Introduction

Tibet Under Communist China—50 Years is a detailed and comprehensive examination of the various strands of Beijing's imperial strategy to cement its rule over one of the restive outposts of communist China's sprawling empire. It sheds new light on the over-arching geopolitical impulses that drive China to initiate new, and sometimes contradictory, policies in Tibet, only to reverse them in a decade or two, all in the attempt to ensure that one loose brick does not bring the whole imperial edifice crumbling down. In this respect, Tibet Under Communist China—50 Years will be a new resource to both China specialists, governments, businessmen and other interested parties in their understanding of the world's largest surviving empire, which also happens to be its biggest market with a booming economy and an insatiable appetite for energy and other resources.

As long as China remained a one-party dictatorship sticking to a socialist pattern of development, the natural resources of the so-called minority peoples were fairly safe. Now with China's conversion to a market economy with one of the highest annual growth rates in the world, the abundant natural resources on the fringes of the empire are rapidly exploited to fuel the dynamic development of the centre. The change of the Chinese attitude to its imperial fringes, from mere imperial outposts to resource-rich colonies to supply the raw material to maintain a dynamic economy, should be of enormous concern to the so-called minorities who inhabit these vast regions endowed with rich natural resources. It should also be of concern to the rest of world as the competition for fast-depleting natural resources will reach new height and vigour.

Tibet Under Communist China—50 Years gives an exhaustive account of this change of attitude of Beijing to one of its colonies. Earlier communist China looked at Tibet more from a geopolitical and security perspective. Now coupled with this enduring imperial reason for staying put in Tibet, an economically vibrant China looks to Tibet as the best source for coastal China's galloping demand for energy, fuel and water. The devastating impact of this change of attitude toward Tibet is already felt in Tibet as Tibetans, unable to compete with more skilled Chinese settlers, are becoming increasingly marginalised by the forces of globalisation unleashed on the roof of the world. Having lost their country, Tibetans in increasing number are losing their jobs to the Chinese settlers streaming to Tibet to take advantage of the economic boom.
This is one of the issues of concern to Tibetans discussed in Tibet Under Communist China—50 Years. It also gives a detailed account of the events that led to the fall of Tibet, Chinese efforts to collectivise Tibet’s traditional economy, campaigns to eradicate the influence of Tibetan Buddhism, the militarization of Tibet, the brief contacts between Dharamsala and Beijing, a history of Tibet and Tibet’s old social system and other issues that are of vital concern to Tibet’s neighbours.

In short, what China does or does not do in Tibet becomes a mirror to the deep-seated imperial impulses of this ancient and daunting land. We hope that this book will provide an accurate pointer to not only what China is doing in Tibet, but also to the overall direction in which China is heading.

Secretary (Information)
Department of Information & International Relations
Central Tibetan Administration
Gangchen Kyishong
D H A R A M S A L A  1 7 6 2 1 5
H.P., India
Glossary of Names and Places

Amdo
One of the three provinces of traditional Tibet, now divided between Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan provinces.

Chamdo
Chamdo, former headquarters of the Eastern Tibet, is now the administrative seat of the Chamdo Prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Chamdo is spelled as Qamdo in Chinese documents.

Chideshol
Chideshol is a village in Lhoka area in the Central Tibet. Spelled as Ji de xue in Chinese documents, Chideshol now falls under the Lokha (Ch: Shannan) Prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region.

Damshung
Damshung is a town, located between Lhasa and Nagchu. It is spelled as Daxiong in Chinese documents.

Dechen
Dechen forms the southernmost part of Kham. It is now referred to as Deqin Xian. Tibetan areas around Dechen are now designated as Deqin Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the Chinese province of Yunnan.

Derge
Derge, a major town in Kham, is now officially referred to as Dege Xian by the Chinese. It now falls under Kartze (Ch: Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province.

Dhartsedo
Dhartsedo, a major town in eastern Tibet or Kham, is now referred to as Kangding Xian. It currently falls under Kartze or Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dhashi</td>
<td>Dhashi, now named as Haiyan Xian, is a strategic town located on the northeastern shores of Lake Kokonor in Amdo. It falls under Tsojang or Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Qinghai Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drichu</td>
<td>It is the Tibetan name for Yangtze River, which has its head source at Mt. Thang-la (Ch: Tanggula) in Central Tibet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drichu-toe</td>
<td>Drichu-toe is the Tibetan name for Tongtian River, which flows from Tibet to China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dromo</td>
<td>Dromo is a small town in central Tibet or U-Tsang, near the border of Bhutan and the Indian State of Sikkim. It is also known as Yatung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dronpa</td>
<td>Dronpa (Ch: Zhongba) is a small town located in western Tibet, bordering the Mustang region of Nepal. It is also known as Tadhun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzachu</td>
<td>It is the Tibetan name for Upper Mekong River, which flows through Chamdo to Yunnan Province in China. It is also known as Langcang River by the Chinese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gartok</td>
<td>Gartok is a small place in Ngari, western Tibet.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Golok</td>
<td>Golok is located in Amdo. It is now designated as Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gormo</td>
<td>Gormo (Ch: Golmud), the second largest town in Amdo, was once a vast pastoral land inhabited by a few hundred Tibetan nomads. Today it is a city with a population of 88,500 (1994). Administered by the People’s Liberation Army, Gormo is a major military base on the Tibetan plateau. It is connected by road and rail line to Siling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyantse</td>
<td>Gyantse is a major town in central Tibet. It is spelled as Jiangzi in Chinese documents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TIBET UNDER COMMUNIST CHINA

Gyerong Gyamo Ngochu is also known as Dadu River in Chinese documents.

Kangtsa Kangtsa (Ch: Gangcha Xian) is a major town to the north of Lake Kokonor in Amdo. Currently, it falls under the Tsojang or Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province.

Kanlho Kanlho is a Tibetan area incorporated into Chinese Province of Gansu. It is now referred to as Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.

Kartze Kartze, a major town in eastern Tibet, is now the administrative seat of Kartze or Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the Chinese province of Sichuan.

Kham Traditional eastern Tibetan province, now divided between “Tibet Autonomous Region”, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces.

Kongpo Kongpo or Gongbu (Chinese) is a tropical fertile valley in southern Tibet, bordering the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh. It is one of the biggest military bases in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

Kyirong Kyirong (Ch: Jilong) is a small border town in western Tibet.

Lhoka Lhoka lies to the south of Lhasa. It is now referred to as Lokha or Shannan (Chinese) Prefecture of Tibet Autonomous Region.

Lhuntse Dzong Lhuntse (Ch: Longzi) Dzong is a border district in southern Tibet.

Laogai (Chinese) Reform through labour (camp); equivalent to a prison. Holds more serious prisoners than a laojiao, a reform through education (camp) which houses detainees usually for up to four years.

Machu It is known as Yellow River to the Chinese.
Mang-ya (Ch: Mangya Zhen), now a part of Haixi Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, is located in the westernmost part of Amdo, bordering Southern Xinjiang.

Markham, a major town in Kham, is now a part of Chamdo prefecture of Tibet Autonomous Region. Markham is spelt as Mangkang in Chinese documents.

Spelt as Mozhu-gongka in Chinese documents, Meldro Gonggar is a small village to the northeast of Lhasa.

Metok Dzong (Ch: Motuo) is a small strategic town in southern Tibet, where Yarlung Tsangpo or Brahmaputra river bends to enter India. It is one of China’s important military outposts in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

Mili is now referred to as Muli Tibetan Autonomous County in the Chinese province of Sichuan.

Nangartse (Ch: Langkazi) is a small town to the west of Yamdrok Lake in Central Tibet.

Nagchu (Ch: Nagqu), a strategic town located to the north of Lhasa, is the administrative seat of Nagqu Prefecture of Tibet Autonomous Region.

Ngaba is a Tibetan area incorporated into Chinese Province of Sichuan. It is now referred to as Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture.

It is referred to as Yalong River in Chinese documents.

Nyemo is a small town located between Lhasa and Shigatse. It is spelt as Nimu in Chinese documents.
TIBET UNDER COMMUNIST CHINA

Nyingtri
Nyingtri, a major town in the Kongpo (Ch: Gongbu) area in central Tibet, is now referred to as Linzhi Prefecture of the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

Parig
Parig, located in northeastern Amdo, is now referred to as Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous County in the Chinese Province of Gansu.

Phenpo
Phenpo is a village in Lhundrup Dzong or District on the outskirts of Lhasa. It now falls under the Lhasa Municipality.

Powo Tramo
Powo Tramo (Ch: Bomi) is a lagao camp located in southern Tibet, currently under Chamdo Prefecture of Tibet Autonomous Region. It is where prisoners were forced to work on lumbering industries.

PSB

Qinghai Province
Qinghai Province is entirely a Tibetan region, consisting of Amdo and Kham areas. The current administrative division of Qinghai Province includes: 1) Xining District, 2) Haidong Prefecture, 3) Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 4) Haixi Mongolia and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 5) Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 6) Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 7) Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 8) Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.

Ruthok
Ruthok is a major town in Ngari (Ch: Ali), western Tibet, which borders Ladakh region of India. It is spelled as Ritu in Chinese documents.

Saga
Saga is a small town located in western Tibet, bordering Yolmo region of Nepal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serkhog</td>
<td>Serkhog, known officially as Datong in Chinese documents, is a strategic town located to the north of Siling city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siling</td>
<td>Spelled as Xining in Chinese documents, Siling used to be the provincial capital of Amdo, and is now the capital of Qinghai Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shigatse</td>
<td>Spelled as Xigaze in Chinese documents, Shigatse is the second largest town in Central Tibet. It is also the seat of the Panchen Lama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taktse</td>
<td>Taktse (Ch: Dazi) is a small town in the outskirts of Lhasa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terlenkha</td>
<td>Terlenkha (Ch: Delingha) is located on the northeastern edge of the Tsaidam Basin in Amdo. Terlenkha is 511 km by road from Siling and 521 km by rail—halfway between Siling and Gormo. Now raised to “City” status, Terlenkha is an artificial Chinese outpost developed originally to serve as the hub of a vast penal network and later as a center for industrial, primarily mineral, exploitation. It is also the capital of Haixi Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thang-la</td>
<td>It is known as Mt. Tanggula in the Chinese documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>Tibet in this document refers to historical Tibet, which is now divided by the Chinese Government into a number of administrative regions. 1) Qinghai Province, 2) “Tibet Autonomous Region”, 3) Tianzu Tibetan Autonomous County and Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu Province, 4) Aba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Ganze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and Muli Tibetan Autonomous County in Sichuan Province, 5) Deqin Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TAR  The Tibetan area west of Drichu (Yangtze River) and south of the Kunlun mountains, formerly known as U-Tsang, is now designated as the Tibet Autonomous Region. This is the only area recognized by modern-day China as “Tibet”. It was formerly constituted as an “autonomous region” in 1965. Chinese: Xizang zizhiqu.

