological well-being of a number of societies and countries is very much at stake.

Thank you.

Kalden Tsomo

Thank you Professor for enlightening us on why Tibet is known as the roof of the world and water tower of Asia and sharing your insight on a very important and pressing subject of today, tomorrow and forever, but not as well understood as it should be. Thank you Professor.
Plenary II– Present: Present Situation In Tibet Under Chinese Occupation

Kalden Tsomo

So may I invite second speaker of the session Kate Saunders to speak on current human rights situation inside Tibet and the case of Larung Gar. Let me briefly introduce Kate. Actually she needs no introduction. Kate Saunders helps monitor and heads communication for the International Campaign for Tibet, managing a field operation of Tibetan researchers, interviewing Tibetan sources and writing analysis on the situation in Tibet. Kate is a writer and journalist who has specialized on Tibet for around 15 years, advising journalists, academics, parliamentarians and government ministries. Kate has written numerous reports for the International Campaign for Tibet and Tibet Information Network and her book ‘Eighteen layers of Hell: Stories from the Chinese Gulag’ was published by Cassell in 1996. Her articles have been published in newspapers and magazine worldwide including the Guardian, the Times, Washington Post and Times of India.

Thank you.

Kate Saunders

So thank you for inviting me. I am very grateful to be here and I am sorry to say Brahma, no after-lunch jokes in my presentation either. I have been asked to speak about the present situation and in particular about the demolitions at Larung Gar and Yarchen Gar religious institutes. So the struggle of the religious sphere to survive in Tibet and China today is one of the most visible and prominent issues and that’s because of the growing popularity of Tibetan Buddhism across the world and also because of the travels of the Dalai Lama. So in comparison to earlier demolitions at Larung Gar in 2001, we have had a new window into what is unfolding on the plateau in this respect through
social media, through video footage that is circulating. So we have seen videos of heavy vehicles moving in to demolish monks and nuns’ huts while you can hear the sound of monks chanting in the background. We have seen footage of nuns being expelled with others, weeping as they watched them being moved away in convoys of buses. We have also seen more recently videos of nuns in military camouflage uniform being made to sing military Maoist songs and to dance to pop songs, a severe humiliation for them. And the DIIR has captured some of that recent footage in one of their video that’s just been released. So I am going to show in this presentation that the religious crackdown in these Buddhist centres and other issues of religious suppression are part of a complex network of policies and approaches emerging from China’s strategic objectives in Tibet. I will also show how the new dynamic of tourism is shaping developments at Larung Gar and in broader Tibetan society. So the subject for this symposium is ‘Tibet; Past, Present
and Future,’ and I am tasked with looking at the present situation. We are in a time when
the unfolding story and the Tibet issue is much more complex than it was before. The
details, the context are much more difficult to understand even if we grasp the nature of
the problems. So the questions we need to ask accordingly need to be deeper and more
searching about the present situation. The situation in Larung Gar compels us to look
at some of the core issues affecting Tibet today. These are issues of land, of culture, of
cultural survival, of religion and also a sense of Tibetan identity that emerges from a
religious culture of dizzying depth and scholarship. How is this culture surviving in the
phase of protracted and systematic attack on its roots in which the most moderate and
the mildest expression of loyalty to the Dalai Lama is viewed as nothing less than an
act of secessionist sabotage in the words of Tibet Daily, capable of imperiling the very
sanctity of the Communist party’s State. So Larung Gar Buddhist academy and Yarchen
Gar are in the same prefecture of Sichuan that is in the Tibetan area of Kham. They
are non-political hubs dedicated to monastic education, academic learning and ethics
since the mid 1980s. Traditionally they have bridged Tibetan and Han communities
and they have been targeted now under three consecutive CCP administrations, under
Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and now under Xi Jinping. It is important to note that they are
not actually monasteries; they are encampments or Chogars which first emerged in the
fourteenth century in Tibet. They have revitalised Tibetan scholarship and contemplation
in recent years in particular since the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. So they are
avant-garde monastic institutes for the study, practice and promotion of the teachings
that would be impossible in conventional monastic institutes due to the policies and
measures of the Chinese authorities.

So the demolitions at the Larung Gar we have witnessed in recent months were first
outlined in an order given by the County government which stated that homes for all
but 5000 monks, nuns and laypeople would be demolished and that by September 2017, the population of the encampment must be limited to 5000 persons. And it seems now the Chinese are trying to complete by June 2017. So they are trying to move the schedule forward. The population of Larung Gar is probably at least 10,000, probably 20,000, 30,000 at times of specific teachings. And there are students from the teachers there all over the world in China, India and the West as well as in different areas of Tibet.

So the images circulating in social media of the bulldozed wooden buildings with monks standing in the rubble are reminiscent of 2001, the demolitions and expulsion of more than a thousand people, but it’s slightly different now. The political and religious context is different now. There has always been a strong link with Chinese Buddhists to these centres and they have been involved in literally shifting the centre of gravity of Tibetan culture. In many ways Tibetan religion was perceived as backward, Tibetan people were perceived as backward. But what we have seen here is that the new generation of leaders who have revitalised the scholarship and religion and given it a whole new status within China that’s led to a situation we now see with the Khenpos or abbots at Larung Gar having a following on social media of more than 1.5 million Chinese as well as Tibetans and appearing on a cover of major Chinese State magazines. So to an extent they have more space than they use to have because of that popularity in China. As a result, the mechanisms of the state to control and influence over what’s happening on these places become much more systematic. What we have documented is that the drive to increase and develop tourism is also part of the context behind the demolitions at Larung Gar. These slides show how tourism has become one of the tools of the Chinese government for confronting revivalist trends of Tibetan culture and religion and confronting the new Tibetan resilience that has
been seen particularly among the young generation. In the vast valley at the foot of Larung Gar for the past year there has been massive construction work and there is a series of buildings and establishments, which you can see here, that are linked to the development of the tourist industry. Although you can’t see clearly [on this slide] the

This image, taken at Larung Gar Buddhist institute in fall, 2016, shows a sign at one site of the Chinese construction company Huaxi which reads: “Congratulations to the [Huaxi] Sichuan Sixth Branch for achieving special top status as general contractor in building construction” (Image: ICT)