Tibetan Plateau  The PRC has now renamed the Tibetan plateau as Qinghai-Tibet Plateau.

Toelung Dechen  Spelt as Duilong Deqin in Chinese documents, Toelung Dechen is a small village in the outskirts of Lhasa.

Tsaidam Basin  The resource-rich Tsaidam (Ch: Chaidamu) Basin is located in the northwestern edge of Amdo.

Tsawa Pomdha  Tsawa Pomdha, also known as Dzogang (Ch: Zuogang), is currently under Chamdo prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region.

Tsethang  Tsethang is a major town located South of Lhasa.

Tsojang  Tsojang is Amdo area located to the north of Lake Kokonor. It is now designated as Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province.

Tsona  Tsona (Ch: Cuona) is a small border town located in Southern Tibet, bordering Arunachal Pradesh in India.

Tsonub  Tsonub is Amdo area located to the west of Lake Kokonor. It is now designated as Haixi Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province.

Tsakha  Tsakha (Ch: Chaka) is located in Tsaidam Basin.
Tsoshar
Tsoshar is Amdo area located to the east of Lake Kokonor. It is now designated as Haidong Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province.

Tulan
Tulan Dzong is located 221 km to the west of Gormo. It is now referred to as Dulan Xian in Haixi Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province. Since the early 1950s, the PRC has developed Tulan Dzong as a center for laogai.

Western Region
Western Region or Western China encompasses 5.4 million sq km and 300 million people across six provinces (Gansu, Qinghai, Shanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan), three autonomous regions (Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang) and one city (Chongqing). Of the 5.4 million sq km, 2.5 million sq km constitute traditional Tibetan areas of U-Tsang, Amdo and Kham.

Zayul
Zayul (Ch: Chayu) is a small strategic town located in the Southern most part of Tibet, bordering Burma and the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded on October 1, 1949. Immediately, Radio Beijing began to announce that “the People’s Liberation Army must liberate all Chinese territories, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan and Taiwan”. The Tibetan Foreign Office responded to Mao Zedong, on November 2, 1949, that, “Tibet has from the earliest times up to now been an independent country whose political administration has never been taken over by any foreign country; and Tibet also defended her own territories from foreign invasions.” The Foreign Office communique also demanded the return of its Amdo and Kham territories annexed by China’s earlier governments. Copies of this document were sent to the governments of India, Great Britain and the United States. However, these governments advised Lhasa to enter into direct negotiations with Beijing as any other course of action might provoke military retaliation by China.

Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marched through Eastern Tibet and circulated a 10-point document, instructing Tibetans to cooperate with China in “liberating” their country from foreign imperialists. This struck the Tibetan Government as a curious claim since there were fewer than 10 foreigners in the whole land at that time.

The Tibetan Government decided to send a delegation, consisting of Tsepon Shakabpa and Tsechag Thubten Gyalpo and five assistants, to negotiate with the PRC in a
third country—possibly the USSR, Singapore or Hong Kong. China suggested Hong Kong, to which the Tibetan Government agreed; its delegates were directed to discuss the contents of the Foreign Office communique to Chairman Mao and to raise the issue of the threatening Chinese radio announcements still being made about an imminent “liberation of Tibet”. The delegates were instructed to secure an assurance that the territorial integrity of Tibet would not be violated.

When the group reached Delhi and applied for Hong Kong visas, the British refused—arguably to avoid antagonizing the Chinese Government by stamping visas on passports issued by the Tibetan Government. So, in June 1950 the Tibetan Government instructed its delegates to hold negotiations in Delhi. The Chinese disagreed and suggested that the Tibetans should leave for Beijing after preliminary talks with their new ambassador to India, due to arrive shortly in Delhi.

During preliminary talks in Delhi, the Chinese Ambassador, Yuan Zhong Xian, demanded that the Tibetan delegation accept a three-point proposal: i) Tibet should be recognized as part of China; ii) Tibetan national defence would be handled by China; and iii) Tibet’s political and trade relations with foreign countries must be conducted through China. The team were then to proceed to China in confirmation of the agreement.

The Tibetan Government instructed its delegates to reject the Chinese proposal, particularly the contention that Tibet was part of China. But, by the time this response reached the delegates on October 23, 1950, China had already taken Chamdo, Eastern Tibet’s provincial capital, and was poised to march further into Tibet. On October 7, 1950 Commanders Wang Qimei and Zhang Guohua had led 40,000 PLA troops in an eight-pronged attack on Chamdo. The Tibetan force, numbering 8,000 troops, engaged the PLA in fierce encounters. By October 19 the Tibetans had fought 21 battles and lost over 5,700 men. Chamdo fell to the PLA and Kalon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the provincial governor, was captured.

Deplored by India

The Chinese aggression came as a rude shock to India. In a sharp note to Beijing on October 26, 1950, the Indian Foreign Ministry wrote: “Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by the Chinese Government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronized with it and there naturally will be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgement of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace.” A number of countries, including the United States and Britain, expressed their support for the Indian position.
Back in Lhasa, the Tibetan Government decided to appeal to the United Nations for mediation. It wrote to the UN Secretary General on November 11, 1950, pleading for the world body's intervention. The letter said, in part: “Tibet recognizes that it is in no position to resist the Chinese advance. It is thus that it agreed to negotiate on friendly terms with the Chinese Government... Though there is little hope that a nation dedicated to peace will be able to resist the brutal effort of men trained to war, we understand that the United Nations has decided to stop aggression wherever it takes place.”

The Tibetan National Assembly convened an emergency session and requested the Dalai Lama, then only 15, to assume full authority as head of state and move his government temporarily to Dromo (Yatung), near the Indian border, so that he would be out of personal danger. At the same time, the Tibetan Foreign Office issued the following statement: “Tibet is united as one man behind the Dalai Lama who has taken over full powers ... We have appealed to the world for peaceful intervention in (the face of this) clear case of unprovoked aggression.”

On November 17, 1950 the Dalai Lama assumed power at a formal ceremony and wrote to Mao Zedong: “The relationship between Tibet and China has deteriorated during my minority. Now that I have taken responsibility, I wish to revive the past harmonious relationship between us.” The Dalai Lama asked Mao to release the Tibetan prisoners of war and withdraw Chinese troops from Tibetan territory.

On that very day, El Salvador proposed that the aggression against Tibet be put on the UN General Assembly agenda. However, discussion before the General Assembly was shelved when the Indian delegation asserted that a peaceful solution that was mutually advantageous to Tibet, India and China could be reached between the parties concerned. A second letter from the Tibetan delegation to the United Nations on December 8, 1950 brought no change in the situation.

Ngabo, now a captive of the Chinese invasion forces, sent two successive messages to Lhasa, requesting negotiations with China in Chamdo and offering his services as a negotiator. This, Ngabo's letter advised, was the best means of preventing a military takeover of the rest of the plateau.

Having lost Eastern Tibet, and lacking active international support, the Dalai Lama and his government appointed a three-member delegation, headed by Ngabo. The two other delegates—Khenchung Thubten Legmon and Sampho Tenzin Dhondup—left Lhasa for Chamdo with a five-point proposal to hand over to Ngabo, the leader of the delegation. The proposal demanded the return of Tibetan territories in Kham and Amdo, and the withdrawal of Chinese troops from there. The PRC, on the other hand, wanted to discuss the “peaceful liberation” of the remaining areas of Tibet.
Obviously, there was no common ground for negotiation. The Chinese and Tibetan governments then decided to hold fresh negotiations in Beijing.

The new five-member Tibetan delegation to Beijing, led by Ngabo, was authorized to table a five-point position statement, demanding the return of Tibetan territories up to the eastern border city of Dartsedo and repatriation of all Chinese civilian and military personnel from Eastern Tibet. The delegation was instructed to refer all-important matters back to the government in Dromo and expressly not given plenipotentiary authority to conclude an agreement.8

17-Point Ultimatum

On April 29, 1951 negotiations opened in Beijing with the presentation of a draft proposal, containing 10 points, by Li Weihan, leader of the Chinese delegation. This document held the same demands made earlier by China in Eastern Tibet. The Tibetan team rejected the Chinese proposal and pressed its own government’s position. Negotiations dragged on for nearly a month and finally, on May 21, China presented a draft of what came to be known as the “17-Point Agreement”; this was strikingly similar to the 10-point document, which the Tibetan delegates had rejected earlier. However, China stated that the terms, as they now stood, were final and amounted to an ultimatum. The Tibetan delegation was addressed in harsh and insulting terms, threatened with physical violence, and members were virtually kept prisoner. No further discussion was permitted and, contrary to Chinese claims, the Tibetan delegation was prevented from contacting its government for instructions.9 It was given the choice of either signing the “agreement” on its own authority or accepting responsibility for an immediate PLA advance on Lhasa.

When the Tibetan delegates signed the “17-Point Agreement” on May 23, 1951 without being able to inform their government, they stressed that they were signing only in their personal capacity and had no authority to bind either the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government to the “agreement”. This did not deter the Chinese Government from proceeding with a high-profile signing ceremony and announcing to the world that an “agreement” had been concluded for the “peaceful liberation of Tibet”. Even the seals affixed to the document were not those of the Tibetan Government; they were improvised in Beijing and merely bore the personal names of the delegates.

Entitled the “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet”, amongst the 17 points of the “Agreement” were clauses authorizing the entry into Tibet of Chinese forces and empowering the Chinese government to handle Tibet’s external affairs.
It also guaranteed that China would not alter the existing political system in Tibet and not interfere with the established status, function, and powers of the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama. The Tibetan people were to have regional autonomy and their religious beliefs and customs were to be respected. Internal reforms in Tibet would be effected after consultation with leading Tibetans and without compulsion.

Soon after the signing ceremony, the Tibetan delegates met Chairman Mao Zedong, Premier Zhou Enlai and other Chinese leaders. Zhou responded during this meeting to Ngabo's earlier letter, demanding the reunification of Tibetan areas in Kham and Amdo under the existing Tibetan administration. While stating that the existence of historical differences among different Tibetan regions meant that this was not the opportune moment for reunification, Zhou agreed that the Tibetan areas could unite after some years through mutual consultation among the concerned groups.

On May 27, 1951 Radio Beijing broadcast the full text of the “Agreement”. This was the first time the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government heard of the document. The reaction in Dromo (where the Dalai Lama was headquartered at that time) and Lhasa was one of shock and disbelief. However, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government withheld public repudiation of the “Agreement” in order to prevent more bloodshed.

The Tibetan Government sent a message to its delegates in Beijing, reprimanding them for signing the “Agreement” without consulting the government for instructions. The delegation was told to send the full text of the document and wait in Beijing for further instructions. In the meantime, a telegraphic message was received from the delegation to say that the Chinese Government representative, General Zhang Jingwu, was en route to Dromo, via India. It added that some of the delegation members were returning home, via India, and that Ngabo was journeying overland to Lhasa.

On his arrival in Dromo, General Zhang Jingwu set out to pressure the Tibetan Government to radio its acceptance of the “Agreement” to Beijing. From September 24 to 26, 1951 the Tibetan negotiating team addressed the National Assembly in Lhasa and gave a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the signing of the “Agreement”. Lhawutara, in particular, said that the negotiators were willing to accept any form of punishment for signing the “Agreement” without approval from the government. The Tibetan National Assembly, while recognizing the extenuating circumstances under which the delegates found themselves forced to sign the “Agreement”, asked the Kashag (Tibetan Cabinet) to accept it if China accepted certain conditions. The Kashag, in turn, told General Zhang Jingwu that it would radio its acceptance, provided China agreed to the following conditions:
The powers and functions of the Military-Administrative Commission, which China proposes to set up in Lhasa, should be defined vis-à-vis the powers and functions of the Dalai Lama;

Only a limited number of PLA troops should be stationed in Tibet; the responsibility for defending the important borders of Tibet should be entrusted to the Tibetan Army;

All the Tibetan-inhabited areas should be united under the Tibetan Government; Chamdo and other areas of Kham should be returned to the Tibetan Government.

General Zhang responded that the question of uniting the Tibetan areas should be decided after conducting a referendum among the “Tibetans in Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan and Qinghai”.11

Soon 20,000 PLA troops arrived in Central Tibet and occupied the principal cities of Ruthok and Gartok, and then Gyantse and Shigatse. Now the whole of Tibet was virtually under the PLA’s sway. From this position China refused to reopen negotiations and Tibetans and the Dalai Lama had effectively lost the ability to either accept or reject any Tibet-China “Agreement”. The best course, the Dalai Lama now decided, was to cooperate with the Chinese Government in implementing the “Agreement” so as to make the most of what it promised to Tibetans.

On October 24 the Kashag acquiesced to the phrasing of a telegram which General Zhang had drafted on behalf of the Dalai Lama. The telegram, addressed to Mao Zedong, expressed the Dalai Lama’s support for the “17-Point Agreement”. Four days later, Zhang Guohua and Tan Guansen led a large PLA contingent into Lhasa. Thousands of additional troops followed soon after.

Famine Fuels Anger

The absence of transport facilities between Tibet and China meant that the Tibetans had to surrender their precious foodgrains to feed the escalating occupation army. Food prices soared 10-fold, affecting the livelihood of poor Tibetans, “whose share of food and daily necessities has been ruthlessly whittled down”.12 This raised the first spectre of famine in Tibet’s history, fuelling the population’s smouldering rage over the annexation of their country.

The angry populace snapped Chinese power and telegraph lines, threw rocks at the residences of Chinese officials, and spat on and beat up stray Chinese personnel. Posters were pasted up at night denouncing the occupation of Tibet and telling the Chinese to “Go Home”.

On March 31, 1952 the mass movement, Mimang Tsongdu (People’s Assembly), was born. On the following day, 1,000 members of Mimang Tsongdu picketed General Zhang’s house and shouted slogans for Tibetan independence and the withdrawal of the PLA. The Chinese general blamed the two
Tibetan prime ministers and “foreign imperialists” for inciting the people, and so pressured the Tibetan Government to ban Mimang Tsongdu and force the two prime ministers to resign.

By now, there was no doubt in the minds of China’s leadership that Tibetans looked upon the “Agreement” with sheer contempt. On April 6, 1952 Mao Zedong said, “(N)ot only the two Silons (i.e. prime ministers) but also the Dalai and most of his clique were reluctant to accept the Agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. ... As yet we do not have a material base for fully implementing the Agreement, nor do we have a base for this purpose in terms of support among the masses or in the upper stratum.”

The communist ideologues promptly set out to erode the powers and position of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government: First, the existing political and regional divisions were exploited and institutionalized to create rival centres of power. Backed by the PLA, the new organs of control effectively usurped all powers from the Tibetan Government.

Communist reforms were imposed on the people of Kham and Amdo; their way of life was forcibly changed and hundreds of religious and cultural institutes were razed to the ground. Tibetans in these areas reacted by taking up arms against the Chinese. Thousands of Tibetans died in skirmishes; many went to jail and were never seen again. The resistance gradually spread to Central Tibet, culminating in the National Uprising in Lhasa on March 10, 1959 and the escape of the Dalai Lama a week later.

The “Agreement” was now in tatters; the Chinese had violated it by reneging on their promises to respect Tibet’s political system and to consult the local leaders of Tibet in carrying out reforms. Tibetans were convinced that the “Agreement” was merely a façade behind which China was bent on obliterating every vestige of Tibetan identity.

On April 18, 1959 the Dalai Lama issued a press statement in Tezpur, Assam in India, stating that the “17-point Agreement” had been signed under pressure from the Chinese Government. Then, on June 20, he issued another press statement from his new Indian headquarters in Mussoorie, in which he described the “Agreement” as having been forced upon Tibet by invasion, threat and deceit. The International Commission of Jurists stated that through this repudiation Tibet legally “discharged herself of the obligation under the Agreement”.

TIBET UNDER COMMUNIST CHINA
Reforms and collectivization: 1956-1979

In 1956 the advancing People’s Liberation Army of China introduced “democratic reforms” in some areas of Kham and Amdo. In 1958 the “reforms” were expanded throughout these two eastern Tibetan provinces. A year later, the central province, U-Tsang, was also subjected to “democratic reforms”. Under this program, Beijing confiscated the property and possessions of aristocrats and other wealthy families.

The confiscation of private properties was followed by the herding of Tibetans into “mutual aid teams”; this Maoist experiment was supposed to bring economic development through the mobilization of a population that had hitherto remained immobile. By the end of 1962, 166,000 households in Central Tibet were marshalled into 22,000 “mutual aid teams”. Although this change did not end private ownership, a considerable amount of grain and animal products were seized as “patriotic public grain tax”, “surplus gain sales” and “contribution of past grain reserves”.

Such communist policies had the effect of dampening people’s interest in production, resulting in a dramatic decline in food production, and famine became widespread. However, “mutual aid team” leaders exaggerated production figures and submitted false reports in order to impress their superiors. And these false statistics became the basis for determining the amount of taxation. The result was crippling for people’s
The authorities also instituted a policy of "he who does not work shall not eat" which badly hit households with infants, aged parents or infirm members. Thousands upon thousands of Tibetans had to survive on rodents, dogs, worms, grass, bark and leaves—whatever they could forage just to survive.

To make matters worse, Tibetans were ordered to turn 80 percent of their fields over to winter wheat to support PLA soldiers and Chinese civilian cadres. As a result, wheat output began to decline after some years of bumper harvests. This is because wheat is alien to Tibet's soil; it depletes the earth's nutrients far faster than the preferred native crop—barley.

In 1965 the Chinese authorities phased out the "mutual aid teams" and introduced communes, putting an end to the very concept of private ownership. The populace was organized into communes and forced to work and eat together from "one big pot". Every commune member worked an average of 15 hours a day or more (from 5 am to 9 pm). In addition, it was compulsory for every member to attend political education sessions at night. The work output of commune members was supervised by the leaders of the "production brigade"—a unit within a commune. Average work-points earned annually by each member came to 3,500 and each work-point earned about eight fen (100 fen = one yuan). So the annual income of each member was around 288 yuan (US$35). However, maintaining a bare minimum standard of living at that time cost around 347 yuan (US$42).
nomads slaughter animals in autumn when they are fat to provide food for the winter. Now no animals could be killed without the express permission of provincial authorities, hundreds of miles away, who made no allowance for the customs of the herdsmen. By early 1959, the animals had either died of starvation or were so thin that their emaciated bodies could provide little sustenance.3

Famine became widespread in Tibet's rural hinterland between 1968-1973, with the populace trying to survive on an annual intake averaging five or six pounds of butter, 10 pounds of meat and four or five kēl (one kēl = 25 to 30 lbs) of tsampa. More than 340,000 people starved to death.4

**Economic liberalization: 1980-1985**

The death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 and the subsequent emergence of a new leadership in Beijing resulted in positive changes in Chinese policies. The Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held in December 1978, rejected the principles of the Cultural Revolution and mass mobilization as a means of achieving political and economic objectives. The plenum made sweeping changes in CCP's policy toward minorities and decided to create an environment conducive for natural "acculturation" of the minorities, instead of forced assimilation. In Tibet, this policy translated into improving socio-economic conditions to encourage the return of the Dalai Lama. In April 1980 the Central Committee of the CCP convened the First Tibet Work Forum in Beijing to review and liberalize religious and economic policies. A month later, members of the newly established Party's Working Committee on Tibet—headed by Party Secretary Hu Yaobang—visited Lhasa City. Hu immediately introduced a six-point preferential policy to improve social and economic conditions.

The new policy called for the decollectivization of agriculture and animal husbandry, suspension of taxes (on agriculture, animal husbandry, industry and commerce) for two years, subsidies to peasants and nomads, and promotion of Tibetan culture, including language. It also called for the repatriation of 85 percent of Chinese cadres back to China. As a result of this policy switch, there was a relative improvement in the quality of life for both the rural and urban populations. Also, for the first time, there was growth in the production of Tibetan-language publications—more than 30 different titles were produced in 1981.