This image shows ongoing construction of a large building most likely to host tourist services, guest houses, travel agencies, trekking and horse riding facilities in an attempt to boost the local economy and capitalize on the increasing cultural and spiritual attractions of Serthar among Han Chinese tourists (Images: ICT).
Chinese labeling on the wall mentions the name of the construction company which is Hua Xi construction company. This is one of the leading companies in Sichuan and in the PRC and they have described this construction of what appears to be a new tourist village as ‘difficult political combat.’ These plans include Tibetan restaurants, souvenir shops, horse trekking, and organised visits to this now world famous religious institute, Larung Gar. They are trying to appeal to a new generation of spiritual seekers who will visit temporarily. The official line on the demolitions [at Larung Gar] has been to deny them and to describe them as a construction development that is a part of a process of accelerated urbanisation towards and I quote ‘a more orderly, beautiful, secure and peaceful land.’ And this incidentally is typical of the Chinese doublespeak that we see in Chinese official policy. China describes its policies in Tibet as maintaining stability and achieving harmony when we know that the result is the opposite. In CCP language national security equals party security. State or social security are loaded terms that encompass notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity and most importantly threats to the survival of the CCP. And we have seen different terminology that a person who represents a threat to the Party’s rule and even goes to a Dalai Lama teaching can be characterised now by the Chinese government as a terrorist. In the same sort of dramatic policies reshaping Tibet’s environment that Brahma Chellaney outlined so lucidly, mega dams are described as ‘water construction conservation’ while nomadic settlement - which is a policy that threatens to eviscerate one of the last sustaining pastoral systems on earth - is described as ‘mitigation of climate change.’ The New York Times drew attention to this doublespeak language in connection to Larung Gar. The Chinese have said that the demolitions were also due to improving sanitation and as the New York Times pointed out if the government was interested in health and safety it could help to construct a new sewer and homes to relieve the overcrowding, but it is not doing anything of this sort.
We have received quite a bit of information about the new building in the area. Yarchen Gar, where a thousand nuns and monks have been expelled, it doesn’t show very clearly but here we can see the building of a new road around Yarchen Gar, which is also designed to be part of the new tourist infrastructure being built at these sites to attract more Chinese tourists.

China is currently implementing very ambitious plans to bring in large numbers of mainly Chinese tourists to state-owned scenic sites and cultural icons of Tibet and there they will be receiving a story that is scripted by the state and it is delivered by its state trained guides. So in this way the authorities are aiming to simultaneously increase high end tourism and also to assert China’s messages, China’s representations of its ownership on Tibet and this commodification of Tibetan culture which includes, for instance, a reimagining of the symbolic former home of the Dalai Lama, the

Around 200 dwellings in the monks’ quarters were demolished to make room for the construction of the curbside. While some locals agree that paved roads and sidewalks are good improvements, others complain that authorities treat monastics unfairly. Meditation huts for nuns who live frugally and immerse themselves in spiritual practice are visible on the hillside beyond (Image: ICT)
Potala Palace, in the latest hotel Intercontinental in their lobby. This coincides with the trend towards increasing repression of Tibetan cultural identity and a crackdown of unprecedented depth and scope. To go back to Larung Gar in the Serthar area, to maximise the benefits of the tourist industry, the Chinese authorities are focusing on secular elements of Tibetan culture such as horse festivals, such as the King Gesar legend and so on. In order to be part of the strategy of China’s objectives in Tibet to both control the narrative and also build the economy. And we have seen the same dynamic in play recently when a young man called Gyaltsen Norbu, as you all know as China’s Panchen Lama, was conferring a major Kalachakra in Lhasa attended by many thousands of people. So this was on the one hand to showcase the sort of dazzling stage the Chinese have created in Lhasa and to send a message that religion is thriving, but to also had the other objective of really countering the Dalai Lama’s influence. The Dalai Lama has taught many more Kalachakras than previous Dalai Lamas in exile, in the west. He is due to teach one soon in Bodhgaya in India to which the Chinese authorities have made tremendous efforts to prevent Tibetans inside Tibet from attending. So this was a dual narrative. So just as the abbots in Serthar in Larung Gar and Yarchen Gar have sought to create some space to discuss and to ensure the preservation of these precious institutes. Tibetans are also creating space and standing their ground inside Tibet and in the last few years, we have witnessed major religious celebrations in eastern areas of Tibet in Kham and Amdo. These things can’t happen in the Tibet Autonomous Region. There was Kalachakra last year that was taught by the respected elder teacher, Jamyang Gyatso, the teacher of the Chinese Panchen Lama and another Kalachakra in eastern Tibet which was taught by another elder Lama. So this also coexists with a new generation of educated Tibetans, who often studied in Chinese universities and often fluent in Chinese as well as Tibetan, expressing concerns about policy direction which are grounded in an understanding of the policy
framework in the official landscape. This is an important dynamic for the future. And you can see it in various incidents not only in these major religious gatherings but also in the writings of artists and intellectuals. A Tibetan cadre published a bold and outspoken critic saying that stability, unity and harmony had not been achieved because of policies damaging Tibetan culture and religion. Writers and singers are expressing sense of loss, of dispossession, of grievances and have an important role in Tibetan society. Partly because of these developments the measures needed to control and dominate have become much more systematic, much more long term.

I will seek to summarise very quickly the last few points. A few months ago on a trip to Qinghai, Xi Jinping warned that greater efforts needed to be made to make religions follow a sinicised direction. And I think this is one of the things that was manifest in Larung Gar and Yarchen Gar and elsewhere. There has been an underlying principle officially of adapting Buddhism to socialism and we have seen an intensified regulatory framework governing religion in Tibet. For instance the 2007 regulations, which seek to control the succession of the Dalai Lama. This has been expanded in many areas, counties and prefectures to make even hanging prayer flags or praying illegal in some areas. Not only is that regulatory framework well developed, but also there has been a shift from implementing those regulations to actually changing the minds of practitioners and Jayadeva talked about this new shift in the PRC. It’s particularly extreme in Tibetan areas. Since 2011 we have witnessed the party’s attempt to really influence and transform the inner landscape of Tibetans as part of their quest towards long-term stability. Therefore, it is the PRC’s economic and strategic objectives that really drive much of its recent policy on the Tibetan plateau including the demolitions and expulsions that we have seen in Larung Gar. The CCP is seeking to create world class manufacturing centres in the cities of Xi’an, Dongguan and Chengdu at the foot
of the Tibetan plateau. As Brahma has outlined, they wish to expand mining. A recent visit by Xi Jinping to the Qinghai area is known now as QTP, (Qinghai Tibet Plateau) is the new phrase for it, in official jargon. He visited the areas where the lithium mining, uranium mining crucial for China’s development and the third element is of course to address the progressive collapse of water resources in north and northeastern China. It’s little known that north China has water reserves that are scarcer than those in the Middle East. So this has rendered Tibet vital to the future of China, to China’s economic expansion. Therefore it has become a nexus for intensified securitization linked to the priority of maintaining CCP control and power, which has informed the major relocation and settlement and urbanisation drives that we have seen in Tibet.

Thank you.

Kalden Tsomo

Thank you very much. Thank you Kate for your presentation outlining how human right situation in Tibet became from bad to worse and for making us visualize how China is undertaking wide scale demolitions in Larung Gar and Yachen Gar. Thank you very much Kate.

With this we come to the end of the second plenary session and thank you Professor Brahma Chellaney and Kate Saunders for making this session possible. Thank you very much.
PLENARY THREE

FUTURE: THE MIDDLE WAY
POLICY: THE WAY FORWARD

– Sino-Tibet Dialogue—What should be India’s role and leverage?
  Prof. Dibyesh Anand, University of Westminster

– The Strategic relevance of the Middle Way Approach
  Dr. Lobsang Sangay, Sikyong, Central Tibetan Administration

– Moderator, Dhardon Sharling, Information Secretary (Equivalent), DIIR
Dhordon Sharling

Good evening and welcome everyone to the third and the final plenary session for today. We listened to an impressive line of speakers talk about Tibet’s historical past as an independent country, the present situation inside Tibet under the Chinese occupation. Now let’s take a look at what the way forward for Tibet looks like.

To do that we have two very distinguished speakers for the session. First, Dr. Lobsang Sangay. I am sure he is a man who doesn’t need any introduction, but as a moderator it is on me to do the needful. Dr. Lobsang Sangay was elected twice to serve as the political leader of CTA and is touted by the international media as the political successor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. He is a Harvard graduate, in fact the first Tibetan to ever receive the S.J.D. degree from Harvard Law School. Dr. Sangay is the recipient of the 2004 Yong K. Kim’ 95 Prize of excellence for his dissertation *Democracy in Distress: Is Exile Polity a Remedy? A Case Study of Tibet’s Government-in-exile*. That was 2004, seven years before he was sworn in as the political leader who would head this very democracy in exile. And in 2006 Dr. Sangay was elected as one of the twenty-four Young Leaders of Asia by the Asia Society. I remember being in Chennai in Madras Christian College and celebrating that particular feat a Tibetan had got on to us at international forum. Asia Society is a global organization working to strengthen relationships and promote understanding among the people, leaders and institutions of world and the United States. Dr. Sangay was a Senior Fellow at the East Asian Legal Studies Program at Harvard Law School through 2011. And he is an expert in international human rights law as well. So Dr. Sangay will be one of our speakers for today.
We also have with us Professor Dibyesh Anand. I keep writing to him as Dr. Dibyesh and he wrote to me saying ‘Dhardon, just call me Professor.’ I don’t know why he wanted to do away with the prefix ‘Doctor’; may be you have a reason for that. But Professor Dibyesh Anand is the head of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster in London. He is the author of the monographs *Geopolitical Exotica: Tibet in Western Imagination, Tibet: A Victim of Geopolitics, and Hindu Nationalism in India and the Politics of Fear* and has published on various topics including Tibet, India-China border dispute, majority-minority relations in Asia, identity politics in Tanzania and nationalism, and a lot of us must be following him on Facebook. I call him a digital activist. He is constantly on Facebook, round the clock, doing a lot of good work, being a force behind social and intellectual change on the social media space in the digital world. So I would like to now first request Professor Dibyesh Anand to speak on the topic ‘The Sino-Tibet Dialogue and What Actually is India’s role and Leverage in this Dialogue.’

Thank you very much for having me here. I am asked to speak on the future. The topic was ‘Sino-Tibetan dialogue: What should India’s Policy and Leverage be.’ In fact, if I had to, I would rephrase my own title and I would call it ‘China-Tibet dialogue: what should India’s policy and leverage be.’ Because when we talk of Sino-Tibetan, sometimes we lose even the claim that China and Tibet are distinct countries. I thought I would rephrase it in that context. I am very glad that I am part of this conference; we had discussions in the morning on the past and the present. I could have spoken on that independent India’s policies were in the beginning continuity from British India. So what Nehru did was not that exceptional because Nehru in a sense was following on what British India was doing since 1910s - something in my
earlier work I have called ‘strategic hypocrisy.’ This involved recognizing Chinese suzerainty as well as Tibetan autonomy, but not doing anything to promote Tibetan autonomy while accepting Chinese suzerainty turning into sovereignty.

The priority for independent India was in descending order - India’s border security, second was friendship with China, and third was welfare of Tibetans. This becomes clear from Nehru’s statements. Something fascinating I came across during my research was an incident that shows the connection of Dr. Ambedkar with Tibet. In 1953, there was a Tibet Day in September where Ambedkar had participated and Nehru was very livid and he did say something along the line that basically India has no desire to claim any position in Tibet which may not be in keeping with the full sovereignty of China. This was 1953. I thought I will highlight that part because clearly there are
aspects of India-Tibet relation that we could recuperate to make arguments that go beyond Nehru’s personality. In general, what we saw in the past was shift of buffer from territorial Tibet (Tibet as a buffer) to an autonomous Tibet so long as Dalai Lama was there. Nehru would often say that Tibet is a very inaccessible territory, PLA cannot really control it, and so long as Dalai Lama is there India is generally safe here. From there the shift was to a situation where the only buffer India had vis-a-vis China, was the Tibetan diaspora in India.