However, a major portion of grants and subsidies—earmarked for farmers and nomads—were used by State-owned enterprises for capital investment, which failed to produce significant results due to rampant corruption and mismanagement. Two Chinese economists, who went to Tibet in 1984 on a fact-finding mission, reported:

In 1982 the highway authorities in Tibet exaggerated their engineering costs and obtained 1.01 million yuan from the national treasury at
one stroke. In 1981, the Shigatse education office appropriated a sum of half a million yuan for the repair of school furniture. Two years later government auditors discovered by chance from the 37.16 yuan balance that the original half a million had not even been entered in the books but had disappeared. ...And how much of the central government subsidies has been squandered in this manner is everybody's guess.5

The two economists further commented that “the increased scale of capital construction would push up the grain requirement further in the years to come”.6 This is because more capital construction means more Chinese “technicians and skilled workers” and more grain requirements to feed them, which is naturally an added burden on the Tibetan peasantry.

In early 1984, the CCP's Central Committee convened the Second Tibet Work Forum, initiating a new phase of economic reform to boost Tibet's development. Apart from opening Tibet to the outside world, the new policy encouraged state-owned enterprises, individuals and China's richer provinces to invest in businesses on the plateau. Realizing the huge potential for tourism in the economic development of Tibet, the Forum approved 43 projects to develop infrastructure for tourism. Contracts for the projects were given to State-run companies from Chinese provinces and cities. This resulted in a sharp increase in Chinese population in the “Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)”.

More than 60,000 Chinese “peddlers and craftsmen” from over 20 Chinese provinces and cities arrived in May 1984 alone to work on the “43 projects”; 50,000 Chinese workers had migrated to the plateau one year before.8 At least 10,000 Chinese households—mainly from neighbouring Sichuan and Gansu provinces—settled in the “TAR's” few urban locations in 1984; another 30,000 Chinese households arrived in 1985. This overwhelming increase in the inflow of Chinese settlers, particularly entrepreneurs and petty traders—led to inflation and loss of employment and business opportunities for Tibetans.

**Integrating Tibet into China: 1986-2001**

China's Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1991) initiated a policy to integrate “hostile border regions”, including Tibet, into China's economy. The Plan saw the western border regions as providers of energy and mineral resources to the central region, where most of China's energy and defence industries are based. In return, the backward western regions were to receive “skilled” settlers with technical, managerial and business know-how. This would ultimately help open up local markets for finished goods from China's affluent coastal regions. The then Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang said:

Our goal is to seek common prosperity for all nationalities, but this cannot be achieved simultaneously. For the time being, the western region is to supply raw materials for the development of the
eastern region and, in return, will market its goods produced in the western region.\textsuperscript{9}

The strategy for implementing the integration policy was revealed in Deng Xiaoping’s remark during a visit to the United States in 1987. Deng said: “Tibet cannot develop on its own... It should seek help from fraternal provinces and municipalities [in China]... We need to get large numbers of Han comrades into Tibet so that they can impart scientific and technological know-how, share their scientific management expertise, and help Tibet train scientific, technological, and managerial personnel to speed up its economic development.”\textsuperscript{10}

Beijing’s new economic directive led to a steady escalation in Chinese population transfer to Tibet, causing food shortages and rampant unemployment among Tibetans. Sixteen labour units of Lhasa Municipality replaced their 30,000 Tibetan employees with Chinese migrants.\textsuperscript{11} The ousted Tibetans were told to go to the villages and look for jobs. Fine old Tibetan houses in Lhasa and neighbouring towns were demolished to make room for new Chinese-style concrete highrises. These new colonies were allotted to Chinese economic migrants who were also given preferential treatment in starting business enterprises.

In the winter of 1989, a high-level CCP politburo meeting was called in Beijing to review its policy on Tibet. The meeting decided to speed up the economic integration of Tibet into China, tighten security mechanisms on the plateau, and bring better-educated and skilled Chinese Party cadres to govern the region— from village to regional level. It also decided to abandon any remaining hope of the Dalai Lama returning.

This was a major shift in policy, having significant impacts. It was to usher in a new era of unprecedented repression on Tibetans and attacks on the Dalai Lama.

Taking a cue from this policy decision, another meeting— held on May 12, 1993 on the outskirts of Chengdu— decided on steps to make it demographically “impossible for Tibetans to rise as in the case of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang”.\textsuperscript{12}

On May 24, 1993 Lhasa City witnessed its first large-scale economic protest as over 1,000 Tibetans took to the streets to demonstrate against the increase in food prices, medical charges and school fees. A month later, nomads from the “TAR’s” Sog County and other parts of Nagchu prefecture ransacked Chinese shops. And, in the same year, economic protests were reported from the region’s rural areas of Nyemo, Meldro Gyama, Phenpo, and Chideshol. Despite the protests, the Chinese authorities passed a new trade-license regulation in the “TAR” in November 1993, allowing Chinese settlers to engage in wholesale or retail trading of whatever commodities the State had decontrolled.\textsuperscript{13}

From July 20 to 23, 1994 the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee and the State Council convened the Third Tibet
Work Forum. The meeting decided to ruthlessly suppress “separatist” movement, undermine the influence of the Dalai Lama, reform Buddhism to suit the need of socialism and take necessary measures to win the hearts of the next generation of Tibetans. It also decided to “open Tibet’s door wider to inner parts of the country” and encourage the migration of “traders, investment, economic units and individuals” from China to the “TAR”. In order to facilitate the implementation of the new policy, Beijing launched 62 new projects in the “TAR”, funded mainly by provinces and cities of China. These, and the 43 projects introduced earlier in 1984, were focussed solely on “hard infrastructure” such as highways, dams, power stations, and mineral extraction, rather than on “soft infrastructure” like health, education and human capacity building. Only nine of the 62 projects were devoted to the improvement of school education and health care services; the remaining projects were focussed on capital construction. Similarly, 20 out of the 62 projects were concentrated in Lhasa City alone and the remainder in the vicinity of a few urban towns such as Shigatse, Chamdo, Gyangtse, Nyingtri, and Markham.

The immediate impact of this biased development was a growing income disparity between the predominantly Chinese population in urban centres and the predominantly Tibetan population in rural areas. Between 1991 and 1996, the average annual income of rural dwellers in the “TAR” increased by only 50 percent to 975 yuan, while that of urban residents spiralled by 250 percent to 5,030 yuan. There was a parallel increase in the income gap between the predominantly Chinese employees of State-owned enterprises and the predominantly Tibetan employees in the informal sector.

From June 25 to 27, 2001, the CCP’s Central Committee and the State Council called the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in Beijing. The meeting reinforced the policy decision taken at the Third Work Forum in 1994 and vowed to accelerate Tibet’s economic development—which in effect means economic integration—to bring lasting stability in China. To facilitate this, the Forum decided to improve Party building in Tibet, bringing in cadres from China with “both abilities and political integrity” who can strengthen the Party’s grasp at all levels. It was also resolved to launch new campaign to educate the people on the “four outlooks” and “two theories”. The four outlooks are the Marxist outlook on the motherland, nationality, religion and culture; and two theories are materialism and atheism. The Forum decided to launch 117 projects with direct State investments totaling 31.2 billion yuan (US$ 3.7 billion).

To sum up, China’s development policies in Tibet, particularly from the mid-1980s, have been aimed at the integration of Tibet into China in order to make it indistinguishable from any other Chinese province.
The Nightmare Period: 1949-1979

An internal Chinese military document states that from 1952 to 1958, the People's Liberation Army crushed 996 rebellions and killed over 10,000 Tibetans in the northeastern region of Kanlho.1 Golog, another Amdo area, saw its population halved from an estimated 140,000 in 1956 to about 70,000 in 1964.2 Referring to this area, the late Panchen Lama told Beijing's leaders: “If there was a film made on all the atrocities perpetrated in Qinghai Province, it would shock the viewers. In Golog area, many people were killed and their dead bodies rolled down the hill into a big ditch. The soldiers told the family members and relatives of the dead people that they should celebrate since the rebels had been wiped out. They were even forced to dance on the dead bodies. Soon after, they were also massacred with machine guns.”3 The Panchen Lama specifically pointed out in his 1987 speech that “in Amdo and Kham, people were subjected to unspeakable atrocities. They were shot in groups of 10 or 20.”

In Lhasa, the PLA operation to crush the Tibetan National Uprising of March 10, 1959 resulted in 10,000 to 15,000 deaths within three days. According to an internal PLA report, 87,000 Tibetans were wiped out in Lhasa and its environs between March and October 1959.4

In the following two decades, a massive number of Tibetans died in prisons and labour camps. Of the 70,000 Tibetans taken
to labour camps in the north of Lanzhou, the provincial capital of Gansu, in 1959-1960, only half survived. Of the 76 Tibetan prisoners sent to Zhangjiao Agricultural Labour Camp in Jiuquan, Gansu Province, in the early 1960s, only 21 survived.

Amdo became China’s biggest gulag with tens of thousands of Tibetan and Chinese prisoners who were put to road and railway construction, exploitation of mineral resources, building of nuclear research centres and to running of state farms for the People’s Liberation Army. At least, 200,000 inmates starved to death.

In an interview with the author of Hungry Ghosts: China’s Secret Famine, a monk from Ngaba (now incorporated into Sichuan Province) said that two-thirds of men from his place were arrested and sent to labour camps, mostly at Guanxian near Chengdu; 70 percent died.

At the Vebou labour camp, 10 hours’ drive west of Siling City, 14,000 of the 30,000 inmates died; Tibetans constituted ten percent of the inmates. Similarly, of the 12,000 inmates in Shen Mu, 6,000 perished. Most of the deaths occurred during China’s Great Famine (1958-1962), which killed more than 900,000 people in Amdo.

In David Patt’s book, A Strange Liberation: Tibetan Lives in Chinese Hands, one survivor, Ama Adhe, reminisces on her life at the Dhartsedo labour camp in Kham (now in Sichuan Province). By the roadside the authorities opened mass graves and filled them with corpses. “Every day,” she recalls, “they would deliver nine or 10 truckloads of bodies to put there. Some days less, some days more. Usually, eight, nine, 10 trucks.” Of the 300 women arrested with her, only 100 survived. The survivors were then made to walk to another prison, a gigantic lead mine. This camp, called Gothang Gyalpo, was teeming with Tibetan and Guomintang prisoners: “So many prisoners were working all over this huge lead mine, they looked like bugs, like ants going in every direction. There were thousands and thousands of them swarming over the mine. And, when I looked around, they were all Tibetan. And their physical condition was the same as at Dhartsedo, starvation. Many were leaning on walking sticks, otherwise they would not be able to hold up their heads.” Only four out of the 100 she arrived with survived this second camp. In 1962, Ama Adhe’s companions overheard the outgoing warden reporting 12,019 starvation deaths in three years.