While territorial buffer has gone, the popular buffer of Tibetan collective presence is important and India needs that. In terms of present, when we look at the situation, I tend to disagree with many scholars here and argue that there is no coherent policy of India. If you try to investigate what its policy is, you will find it very shambolic. MEA has a different approach from Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Defence has different approach from Ministry of Commerce, and there is only a status quo policy which is Dalai Lama focused. So in his absence, we don’t even know what is going to happen. And I am glad that when I heard Mani Shankar Aiyar earlier talking about the hope that with Indian democracy he could not see a situation where Tibetans would be asked to move out. That hope is based on a particular reading of Indian democracy, rather than ethnographic study of Tibetan experience in India. If we actually bother to study Tibetan experience in India, in different parts, we would find that it is not only about differences of momo’s price which Aiyar talked about in the morning, it is also about antagonism between local people and Tibetans. There are certain factors that generate tensions and they should not be ignored. The present situation is also where only limited scholarship is produced in India on Tibet. In the west also, including the UK, we have got at least a couple of thousands of people who work on Tibet. India, where actually so many Tibetans live, hardly produces anything in terms of academic scholarship. We
got few scholars but there are very few of us. Why would India or Indian Universities not invest more in study of Tibet, or for that matter Tibetan diaspora? And largely, whatever exists, when you look at the books written by many scholars in India on Tibet, they are repetitive, derivative, and even wedded to the dominant strategic nationalist narrative of the country without any deep ethnographic studies of Tibetans here, forget Tibetans in Tibet, even Tibetans that live here. I would not name institutions that have produced this but even the think-tanks that exist here, you look at the work they have produced, you find that they are severely limited.

Now there are three different kinds of discourses that exist in India: one that sees Tibetan diaspora as strategic asset, second that sees it as a liability, and third that recognises the comprehensive contribution made by it to India. Many people in military would talk of Tibet as a strategic asset, recognizing how important Tibet is and what we could do to leverage it. There is also a question of liability. If you speak to officials, not in the military but beyond military, you would come across people who would say that “if only Tibet and Tibetan issue were not there, we might have resolved the border with China or for that matter we could have better friendly relations with China.” So that notion of Tibetans being a liability is very much there. Third there are those who recognise the comprehensive contributions made by Tibetans to India’s security, economy, soft power, and culture. This is a discourse we should all be encouraging. Most people in India don’t know about Tibet and they don’t seem to care. And for that who is responsible? I don’t think it is Tibetans but Indians who are responsible for this apathy. But what India needs to recognize is that Tibetans have made comprehensive contributions. For instance, it is their presence that over time rejuvenated Bodhgaya. When you see the Kalachakra ceremony taking place there in January 2017, you will notice how Tibetans have made an immense contribution. When it comes to local economies, go to different
places where Tibetan settlements are located and you will find economy is flourishing. And of course security - I will even argue that one Dalai Lama provides more security than tens of thousands of Indian troops in Arunachal Pradesh. That is something to be kept in mind. But the biggest gift they make to India is in terms of soft power. In the West, for instance, I am sorry for those of you who might be fans of Narendra Modi, but it is not Narendra Modi who provides soft power for India, it is the Dalai Lama. The one person who keeps talking about India as a land of multi-cultural and multi-religious civilization and land of secular democracy is the Dalai Lama, and people listen to him. They don’tlisten to most Indian politicians. While Tibetans often express their gratitude toward India, as scholars who are not Tibetan, onus is on us to recognize and be grateful to Tibetans for what they have done to India.

In terms of future policy, India has broadly three options and that’s my primary focus - what is future and what should India’s policy be. That is why I said it should, not what is or what might be, but what should be the policy. The first option is adventurist. India could be adventurous, tear down existing policies, and as Jaya Jaitley was saying earlier, say that Tibet was not a part of China and support Tibetans in all their aspirations and adopt that kind of approach. In this India will adopt a balance of power approach vis-a-vis China through alliances with other countries, militarize the border further, encourage protests in Tibet, support Tibetan para-diplomacy, and use these as bargaining chips in the border dispute. The problems with that kind of adventurism are its high risk and high cost. Indian state so far, until today, has shown limited willingness and capacity to do this. Let’s take example of the very mild conference that has taken place in Dharamshala few months ago where the Uighur intellectual was given the visa and his visa was rejected. What we find is, the policy is actually of continuity rather than major change. So I think it is high-risk high-cost, Indian state has showed no
willingness, and even capacity to do so. We should avoid situation of the kind which the Prime Minister has done vis-a-vis Baloch, for instance, what he has done by talking of Baloch struggle is not actually to give hope to many Baloch activists, but turned it from being the indigenous movement against Pakistan to one where it is seen as proxy war by India against Pakistan, without actually doing anything substantive. So avoid that situation. Moreover, India has to remember that South Asian neighbourhood itself is too contentious, and India’s position might be slightly dominant but it is not hegemonic. So can India afford to do that? These are the questions. So I would say that should not be India’s policy, being adventurous.

The second option is being conservative, do nothing, or even restrict Tibetans further, restrict new migrations which India is doing in general, make life difficult for the new migrants while providing more facilities for the old migrants. Because when you stop migrations from Tibet, in a sense you are actually stopping Tibetan diaspora from flourishing. This approach would also encourage westward movement of diaspora, make it difficult for Tibetans to find jobs here, put them in despair, so that they move to US, Europe or somewhere else. This approach would wait for the Dalai Lama to pass away and then hope that after that China will be more amenable to compromise on boundary and somehow India can show to China that it is really sincere. The problem with this approach, apart from being completely immoral and unethical, is its basis in a defeatist attitude that would be akin to 1950s. When in 1950s, India was much more powerful and China was not as powerful as it is today, even then India failed in that kind of policy. So my reckoning would be that in future it would fail again, so this defeated attitude would not help. It wouldn’t make India more secure, while permanently destroying the only strategic and soft power leverage India has over China, which is the presence of a thriving Tibetan community that is showing that
Indian pluralism is more accommodative than Chinese authoritarianism. Moreover, this kind of defeatist approach could also lead to a problem because it doesn’t show any appreciation of Chinese nationalism, how Chinese nationalism function.

So what I would suggest is a pragmatic rethinking of policy. This will take into account the dynamics of nationalism as well as strategy in both the countries that will prevent long term China-India fraternal relation. China-India fraternal relations are almost difficult, if not impossible, even in long term, regardless of what Tibetans do. Traditional Tibetan state has disappeared due to Chinese occupation and India has been complicit with it. Even if the Tibetan diaspora here in India disappears, even then China and India would have problems because there are various other issues. Chinese nationalists see Tibetans and Uighurs as essential part of their country. Selling out Tibetan issue by India will not be an end to China’s challenge to India. What would this pragmatic rethinking involve? First, a recognition that Tibet’s importance lies beyond being a strategic card or liability. Second, learn from Chinese diplomacy. Chinese diplomacy and long term thinking generally avoids intense bureaucratic competition and confusion that seems to mark Indian policy on Tibet. A good example of bureaucratic competition harming India’s interest was over the accusation in 2011 that Karmapa was a possible Chinese spy. This absurd allegation and saga was partly a product of lack of coordination between IB and RAW. Leaks from IB were responsible for generating a scandal than only hurt Tibetan sensibilities. I am only talking of two branches of intelligence, forget what other branches of government might do. So prevent such incidents and have some kind of bureaucratic coordination.

The reality is, India is bound by its recognition of Tibet as part of China. Middle Way in that context allows India to benefit, while also allowing China to benefit, and Tibetans
would survive. So in that case Middle Way is the right approach in that context. Middle Way allows India to benefit from a peaceful diaspora here, as well as calmer boundary without having to challenge the sovereignty of China. If India challenges sovereignty of China over Tibet, it will lead to more tensions. So supporting dialogue is useful. Supporting dialogue would be very important because that sort of assures China and supports Tibetans without antagonizing Indian interests there. That is why I like the fact that it says in the new book launched by CTA that ‘Tibet is not part of China but Middle Way remains the viable solution.’ Remains a viable solution doesn’t mean that it would always be a viable solution. It also implies, reminding China that unless you resolve now, it may not remain a viable solution in the future. So I see that hope in the change in the policy in the future. Now how to support dialogue, how can India do it? It cannot offer its good offices because it is very clear that even if west has tried to intervene, China would simply say ‘look you are puppet for India, you are puppet for the west.’ That is what Chinese nationalists are very good at doing. So India should not offer its good offices to mediate between Tibetans and China, that is not required and that is not useful. In fact in 1950s also when India could have done it, China made it very clear that they didn’t want it and India backed out.

The way to support that dialogue is by strengthening the diaspora, not letting it be but strengthening it. So be active and proactive in strengthening the diaspora here. Because if China realizes that the diaspora is not going to be more fragile after the fourteenth Dalai Lama, but it would actually flourish and continue to flourish and would have backing broadly of Indian public and also of Indian government indirectly, China may start taking the whole idea of dialogue more seriously. Right now the hope they have is that when the Dalai Lama passes away, the world forgets and India ignores. So strengthening diaspora would help them very much. Now how to strengthen diaspora and its future.
One, support, nurture and encourage the leadership of Tibetan exile. The leadership, not only the democratic ones those who get elected, but also the religious leadership. That is very important. Second, treat Tibetan government-in-exile as a *de facto* government, if not *de jure* government. Third, give space to religious leaders including Karmapa, and Karmapa is very important for a simple reason, because like the Dalai Lama, the government leaders in different parts of the world would find it easier to engage with by insisting that he is a spiritual leader and so China has no grounds for objection. Foreign leaders would have difficulty doing that with political leadership but with a religious leadership, they can always say they are meeting them as religious leaders. Karmapa, Sakya Rinpoche and many others. Give space to them. The positive development is that the Indian government is doing that already in recent times like allowing Karmapa to go to Arunachal Pradesh; hopefully he will be allowed to go to Sikkim and other places too. Fourth, recognize that Special Frontier Force has contributed immensely to Indian security, including Indian wars with other neighbouring countries. So recognize them with dignity, and when you give them awards or prizes or gallantry awards, don’t hide and give it surreptitiously. They should be treated as equals, that is very important. Fifth, reinvigorate the Tibetan settlements that exist, especially in South India and eastern India. Sixth, look at the option of citizenship. Most Tibetans cannot get Indian citizenship but this is absurd. Legally they are entitled to but they would not get it. Seventh, encourage research and scholarship. That can be done without interfering in China’s internal affairs. Eighth, welcome new refugees. This is something that is not happening and this is something India should do. India is a huge country with lots of population and Tibetans contribute a lot to the local societies. India should recognize that they suffer a lot and therefore what they need to do is to at least provide them with hospitality. Ninth, encourage Tibetan Buddhist networks in Mongolia, Tibet, China, Japan, Hong Kong and the west. India is doing this but at a slow pace and in a haphazard
manner. Tenth, coordinate policies at central and state government levels. Sometimes Himachal government does one thing and Delhi government does something else and this adds to confusion. Tenth, sensitize the wider public about the Tibetan contribution. Keep it away from Indian party politics. Eleventh, make it clear to China that the Tibet issue is not dependent on hosting the Dalai Lama alone and his followers but of Tibetans persecuted by Chinese colonization. So shift the rhetoric from His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his followers to one of Tibetans being persecuted by Chinese colonization.

Half-hearted measures should be avoided. Don’t send confusing signals and be paranoid; in a sense be like the Chinese; which is, don’t compromise on your national interest while speaking the language of diplomacy, cooperation and friendship.