Apho Gaga, a survivor of the Tsawa Pomda labour camp, stated that of the 8,100 imprisoned in 1959, only 370 survived by the end of 1961.

In U-Tsang, more than 10,000 prisoners died in Drapchi prison in Lhasa between 1960-1965. In addition, thousands of Tibetans perished in the three major labour camps—a borax mine in Chang T hang (known to the Tibetans as Jhang Tsala-kha), Nachen Thang hydroelectric plant near Lhasa, and lumbering units in Kongpo, near India. A
survivor of the Chang Thang camp said in an interview that more than 54,000 inmates died of starvation and hard work between 1959 and mid-1961. N.J. Topgyal, a survivor of Kongpo's lumbering camp, stated that, “The Chinese used to pile up corpses and when they reached the size of a small hill the corpses would be set on fire”. In her memoirs, Sorrow Mountain, Ani Pachen, a survivor of the three biggest prisons in the “TAR” writes:

The bodies of the dead were dumped in a ravine behind the monastery. The ravine became so filled that the Chinese started throwing the dead bodies into the Zhachu [upper part of the Mekong River] and Ngomchu Rivers. The vultures and the dogs were not able to eat all the bodies remaining in the ravine, and soon the carcasses began to rot. The stench of decomposing bodies was so powerful that for years people could not go near the ravine.

Documenting the conditions of prisons and labour camps in 1962, the late Panchen Lama wrote:

The guards and cadres threatened prisoners with cruel, ruthless and malicious words, and beat them fiercely and unscrupulously... [The prisoners'] clothes and quilts could not keep their bodies warm, their mattresses could not keep out the damp, their tents and buildings could not shelter them from the wind and rain and the food did not fill their stomachs. Their lives were miserable and full of deprivation, they had to get up early for work and come back late from their work; what's more, these people were given the heaviest and most difficult work... They caught many diseases, and in addition, they did not have sufficient rest; medical treatment was poor, which caused many prisoners to die from abnormal causes.

Ani Pachen, who spent many years in the high security prison of Silthog Thang in Chamdo, describes her first impression of the prisoners in the following words:

As we drove up, there were people standing behind the wire fencing. When we got closer I could see that they had barely any flesh on their bodies. The skin of their faces was pulled tight, their eyes sunk deep in the sockets, their cheeks almost bone, like a skull. But it was their arms and hands that caught my attention. Thin like sticks, hanging limply at their sides. One man raised his head and looked at me. When I looked into his eyes, I felt a shock, for his eyes were completely blank, as if nothing but hollows on either side of his face. Others had eyes so large and liquid, it seemed the only part of them still alive.

All in all, this was the darkest period in the entire history of Tibet. Sweeping massacres, appalling torture, bombardment of monasteries and the wholesale extermination of nomad tribes are the hallmark of these three decades. Some Tibetans say that the sky and earth changed places during this period. Others maintain that they experienced “hell on earth”.

According to information compiled by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, over 1.2 million Tibetans died during this period.
A brief respite: 1979-1986

The new leadership, which came to power in the wake of Mao Zedong’s death, set out to improve the conditions in Tibet in order to encourage the return of the Dalai Lama. In March 1978 the late Panchen Lama was released after 14 years of imprisonment and isolation. In 1979 Beijing announced a policy of liberalization and openness. A large number of Tibetan political prisoners, many of whom had spent about two decades in captivity and were resigned to seeing out their days in shackles, suddenly found themselves free men and women. Tibetans in Tibet and those in exile were allowed to visit each other. In addition, four fact-finding delegations from Dharamsala were invited to Tibet to see conditions for themselves.

In 1980 Chinese Communist Party Secretary Hu Yaobang visited Lhasa and recommended that the “Tibet Autonomous Region” should be allowed to exercise autonomy in the true sense of the word. For the first time since the occupation of the plateau, Tibetans gained a measure of breathing space. There was now real hope that the younger genre of Chinese leadership might be willing to undo the brutal legacy of their predecessors. Tibetans took advantage of the new political climate to call for more rights and freedoms.

However, it soon became apparent that ultra-leftist elements were still well-entrenched in Tibet and not ready to loosen the iron grip of the Maoist era. In May 1982, 115 Tibetan political activists were arrested and branded as “delinquents” and “black marketeers.” More arrests and public executions followed. By the end of November 1983, 750 political activists had been jailed in Lhasa alone.

In 1986 Hu Yaobang was disgraced for his sympathy for Tibet and for the democracy movement in China. Around the same time, anti-Dalai Lama propaganda resurfaced with the venom and invective of the Cultural Revolution era. The hope and euphoria of the early 1980s were wearing out and the atmosphere in Tibet was, once again, becoming charged with bitterness.

Cycle of Protest and Imprisonment: 1987-’94

On September 21, 1987 the Dalai Lama announced his Five Point Peace Plan for resolving the issue of Tibet in an address to the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus. The Chinese government responded by launching a concerted media campaign to demonize the Dalai Lama. At the same time, the authorities were urging anti-Dalai Lama demonstrations by the populace of Lhasa. To further punish the Dalai Lama, 11 Tibetans were sentenced. Two of them received death sentences. Work Units and Neighbourhood Committees compelled 15,000 Tibetans to attend a mass sentencing rally in the sports stadium of Lhasa. These developments—particularly the anti-Dalai Lama campaign—served only to incense the Tibetan populace.

On September 27, Lhasa witnessed the first internationally-reported protest.
demonstration against Chinese rule. The demonstration was led by 21 monks of Drepung Monastery, but was soon joined by around 100 lay people. As they reached the office of the “Tibet Autonomous Region” government, the police confronted and arrested all the monks, along with five lay protesters.18

On October 1, the Chinese National Day, 34 monks, including 23 from Sera Monastery, marched along the Barkhor street encircling the Jokhang temple, carrying the banned Tibetan national flag and shouting slogans for Tibetan independence. About 50 lay Tibetans joined the monks. As they were making the fourth circuit, security personnel started beating the demonstrators. All the monks, along with some 30 lay protestors, were arrested and taken to the police station at the southwest corner of the Jokhang.19 A crowd of about 2,000 Tibetans stormed the police station to release them. Police then opened fire, killing at least seven protestors.20 Many demonstrators were subsequently arrested.

On October 6, 1987 there was yet another demonstration, this time by some 50 monks from Drepung Monastery. The monks went to the “TAR” government office and called for the release of their colleagues. They also shouted slogans for Tibetan independence. The police arrived within a few minutes. As the monks were arrested, they were viciously beaten with belts, sticks, rifle-butts and metal rods. The monks were released after two days. In the subsequent months, there were several minor demonstrations in Lhasa.

In July 1988, Beijing’s security chief, Qiao Shi, visited the “TAR” and announced “merciless repression” on all forms of protest against Chinese rule.21 On December 10, 1988 there was a massive demonstration at the Jokhang, during which Chinese security personnel killed at least 15 demonstrators, seriously wounded over 150. Many more were arrested. According to a Western journalist, who was an eyewitness, one officer was heard ordering his men to “kill the Tibetans”.

Between March 5 and 7, 1989 Lhasa was again in turmoil, with demonstrators waving the outlawed Tibetan flag and demanding independence. Automatic weapons were fired during the crackdown— even into some homes. Estimates of the death toll varied from 80 to 400. The official Chinese figure was only 11. According to Tang Daxian, a Chinese journalist who was in Lhasa during this period, some 400 Tibetans were massacred, several thousand injured and 3,000 imprisoned.22 At midnight, on March 7, 1989, Martial Law was declared in Lhasa.

Over a year later, on May 1, 1990, China announced the lifting of Martial Law. However, the Australian Human Rights Delegation to China and Tibet in July 1991 observed: “Though Martial Law had indeed been lifted on May 1, 1990, it continues to exist in all but name”. Amnesty International, in its 1991 report, confirmed this, adding, “the police and security forces retained extensive powers of arbitrary arrest and
detention without trial”.

On April 10, 1991 the police arrested 146 “criminals” in a run-up to China’s celebration of the 40th anniversary of the signing of the “17-point Agreement” on May 23. This was followed by more arrests and public sentencing rallies. On the day of the celebration the whole of Lhasa was put under curfew.

Then, starting from February 1992, groups consisting of 10 Chinese personnel raided Tibetan homes in Lhasa and arrested those found in possession of anything deemed subversive; this list included photographs of the Dalai Lama, and tapes or books containing his speeches or teachings. Over 200 people were arrested. Despite the lessons of the bloody crackdown in March 1989, large numbers of Tibetans again took to the streets on May 24, 1993. Eye-witnesses, including tourists, estimate there were over 10,000 demonstrators massed that day. The demonstration, which continued over a period of two days, was once again quelled with brutal force as the demonstrators made their way home at dusk.

An increasing number of demonstrations were being reported from Tibet’s countryside as well. At least 240 Tibetan political activists were arrested in the rural areas of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo during 1993. In Amdo alone, various sources stated that some 80 Tibetans had been arrested between July-September 1993.

Evidence of arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detentions often resulting in disappearances, and summary executions, were cited in Amnesty International’s 1990 report. It stated that “over a thousand people, including prisoners of conscience, were arrested after Martial Law was imposed in Lhasa in March” and that “some of them were summarily executed”. It also pointed out that “evidences of persistent human rights violations in Tibet continued to come to light in 1989, including reports of numerous arbitrary arrests, long-term detention without charge or trial, and torture”. Incommunicado detention then was almost routine. Often it was left to the devices of the relatives of the arrested person to locate him or her.

In 1990, the President of the People’s Higher Court, said, “Leadership of the Party (CCP) over the courts is the basic guarantee for the courts to achieve their adjudicatory tasks.” This means all acts and beliefs contrary to China’s Central Communist Party policy are grounds for suppression, regardless of established legal safeguards. To make matters worse, the State is not expected to inform prisoners of the grounds for their arrest or their right to legal remedies. Arrest warrants are rarely issued or produced. Grounds for arrest and imprisonment seem to be found in any kind of activity: many Tibetans are condemned to long periods of confinement for speaking with foreigners, singing patriotic songs, putting up wall posters, possessing copies of an autobiography of the Dalai Lama or some
video or audio cassettes, or for preparing a list of casualties during Chinese crackdowns on demonstrations, etc.