I will conclude with this. Essentially recuperate the spirit of Panchsheel to an extent rather than revisiting or rejecting it. No need to revisit Panchsheel because that would lead to more problems and would be very disruptive. A speaker earlier talked of Panchsheel and the Middle Way – the similarities between them. The problem is, not only him but many other Indian scholars seem to forget that the Panchsheel agreement was not an agreement between India and China alone, it was the last international agreement and treaty where Tibet was mentioned. Panchsheel agreement was around selling traditional Tibetan state to China, recognizing Tibet as part of China, but it was about India’s relation with Tibet. If you look at most of the Indian writings produced in recent times they don’t even mention Tibet. So how can you talk of Panchsheel without recognizing that Tibet was an integral part of that agreement? When I say that Panchsheel’s true spirit should be recuperated, I am arguing that basically Middle Way Approach, not necessary the independence, offers that. The Middle Way offers an approach which would be face-saving for all while also supporting Tibetans. So remember again that, in the end, one thing which India could do in practical terms,
is ask for revival of trade and intercourse between Tibet and India and re-opening of diplomatic mission in Lhasa is the true spirit of Panchsheel. Why not try for this? India has to be clear that friendship with China does not imply non-friendship with Tibet. And I do think that pragmatic policy which I outlined here is feasible within the current setup. But whether Indian government and public have the capacity, will and the vision to do that or not, I leave it to you to decide.

Thank you.

Dhardon Sharling

Thank you very much Professor Dibyesh Anand for talking about what should be India’s policy. I am sure there is more room for discussion on that. So before that I would like to now request Dr. Lobsang Sangay to speak on the topic and the particular topic we have assigned you with is ‘Strategic Importance and Relevance of the Middle-Way Policy’ and I would like to remind our speaker that you have twenty minutes for your presentation.

Dr. Lobsang Sangay

Thank you very much Dhardon la. Now you know why Dibyesh doesn’t want to be called doctor but rather professor. Because if you are a doctor, you only speak on one dissertation or topic. He is professor and he has covered everything. So I am left with nothing much to say actually. All the points that I was jotting down, you covered ninety percent of it, so Dibyesh you have left me nothing to say. Next time you come as a doctor and speak on one assigned topic so I will have something to say also.
Also the challenge that we are given, this panel is given, is to talk about the future and the solution. Often I am asked why you took this job. What can you do to solve the issue of Tibet? That is kind of part of my job. So my job is to, obviously, be in my office in Dharamshala—a kind of remote town, now we have airport and a movie theatre. From there we are supposed to influence the capitals around the world, which in turn will impact and influence Beijing and they will review the policy of Tibet and solve it. That is my job. And now I am supposed to propose the template or the solution for the future. So it is a difficult task.

But let me start with Panchsheel. Panchsheel being raised by Mani Shankar Aiyar ji and you. The origin of Panchsheel is very important. Let me put it this way. The Middle Way Approach
is an authentic Tibetan-based, Tibetan-thought-through solution to the problem. Panchsheel was, in some ways, an Indian effort to solve or address Tibet issue. Simla Convention was British effort to address Tibet issue. Seventeen Point Agreement was Chinese effort to address the Tibet issue. And hence, Middle Way is based on all these experiences- the Seventeen Point Agreement, Simla Convention and Panchsheel. We Tibetans thought it through and as envisioned by His Holiness, proposed the Middle Way as the solution.

Now as for Panchsheel, it is very important. When Simla Convention was signed, there was a representation from China as well. They objected and did not sign the final document. Their objection was mainly on the border between Tibet and China. The Chinese representative did not object to anything with the border of India and Tibet. Now when Tawang and Panchsheel comes up people forget that the Chinese, if you read the Simla Convention, there is no objection at all from the Chinese side on the India-Tibet border which is now India-China border, which we don’t agree, but on the Tibet-China border. Now, on the sidelines of Panchsheel, two other agreements were signed - one is McMohan line which is the border line and the other is Panchsheel. Panchsheel was essentially a trade regulation or trade-based agreement between Tibet and at that time British India. So it was signed in 1914. So it was to be renewed every ten years. So 1914, 1924, 1934, 1944, all these was renewed between Delhi and Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet. But in 1954, Pandit Nehru sent his delegation to Beijing and the delegation came back after couple of months and said, ‘we have the agreement and it is called Panchsheel.’ The Panchsheel is derived from Sanskrit term Paanch. If you look at the preamble of the Panchsheel, it has five points, but if you look at the body of the Panchsheel, it has nothing to do with India-China relations. Still it is a trade relation, trade route from Sikkim to Shigatze to Lhasa. It has nothing to do with the bilateral treaty between India and China. It is only the preamble where there are five points. At that time Nehru said Panchsheel is
Indian term, so it is us, and China said, well we will have another Panchsheel with Burma, so they co-opted even the Sanskrit term called Panchsheel and made it their own.

They are the authors because they have Panchsheel with Burma as well. Now the problem is, when Panchsheel was signed, India gave away some effort to mediate or support the Tibet cause in a big way. At that time, this is how shrewd or smart the Chinese are. At that time Nehru wanted Panchseel to last twenty-five years. China said ‘no, only five years.’ In the end they agreed for eight years. Now what happened in five years – in 1959 Tibet was occupied. What happened in eight years – in 1962 Indo-China war happened. They planned this all along while Panchseel was signed. This I think is very important for all of us to know. China wants to celebrate Panchsheel- they marked hundred years of Panchsheel, fifty years of Panchsheel, they buy this editorial ad in Indian newspapers. Everybody read this and say Panchsheel was a good thing. But if you look at the history of Panchsheel, actually the 1962 war was planted in Panchsheel agreement. This is how shrewd or smart the Chinese were.

Now, what does Middle Way do to us? It is not that His Holiness did not try, or the Tibetans didn’t try. We went to United Nations in 1959, 1961, and 1965, and we lobbied and three resolutions were passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. At that time PRC was not a member of the UN Security Council but Taiwan was, or ROC was. The three resolutions we have in the United Nations says, two of them talk about human rights and one talks about self-determination of the Tibetan people. In all of these three resolutions, China was not mentioned. They talk about Tibetan human rights and self-determinations but where should Tibetans get their self-determination from is not mentioned. So even at that time when China was not the member of UN Security Council, we moved the UN and that was the result - three resolutions in the General Assembly. I had a friend from Palestine and I talked to him and said that we have three
resolutions in the United Nations on Tibet, and he said we have hundreds of resolutions in the United Nations, especially on the Palestinian issue. Nothing happens because UN general assembly is more or less an advisory body, it is the Security Council which decides. Then I stopped highlighting it as far as our achievement is concerned. Palestine has hundreds of resolutions in the UN General Assembly and nothing has changed and three resolutions in 1950s and early 1960s do not mean much.