Amnesty International in 1992 expressed concerns over imprisonment of prisoners of conscience and of other political prisoners after unfair trials, torture and ill-treatment of detainees, the use of the death penalty and extra judicial executions. Constitutional and legal provisions in Tibet restrict the exercise of basic freedoms and lack human rights safeguards consistent with international standards.

“All such manifestations (i.e., demonstrations and political dissent) of dissatisfaction with Chinese rule—whether peacefully conducted or otherwise—are viewed by the authorities as constituting ‘illegal separatist activity’, and those who have led or participated in them have been punished with escalating force and severity. ‘Merciless repression’ remains, in Tibet, the order of the day.”

In its 1993 report, Amnesty International went on to state: “Arrests of Tibetan political activists continued. Over 200 political prisoners, including at least a hundred prisoners of conscience, remained held in Tibet. They included Buddhist monks and nuns detained for peacefully advocating Tibetan independence, and lay Tibetans allegedly found in possession of Tibetan nationalist material. Some were serving prison terms imposed after unfair trials, others ‘terms of re-education through labour’ imposed without formal charge or trial.”


The overall trend of repression from 1987 to 1994 was largely a reflection of the State’s reaction to Tibetan resistance activities. This changed dramatically towards the end of 1994 when the authorities devised an array of pro-active measures to eliminate the roots of protest movements. This new wave of repression was implemented in the form of “anti-Dalai” and “anti-splittist” campaigns, as recommended by China’s infamous Third Forum on Tibet, held in Beijing in July 1994. The Forum advocated:

The struggle between ourselves and the Dalai Clique is neither a matter of religious belief, nor a matter of the question of autonomy, it is a matter of securing the unity of our country and opposing splittism...No one should be careless about it. This is a life-and-death struggle, and of course it is not an ordinary issue but an important issue. The Standing Committee of the TAR Congress and the judicial organs should carry out thorough investigations in order to find out problems in the ways we deal with our struggle against splittism, and seriously analyze those problems in the law. If there is anything not yet mentioned in the law, the judicial administrations should give their views quickly and establish laws and regulations to fight against the splittists so that the laws and regulations become more effective...

As “striking relentless blows” is one of the important elements of the Comprehensive Management of Public Security, the judicial organs...
should organize local public security organizations to solve their own main problems by having focal places to deal with and focal points to solve. We must rely both on the relevant public security offices and on the vast numbers of masses in dealing with public security work.

This chilling directive was followed immediately by a dramatic escalation of repression throughout Tibet. New security measures were put in place to tighten control over the population. The neighbourhood surveillance system of the Cultural Revolution era was resuscitated with networks of informers in offices, work groups, schools, monasteries, apartment buildings and neighbourhoods. People were coerced into providing information about colleagues and neighbours on pain of losing housing, employment, education, a place in the monastery, etc. Telephone hotlines were set up to facilitate people informing on each other. During religious festivals, special security cameras are installed on pilgrim circuit routes and at other key sites.

In 1995 the authorities introduced a new strategy for intimidating political suspects. Used mostly in urban areas, this strategy involved detaining suspects repeatedly for short periods, often for about two days each week, during which time they were interrogated through the use of sophisticated torture techniques, which left no visible marks. Such techniques included exposure to extreme temperatures or making detainees stand in icy water in winter or sit in crippling positions for long periods. The trend from the year 2000 has been to spirit away suspects to PSB guesthouses, where they are interrogated and tortured, often for four to 24 weeks. If the security personnel fail to elicit a confession, the suspect is released with strict warnings against disclosing the reasons or details of their disappearance.

This technique is used typically against people suspected of communicating information on the situation inside Tibet to the outside world. When the victims are released, they are sufficiently intimidated not to dare tell anyone about their detention lest they suffer another round of torture. In some cases the victims are so intimidated that they agree to become informers for the State.

In 1996, China’s three major political campaigns of “Patriotic Education”, “Spiritual Civilization” and “Strike Hard” adopted the Third Forum’s objectives and stepped up repression even further. As with “Patriotic Education” and “Spiritual Civilization”, the goal of the “Strike Hard” campaign in Tibet differs completely from that in China.

In China, the campaign was launched to combat official corruption and common crimes, such as murder, robbery, drug trafficking, etc. However, in Tibet, it became the cutting edge of China’s “relentless blows” at separatism and the influence of the “Dalai Clique”.

Addressing the inaugural rally of the “Strike Hard Struggle” on May 6, 1996, Raidi, Executive Deputy Secretary of the
“TAR” Communist Party, linked the campaign to the anti-splittist fight when he said, “Tibet is located on the frontline of the anti-separation struggle, and safeguarding social stability and the Motherland's unity is the most important political responsibility.” He further stated that “paying great attention to this struggle to severely crack down on crimes is both an expression of whether or not we have a sense of the masses of people, and an expression of whether or not we attach importance to politics.”

To drive home the seriousness of this campaign, Tibet Daily on June 17, 1996 carried an article with the byline of Bai Zhao, President of the “TAR” Regional People’s Court, which urged upgrading the intensity of the “Strike Hard” struggle and said that severe punishments and death sentences must be meted out to those who deserve them.

Bai Zhao's report boasted that in 1996 the court had handled a total of 2,126 criminal cases and that 1,726 detainees involved in 977 cases had been swiftly convicted at their first trial. The report further stated that 60.8 percent (1,049) of the detainees had been sentenced to more than five years imprisonment, or life imprisonment, or death (a death sentence with reprieve); 37.34 percent (645) to less than five years of imprisonment; 1.36 percent (24) had been released; and 0.43 percent (eight) had been declared not guilty.

Another report submitted by Bai Zhao in May 1998 said that the courts had tried 6,291 people over the past five years and had found 0.73 percent not guilty. The report revealed that more than half the detainees received sentences ranging from five years to death.

Political detainees are invariably tortured to extract confessions before the trial. The Dharamsala-based Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy has documented a variety of torture techniques or methods used on political detainees and prisoners. These include aerial suspension, hand and foot cuffs, electric shocks, exposure to extreme temperatures, attack by dogs, sexual assault, electric cattle prods applied to the private parts and sensitive areas, long periods of solitary confinement, urinating in the victim’s mouth, forcing victims to watch torture videos, keeping victims standing for long periods of time and deprivation of food, water and sleep.

In 1998, Amnesty International expressed concerns that torture and ill-treatment of detainees in prisons and labour camps remained widespread, sometimes resulting in death. In 1999 Physicians for Human Rights stated that the frequency of torture—including psychological abuse, beatings, rape, use of electric cattle prods, and prolonged periods of starvation—suggested that torture was part of a widespread pattern of abuse.

Article 247 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that “judicial workers who extort a confession from criminal suspects or defendants by torture or who use force to extract testimony...
from witnesses, are to be sentenced to three years or fewer in prison or put under criminal detention”.

However, such provisions continue to be routinely ignored in the face of political considerations. The International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims observed in 1999 that despite the imposition of laws barring torture by prison personnel, as enshrined in Article 14 of the 1994 Chinese Prison Regulations, abuses such as extortion of confessions through torture, inflicting corporal punishment or maltreating prisoners, subjecting prisoners to indignity and beating up prisoners or failing to take action when other people beat up prisoners continue.

It must be pointed out here that China’s growing sensitivity to international pressure has resulted in a number of changes in its repression strategy. One such change has been the decrease in death sentences to political prisoners. Instead, death sentences are handed down to common criminals during times of political tension in Tibet. This serves the purpose of implanting fear in the minds of potential political activists while at the same time reducing the risk of international condemnation. Instead of death sentences, the political prisoners suffer prolonged torture, leading to slow, quiet deaths or permanent injury or debilitation. The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy has recorded 69 deaths since 1987 occurring in prisons or immediately after release from prison, either in hospitals or at the victims’ residences.

This period is marked also by escalation in the enforcement of control over activities that provide the oxygen of inspiration to Tibetan nationalism. Restrictions on religious practices began to be enforced with greater severity. Searches of private houses for shrines and photographs of the Dalai Lama became more frequent. School children were threatened with expulsion if they were seen visiting monasteries and temples. Fresh orders were issued to Party cadres—with increasing severity—to withdraw and recall their children from Tibetan schools, monasteries and nunneries in exile. Bans were intensified on the celebration of emotive national festivals such as the Tibetan New Year, the Dalai Lama’s birthday, Saka-Dawa, etc. In 1999 three Tibetans were arrested in Dram, the last Tibetan outpost on the border with Nepal, for performing the religious ceremony of offering incense to the deities to mark the birthday of the Dalai Lama on July 6.

Tibetans who have visited India are viewed as another source of “separatism”. Returnees are suspected of “polluting the minds” of other Tibetans and foreign tourists. To deal with them, the authorities issued new border regulations on June 1, 2000 to control crossings without papers; this is aimed particularly at those returning to Tibet after studying or working in India. The London-based Tibet Information Network (TIN) reports that returnees are subjected to harassment and interrogation by the authorities. Their families and friends are
targeted for house searches and questioning. A man from Amdo who was returning to Tibet after spending two years in India was detained at the border town of Dram and interrogated for 20 days, before being moved to his native village for further investigations. Many of the returnees are sentenced to imprisonment for two to three years.

In the year 2000 all tour guides who had studied in India were fired from their jobs. A new regulation required all tour guides to produce a middle school certificate from a school in China or Tibet, effectively excluding Tibetans educated in India from this profession. In the summer of 2000, the “TAR” Tour Guide Discipline Management Department carried out a massive investigation into 18 branches of tourist agencies in Lhasa to root out Tibetan guides educated in India. Following the investigation, 29 India-educated guides were expelled from their jobs in July 2000 in Shigatse prefecture alone.

In addition, the authorities became more stringent in implementing earlier strategies to drive political activists to a life of privation and isolation. Upon release, political prisoners are banned from returning to their jobs or to the institutions to which they belonged at the time of their arrest. Instead, they are compelled to return to their places of origin—in most cases to rural areas where the livelihood options are limited. On top of this, they and their families are placed under constant surveillance and ordered to report frequently to the local PSB for further interrogation; they are not allowed to travel away from their villages without PSB permission. Monasteries and nunneries are not allowed take them back; government agencies and private enterprises are forbidden from employing them. Even starting a private enterprise is not an option since licenses must be obtained from the government. Friends and relatives are warned against associating with them or helping them. Those extending help may be accused of harbouring secret sympathy for “separatism” and sentenced accordingly.