The US and all the European countries were approached and even India was approached. At the end His Holiness felt that we have to compromise, there has to be a win-win proposition and hence the Buddhist notion of *Umaylam*, the Middle Way, the idea or the term came from a Buddhist term but it also kind of win-win situation for both sides. Essentially it took into consideration the Chinese view, that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China will not be compromised. If you want to touch that, you don’t come to the negotiating table. Some of my Indian friends said why you don’t ask for more, then you get little less. I said if they are offering it obviously we will say ‘even though you are offering something bigger I will take little less; but there is no offer. There is no negotiating table to begin with. So to enter the negotiating table, you have to take into consideration the Chinese side - sovereignty and territorial integrity.

From our side what we are saying is - end repression of the Tibetan people, destruction of Larung gar, the eviction of nuns from the Yachen gar, you can clearly see the revival of Cultural Revolution in Tibet. What is Cultural Revolution? Demolish monasteries, expel monks and nuns, and make nuns wear military uniforms and make them sing songs praising Chinese leadership, and make nuns dance on stage to pop songs praising Communist Party. This is happening in Tibet now. This is almost like Cultural Revolution being revived in Tibet.
Given this scenario, and as Brahma Chellaney mentioned about the damming of river and exploitation, so taking into consideration, the urgency of the situation in Tibet, His Holiness felt we must find a solution. Mainly because as much as CTA and exile Tibetans are concerned, they can make noise and express their preferences, but we are only 2.5 percent of the Tibetan population. Of the six million population, 97.5 percent are inside Tibet. His Holiness’s thinking is, to end the repression of 97.5 is a priority over 2.5 percent exile Tibetans’ preferences. Hence in the interest of Tibetans in Tibet, the Middle Way Approach was envisioned.

So taking into consideration the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, we don’t, in some ways, challenge ‘One-China policy.’ ‘One-China’ has many interpretations - One-China could mean there is only one government for China that is PRC government. Some say sovereignty and territorial integrity of China belongs to PRC, which includes Taiwan and other territories as well. So there are different interpretations but the Middle Way Policy does not challenge One-China policy. What it does is it gives us the space. We have all read about Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen making a call to Trump, it became a big news which I think is a bold step on the part of Trump to receive the call and also making a statement that we are not bound by ‘One-China policy.’ But Tsai Ing-wen can only make a call to Trump, she cannot visit USA, she cannot visit Europe, she cannot visit India because of the ‘One-China’ dispute with China. Now as far as exile Tibetans are concerned, His Holiness visits around the world, even the CTA leaders can visit around the world, thanks to the Middle Way policy.

Now White House has applauded, endorsed and supported Middle Way and issued statements in 2012, 2014 and 2016. So, once the Middle Way is applauded and supported by the US government, it allows space for Tibetans to travel around and advocate our
cause. So the Middle Way Approach, in that sense, is quite unique and, in some sense, genius. It does create a space for us. And also any member of the United Nations, if ‘One-China’ is challenged, China can impose and trigger UN Charter Article 2(4) where members of the United Nations has to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other UN members, which includes China. If you go to the International Court of Justice, if any country supports independence for Tibet or Xinjiang or Taiwan, they can take you to the court, and the likelihood that you might lose is high because the UN Charter is very clear. And also different governments and countries have bilateral treaties with China respecting, again the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.

In that sense Middle Way creates that middle space which is large enough for Tibetans to survive, strengthen and sustain. In that sense, on the part of His Holiness, I think he came out with a very good idea because our goal is to preserve our identity and pursue our dignity. And then we have ‘Five-Fifty’ vision. When we say preserve our identity, it means our language, culture, religion, customs which is part and parcel of our identity. We have to preserve it. If we lose our identity, then we lose Tibetan cause, we lose Tibet issue we lose Tibetan people. So preserving identity is very important. Hence to preserve identity we need space and Middle Way provides that space. And to pursue dignity, which is to achieve genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people inside Tibet, is our aspiration. It is the dignity that we seek. So you cannot pursue your aspiration or dignity if you don’t have identity. Hence, the Middle Way is also that way, very supportive.

Hence the Middle Way, we think and we believe, is the solution for Tibet issue and this is also a win-win proposition for the Chinese government. Some of the hard-liners in China, as Dibyesh also said, believes that waiting for His Holiness is their end game.
But they are absolutely wrong because their waiting game on Taiwan is a failed strategy. They said we will not negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek on the issue of Taiwan because he is a traitor. They wanted to wait till Chiang Kai-shek dies. He died and his son Chiang Ching-kuo came. The Chinese said we are not going to discuss with the son of traitor, we will wait, and time is on our side. Then came Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou and now Tsai Ing-wen. Now the recent poll in Taiwan shows that 75-80 percent, some say more, call themselves and believes themselves as Taiwanese and not Chinese. China waited all these years, in a sense they lost Taiwan. There is a generational change in Taiwan who believe themselves as Taiwanese, not Chinese.

Similarly they waited for Hong Kong. Now you can clearly see. When I was in the US, twenty years ago, I had couple of classmates from Hong Kong and the ‘One Country Two System Basic Law’ was going on. I asked them why you don’t ask for more, they said we don’t even have a Toyota car you want us to ask for Mercedes. Now you can see Joshua Wong and others, they are raising the voice about independence of Hong Kong; you can clearly see. And the Chinese government, I hope they realize this - more they wait for a better situation to come, the more changes takes place in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Hence for the Chinese government, it is best that they negotiate with His Holiness the Dalai Lama while he is alive and healthy. Mainly because for any agreement to succeed, it is not so much what you get in writing on paper, it is the implementation, acceptance, for that you need His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

So not only Tibetans should be granted high degree of autonomy; for that to be successfully implemented and to be embraced by Tibetans, you need a leader who can persuade the Tibetan people to agree. Hence, His Holiness is not the obstacle but the solution to the Tibet issue.
And because the US government or White House has supported Middle Way Approach, I think, as a guest we cannot demand, we can only appeal to this great country—India—that Indian government should also consider supporting Middle Way Approach. Because you can look at Panchsheel, Simla Convention or the UN Charter, it gives you the space and India is in the best place to support the Tibet issue. It has full credibility, because among all the governments and the countries in the world, it is India which has hosted His Holiness the Dalai Lama and allows the largest number of Tibetans to settle in India; so India can say we are concerned because the largest number of Tibetans are in India for fifty seven years and still remain in India.