In many cases, family members of political prisoners are subjected to economic and social hardship; they are expelled or demoted from jobs and their children are expelled from schools. To sum up, once a person is jailed for political activism, he and his family become virtual pariahs. Many former prisoners say that trying to lead a normal life after prison is far harder than the actual sentence. At this stage, the only option for them is to escape over the Himalayas and seek a new life in exile.

As a result of all these control measures, there has been no mass demonstration in Tibet over the past two years. However, the general sense of anger and alienation—though muzzled—is becoming ever more pervasive and intense. Monks and nuns, who form the bulk of political prisoners, know only too well that at the end of their prison sentences they will find the doors of their monasteries and
nunneries firmly shut against their re-entry. They share the lay political prisoners’ knowledge that their record of political activism will disqualify them from getting employment and that they will be under constant surveillance. For all practical purposes, their careers, they know, are finished. Furthermore, they are constantly reminded of the increasing threat to the survival of Tibetan culture, religion and identity. This has induced a sense of despair, driving them to take greater risks to defy the authorities.

Almost all the torture victims of this period are detainees who have defied the prison authorities by reciting the banned Buddhist mantras, protesting the ill-treatment of inmates, showing allegiance to the exile Tibetan administration and the Dalai Lama, and expressing dissenting views against “political re-education”.

In May 1998 at least 10 prisoners in Drapchi, Lhasa, were tortured to death for shouting slogans such as “Long Live the Dalai Lama” and “Free Tibet” during the visit of an EU delegation composed of Beijing-based ambassadors from Britain, Austria and Luxemburg. Karma Dawa, the leader of the protestors, was executed while the surviving protesters had their sentences increased by four to five years.36

At the same time, political protests by one or two individuals in subtler forms have spread throughout the plateau. This—combined with the Chinese strategy of arresting people on the slightest suspicion of political activism—has led to a three-fold increase in prisoners of conscience. Before 1993 political protests tended to be confined to 22 counties inside the “TAR” and nine counties outside the “TAR”. However, since 1993 political protests have been reported from 31 counties in the “TAR” and 21 counties in other Tibetan areas.37 This was an increase of 40 percent in the “TAR”, and 130 per cent in the Tibetan areas outside the “TAR”. Similarly, detention cases had also increased by 15 per cent from 500 to 600 in Lhasa City and by 250 percent from 100 to 350 in other “TAR” areas.

To deal with such an increase in rural unrest, “TAR” Deputy Party Secretary, Raidi, asked for the “Strike Hard” campaign to be implemented among the rural masses. On January 1, 1998, he said, “The agricultural and pastoral areas have gradually become the frontline in the struggle against separatism … after encountering repeated defeats, the Dalai Clique has in recent years changed the tactics of its scheme by shifting the focus of separatist activities to the vast agricultural and pastoral areas”.38 In the same year, the authorities started installing loyal cadres in key political positions in rural areas. Raidi, in his public address on November 15, 1998, stated that, “Rural grassroots officials are the key force for uniting and leading the masses in an in-depth struggle against separatism, stabilizing the farming and pastoral areas.” The Tibetan edition of the People’s Daily reported on July
15, 1998 that the "TAR" had "rectified 650 township and town party committees and 3,602 village party branches" since 1995.

In addition, the authorities have expanded the network of prison complexes in Tibet. In 1997 a new high security detention and interrogation facility was built in the northeastern suburbs of Lhasa. According to Tibet Information Network, this facility was to accommodate detainees suspected of political disloyalty and former leaders who were said to have made serious mistakes, particularly concerning political matters. Also, Lhasa's Drapchi and Sangyip prison complexes were expanded in 1998. Before 1993 political prisoners were largely confined to the prison network in Lhasa and other major administrative towns. But now, detention facilities in almost all counties and townships house political prisoners.

However, the intensification of surveillance and control mechanisms has ensured that reports of human rights violations in Tibet do not filter out to international monitoring groups. Today the outside world knows little about the number of political prisoners in Tibet. Chinese propaganda claims that there are only a hundred prisoners detained in Tibet for "endangering State security". 39

Tom Grunfeld, author of The Making of Modern Tibet, on the other hand, stated in April 2000 that "there are as many as a thousand political prisoners, mostly clergy who peacefully demonstrated against Chinese rule". Grunfeld also stated that in recent years, China's hardline faction has fostered increased repression in Tibet... "encouraged increased ethnic Chinese migration into Tibet, tightened security in monasteries, obstructed religious practices, and forced monks and Tibetan officials to undergo 'patriotic' retraining. As a result there has been rising animosity toward Chinese rule and increased expression of Tibetan nationalism." 40

Echoing Grunfeld, a Tibetan official in Lhasa told a prominent Chinese writer that, "It is a mistake to believe that there is more stability now than during the period of disturbance in the late 1980s. In those years, people involved in disturbances were mainly monks and a few misguided youths. But today officials, intellectuals and workers have all turned into the opposition. The stability that we see now is just superficial.

If the machinery of repression fails one day, it is certain that many more people than in the 1980s will participate in disturbances. " 41
Destruction and Demolition: 1949-1979

In the early years of Communist invasion, Beijing announced that no restrictions would be imposed on the practice of religion. Its formal pledge to protect and respect Tibet’s religious traditions was spelled out in the “17-Point Agreement” of 1951. This “Agreement” explicitly stated that the traditional status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama would not be altered and that “the policy of freedom of religious beliefs laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference will be protected”.

However, Beijing soon decided that Tibet’s social and religious systems were alien to its atheistic taste. It announced, “The Chinese Communist Party considers that its ideology and that of religion are two forces that cannot co-exist and occupy the same spot at the same time...the differences between the two [i.e., science and religion] can be likened to those between light and darkness, between truth and falsehood. There is absolutely no possibility to reconcile the mutually-opposed world views of science and religion.”

In the light of this policy, China’s “Democratic Reform” vandalized monasteries, nunneries, temples, and other cultural institutes; all articles of value were looted, desecrated and dismantled. Prior to their destruction, expert teams of mineralogists visited religious buildings to locate and extract all the precious stones. Next came the metallurgists who listed all metal objects
which were subsequently carted away in trucks requisitioned from army headquarters. Monastery walls were then dynamited and all the wooden beams and pillars removed. Clay images were destroyed in the expectation of finding precious stones and metals inside. Finally, whatever remained—largely bits of wood and stone debris—was removed. Literally, hundreds of tons of valuable religious statues, thangkas (scroll paintings), metal artifacts, and other treasures were shipped to China either to be sold or auctioned in international antique markets or to be melted down.

When a team of Tibetans visited China officially in 1982 and 1983 to identify and retrieve Tibetan artifacts, a Chinese man in Beijing told them that “(m)ost of the Tibetan cultural artifacts carted to China were destroyed. The statues and ritual objects of pure gold and silver were never seen again. Those of gilded copper, bell-metal, red copper, brass, etc, were ferried to Luyun, from where they were eventually sold to foundries in Shanghai, Sichuan, Taiyuan, Beijing, Tianjin, etc. The foundry called Xi-you Qingshu Tie (precious metal foundry) located about five kilometers to the east of Beijing city, alone purchased about 600 tons of Tibetan crafted metals.” The team found that almost all artifacts taken by other foundries had already been melted down.¹

This physical desecration and destruction was accompanied by public condemnation of religion, and humiliation and ridicule of religious persons. Religious texts were burnt and mixed with field manure; the sacred mani stones (stones or slates with prayers or images engraved) were used for making toilets and pavements; monks and nuns were forced to copulate in public and taunted to perform “miracles”; ruined monasteries and temples were turned into pigsties; starving monks and nuns in Chinese prisons were told to “get food from the Buddha”.

The present Chinese leadership and its international apologists maintain that the destruction of Tibetan culture and religion was part of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) which wreaked similar havoc on China. This is not at all true. Much of Tibet’s culture and religion was destroyed between 1955 and 1961 and with the calculated aim of wiping out Tibet’s distinct identity.

As early as 1962—four years before the onset of the Cultural Revolution—the late Panchen Lama stated that the “democratic reform” had reduced the number of monasteries by 97 percent and the ecclesiastical population by 93 percent.² To our knowledge, out of over 6,000 monasteries and nunneries only about eight escaped destruction. Out of nearly 600,000 monks, nuns, rinpoches (reincarnates) and ngag-pas (tantric practitioners), over 110,000 were tortured and put to death, and many more were forcibly defrocked.

Religion Resurfacing: 1979-1994

The liberalization policy of 1979 brought
a modicum of religious freedom in Tibet. This included permitting the populace to rebuild and renovate some monasteries and temples as well as allowing freedom for ritual practices—such as making prostrations, circumambulating places of worship, offering butter lamps, reciting mantras, turning prayer wheels, burning incense, putting up prayer flags, etc. However, these are only external acts of worship and not the essence of Buddhism. The core of Buddhism is persistent striving for mental and spiritual development through intensive study with qualified lamas, understanding and practice. The study of Buddhism is exactly what the Chinese authorities continued to discourage, as they wanted to misrepresent Tibetan religion as practices in superstition and blind faith. Monastic colleges were not allowed to continue in the traditional way, and a ceiling was placed on the number of monks allowed in each monastery. Before the Chinese invasion, Sera had about 8,000 monks, Drepung 10,000 and Gaden 5,600 monks. The Chinese government directive of 1997 stated that Sera is allowed to have a maximum of 300 monks, Drepung 400 and Gaden 200.

The official Chinese directives laid down the following criteria for admission to a monastery: The candidate should be at least 18 years old; should “love” the country and the Communist Party; should have parental consent and obtain formal approval from the monastery’s Democratic Management Committee; should have the consent of the county or provincial authorities and the Public Security Bureau; the candidate and his/her parents should have a “good political background.”