From the civilization point of view also, it is credible because the Nalanda University was destroyed in 13th century. Good thing is that in 7th and 8th century some Tibetan scholars came to India and learned Sanskrit and translated every possible Buddhist texts and took it back to Tibet and the Nalanda tradition was revived in Tibet and thrived in Tibet. But unfortunately in 1950s the Chinese came and destroyed 98% of monasteries and nunneries and 99% of monks and nuns were disrobed. They destroyed the Nalanda tradition in Tibet. Thankfully for His Holiness the Dalai Lama, eighty thousand Tibetans came to India and revived Nalanda tradition in India. So we are not just the water tower of Asia but we are also instrumental in revival of Nalanda tradition, which India can proudly claim as theirs. So we have contributed. And the civilizational relationship is there between India and Tibet as well.

Now obviously His Holiness always proudly say that ‘I am a son of India’ and his reasoning is very simple… “because my brain all about Nalanda tradition and my body is also made in India because daal, baadh and chapati that I had for sixty years have made me into Indian.” So I was just thinking if sixty years of daal, baadh and
chapati of India makes him son of India, then Lord Shiva spent five thousand years in Mount Kailash in Tibet, I think he has become a son of Tibet because he has eaten so much momo and thukpa, but all vegetarian, that we can claim Shiva as son of Tibet. Some people told me that during Diwali you eat baang and it has something to do with Lord Shiva also. I think baang and chang were mistaken. It is actually chang lost in translation. So civilizational relationship as well, and the fact that we have been here for fifty seven years, you can clearly see, me including, all the people sitting on the dais and in the audience as well, most of us, almost ninety percent of Tibetan leadership in exile, CTA included, were born and brought up in India. So now we are made up of Indian chapati and daal, so Tibetan leaders are made in India. And the Ahimsa that we follow, following Gandhiji, so our philosophy is also Indian. The democracy that we follow in Dharamshala and the Tibetan world is also very much an adaptation of Indian democracy. We all talk about Modi’s ‘Make in India’ slogan. The original ‘Make in India’ is the Tibetan movement. So if India wants ‘Make in India’ to succeed, the Tibetan movement has to succeed. And I hope and believe we will. When that day comes it will be the success of India, it will be success of international community, and it will be success of the Tibetan people, with His Holiness the Dalai Lama back in Lhasa.

Thank you very much.

Dhardon Sharling

Thank you very much Dr. Lobsang Sangay for elaborating on how the Middle Way Policy not just remains a policy but a strategic approach to resolving the Tibet issue and I think the crux of what you really said is when all roads are close it is the Middle Way Approach that actually helps you navigate your way through.
Thank you very much Dr. Lobsang Sangay and Professor Dibyesh. So that brings us to the close of the third and final plenary session and also the daylong symposium. In 2011, after Dr. Lobsang Sangay was newly sworn in, I remember reading an interview with *Time*, and he made a very very important statement, which said ‘Tibet sets the litmus test for China’s rise.’ And between November 2012 and March 2013 when Xi Jinping took over political leadership, I was part of Tibet International Network and I think Kate would be very familiar with this, we ran a campaign saying – ‘Xi Jinping, Tibet remains your biggest Challenge.’ And it is 2016 and I think China really needs to realize that His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Middle-Way Approach presents an opportunity for them to address their legitimacy deficit in Tibet or over Tibet. And mostly importantly to peacefully resolve the Tibet issue. I hope today’s discussion will send the message, loud and clear to the Chinese leadership what Tibet stands for, what our future course of action is, and how well can the Chinese leadership fit well into this amazingly and responsibly crafted strategy called the Middle-Way Approach.

Thank you all for your attention, for your participation and I am really glad to see the hall jam-packed right through morning until the very end. We overran by 18 minutes and I apologize for that, but I really hope all of us will go back and take away a lot of messages that we have all received from the very distinguished speakers who have addressed Tibet - its past, present and future. Thank you all very much and wish you all a very good evening ahead.
PHOTO COLLAGE:
SYMPOSIUM IN FRAMES
AGENDA:

10:30 Guests arrive and high tea
11:00 Opening program and book launch

12:00–13:00 PLENARY ONE

PAST:
THE HISTORICAL STATUS OF TIBET AND CHINA
– Relations between independent Tibet and India (1947-1962) - Claude Arpi, Historian and Tibetologist
– Current developments in Tibet and China–its implications for India- Jayadeva Ranade, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy
Moderator: Sonam Norbu Dagpo, Secretary, DIIR

13:00–14:00 Lunch

14:00–15:00 PLENARY TWO

PRESENT:
CURRENT SITUATION INSIDE TIBET UNDER THE CHINESE RULE
– Tibet’s environment and its impact on Asia- Prof. Brahma Chellaney, Centre for Policy Research

– Current human rights situation inside Tibet and the case of Larung Gar- Kate Saunders, International Campaign for Tibet
Moderator: Kalden Tsomo, EU, UN & HR Desk, DIIR

15:00–16:00 PLENARY THREE

FUTURE:
THE MIDDLE WAY POLICY: THE WAY FORWARD
– The Strategic relevance of the Middle Way Approach- Dr. Lobsang Sangay, Sikyong, Central Tibetan Administration
– Sino-Tibet Dialogue- What should be India’s role and leverage?- Prof. Dibyesh Anand, University of Westminster
Moderator: Dhordon Sharling, Secretary, DIIR

16:00–16:30 Closing

VENUE:
The Speaker Hall
Constitution Club of India
Rafi Marg, Behind Reserve Bank of India
New Delhi, 110001
RSVP–9882322797, 8585901655, 9882868416