In addition, the daily functions of monasteries were regimented through a maze of state bureaucracies, such as the Religious Affairs Bureau, the Chinese Buddhist Association, Democratic Management Committee, Political Education Work Teams, security organs, etc. The presence of such control mechanisms in monasteries and nunneries became all too palpable in the wake of Tibetan protest demonstrations, beginning in September 1987. Members of “Work Teams” camped in the monasteries for months to re-educate the monks to foster a large number of “fervent patriots in every religion” who accept the leadership of the Party and government, firmly support the Socialist path, and safeguard national and ethnic unity.

Cultural Revolution Returns 1994-2001

In 1994 China’s Third Tibet Work Forum vowed to reform Tibetan Buddhism and culture to suit the socialist society and to tighten government control over monasteries and nunneries. The Forum’s manifesto recommended the following formula to reform Buddhism:

We must teach and guide Tibetan Buddhism to reform itself. All those religious laws and rituals must be reformed in order to fit in with the needs of development and stability in Tibet, and they...
should be reformed so that they become appropriate to a society under socialism... First, we should put an end to the unbridled construction of monasteries/nunneries as well as to the unbridled recruitment of monks/nuns. Later, other matters must be tackled on a priority basis...

We must reveal the true political face of the Dalai hidden behind the religious mask, and prevent by all means and ways the monks and nuns in the monasteries of our region from being affected by the influence of the Dalai Clique. The Communist cadres and the vast masses of monks and nuns in the monasteries should demonstrate their determination to distance themselves from the Dalai Clique in the political field...We must enhance the understanding of the monks and nuns about patriotism and law.

In recognizing the reincarnations of the tulku [reincarnated lamas] of Tibetan Buddhism, we must follow the relevant decisions of the State and implement them according to the real conditions in our region and make them more practical as soon as possible. We must do this work earnestly in order to gain the initiative.

We must take precautions against the Dalai Clique—they are interfering in the recognition of tulkus in order to manipulate the monasteries, and this situation must be reversed.

These directives became the core of “Patriotic Education”, “Strike Hard” and “Spiritual Civilization” campaigns that were imposed on Tibet in 1996. Whilst “Patriotic Education” and “Spiritual Civilization” are targeted against Tibetan political activism; this ranges from speaking to foreigners to possessing publications produced by the exile Tibetan administration and participating in peaceful protest demonstrations.

Uprooting the ‘Dalai’s influence’

The clarion call for the “Patriotic Education” campaign was sounded by a front page editorial in the April 5, 1996 edition of Xizang Ribao (Tibet Daily), which called for a campaign to “eradicate the Dalai Splittist Forces’ influence”.

Then, on July 23, 1996, Chen Kuiyuan, the then Communist Party Secretary of the “TAR”, addressed a mobilization rally in Lhasa to launch the “Spiritual Civilization” campaign and declare its main thrust in Tibet. Chen said, “One of the important tasks in facilitating the Spiritual Civilization drive is to screen and eliminate Dalai’s influence in the spiritual field. If we fail to accomplish this task, we cannot claim to have attained any great results in facilitating the Spiritual Civilization drive”.

Monasteries and nunneries became the first targets of the “Patriotic Education” campaign. The authorities argued that monks and nuns had “become the vanguard of disturbances” and that monasteries and nunneries had “become the breeding ground and hotbed for the Dalai Clique’s splittist activities in Tibet.” To counter this, the authorities decided to tighten government control over all religious institutions through
the establishment of a “Democratic Management Committee” and “Patriotic Education Work Unit” in every monastery and nunnery. On July 20, 1997 a 10-point disciplinary code for monks and nuns was issued to all religious institutions.

The disciplinary code, amongst others, forbids the possession and propagation of “splittist” publications and calls for protection of the “stability and unity of the Motherland”. The code also forbids spiritual teachings outside the confines of monastic institutions. Identity cards are issued to “government-approved” monks and nuns to facilitate control over their activities. Those without identity cards are ousted from monasteries and nunneries.

Throughout Tibet “Patriotic Education Work Units” force monks and nuns to denounce the Dalai Lama and pledge allegiance to the Communist Party. Monks and nuns are expressly forbidden to possess or display photos of the Dalai Lama in their rooms as well as in the monastery or nunnery. Resistance to these diktats leads to arrest and expulsion from their institutions. In some cases, the monasteries and nunneries are closed down altogether.

The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) documented a total of 165 arrests (including nine custodial deaths) and more than 2,800 cases of expulsion from monasteries and nunneries in 1996 and 1997. In 1998, the total number of known cases of arrest and expulsion, as documented by the TCHRD, were 327 and 7,156 respectively, and 49 and 1,432 respectively in 1999.

In March 1998, the “TAR” Deputy Party Secretary Raidi said that “35,000 monks and nuns in more than 700 religious institutions have been rectified by patriotic education.”

Simultaneously, a number of “unpatriotic” monasteries and nunneries were closed down and some even demolished. Samdrupling Monastery in Tsetang County, Lhoka, Sungarbling Monastery in Lhoka and Drigung Sherta Dialectic School in Meldro Gonggar were forced to close in 1997. In the same year, the authorities closed down Shigatse’s Jonang Kumbum Monastery, persecuted its head, the Venerable Kunga Yeshi, and sold the monastery’s religious objects in the antique market of Lhasa.

Shongchen Nunnery in Shigatse, Drag Yerpa hermitage in Taktse County on the outskirts of Lhasa City, and the 12th century Rakhor Nunnery in Toelung Dечен County were all pulled down in 1997. The authorities claim that most of these dismantled monasteries, nunneries and hermitages had been constructed without official permission.

Ironically, just as these religious institutions were being closed down or destroyed, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, reported on August 8, 1997, a “golden age” for Tibetan religion and claimed that there were now more monasteries than before the “liberation” of Tibet.
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Lamas—A Communist Dilemma

In 1998 the Chinese authorities started to force senior Tibetan lamas (spiritual teachers) to retire from their religious duty of teaching. In one such case 49 out of 52 senior lamas from Youning Monastery in Gonlung County, “Tsoshar Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture”, in Amdo were ordered to permanently retire from their religious duties.

Such a practice is unprecedented in the history of Tibetan Buddhist tradition and has serious implications for the survival of Buddhist scholarship. Senior monks are crucial to the transmission of religious teachings in all the schools of Buddhism. The Tibet Information Network commented that the move represents a serious threat to the Buddhist tradition in Tibet and “is a new dimension to the patriotic education campaign”.8

One of the political dichotomies of 1999 was the attitude of the authorities towards senior religious figures; they were at one time viewed as a potential threat to stability and unity and as a potential tool of political control.

On the one hand, the authorities impose increasing restrictions on the activities of renowned scholars and religious teachers, perceiving them as a threat to the leadership of the Party. On the other hand, the authorities now make frequent attempts to utilize religious figures, institutions, and traditions to further their political ambitions. Even the system of recognizing reincarnate lamas (tulkus or rinpoches) is being manipulated.

In June 1999, Tao Changsong, Religious Advisor to the Chinese Government, said that the next Dalai Lama “will not be chosen from foreigners”, but that he will be “a Tibetan born in Chinese territory”.9

It is a measure of China’s increasing restrictions on religious freedom and harassment of Tibetan religious figures that the Seventeenth Gyalwa Karmapa, Orgyen Trinley Dorji—recognized both by the Dalai Lama and the PRC government— and Agya Rinpoche, a major Tibetan religious figure who held several important political posts under the Chinese administration, had to flee Tibet at the end of the 20th century.

Explaining the reasons for his escape, Agya Rinpoche said, “Had I remained in Tibet, I would have been forced to denounce the Dalai Lama and my religion to serve the Chinese Government... I would have been forced to help the government have its choice of the Panchen Lama accepted by the Tibetan people. This would violate my deepest beliefs. It was at this point that I knew I must leave my country.”

What is particularly noteworthy is that the new policy of religious repression in Tibet was orchestrated by the highest leadership circles in Beijing.

In his March 1999 speech to ethnic and religious leaders at the Second Session of the Ninth Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference National Committee, Chinese
President Jiang Zemin stated, "To correctly handle religious problems, first we should completely and correctly implement the party's religious policy; second, we should strengthen management of religious affairs according to the law; third, we should actively guide religions to adapt to the socialist society."9

In order to ensure that religion adapts to socialist society, two things, Jiang said, must be done, "First, the religious masses should abide by our socialist country's law, regulations, guidelines, and policies [religious activities must be conducted within the bounds of the law]; second, religious activities should be subjected to and should serve the country's maximum interest and the nation's entire interest."11

The Battle For Hearts And Minds

In 1997 the scope of the "Patriotic Education" campaign was extended to cover schools and other educational institutions to ensure the production of "tens of thousands of youngsters who will sincerely love China and carry forward the work of promoting socialism".

Just as in monasteries and nunneries, "Patriotic Education" in schools involves weaning the younger generations' loyalty away from the Dalai Lama and Tibetan nationalism. In this connection, Chen Kuiyuan made the following remark at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the "TAR" on July 29, 1995:

It has been long since the Dalai Clique started a contest to win over Tibet's educational battleground and future generation from us. If our failure to think clearly allows splittist ideas, publications and incitement to infiltrate our schools, and thus, blacken our future generation and create conditions for the people's schools to churn out successors to the splittist forces, we will have made a historical blunder.12

The targeting of schools and other institutes is also a direct result of the Third Forum, which stated:

The Dalai Clique has enrolled lots of teenagers in their schools abroad to imbue them with the idea of 'Tibetan independence' and splittist ideas. They are trying lots of methods to train successors to the cause of 'Tibetan independence'. In our region there are students in schools who wear the red scarfs [indicating that they belong to the Young Pioneers, the junior wing of the Communist Youth League] but go to monasteries to feed butter lamps, and what's more, some have been deceived by the counter-revolutionary propaganda of the Dalai Clique, so that they sympathize with them and take part in splittist activities.

What will happen after some decades? Will our teenagers grow up as successors to the cause of socialism or to the cause of splittism? This is an important issue that we ought to consider seriously.

The Panacea Of Atheism

Towards the end of 1998 the Chinese authorities came up with a campaign to foster atheism in all walks of Tibetan life. This campaign was targeted to achieve its objectives
within three years. Heralding its start, Raidi stated on November 15, 1998, “As communists, we cannot hold that all is well because we merely announce that we are atheists. Rather, we should make bold propaganda about Marxist atheism and insist on indoctrinating the masses of peasantry and herdsmen in the Marxist stand on religion.”

Then, on January 8, 1999, a meeting of the “TAR” Party Propaganda Department decided that “atheism is necessary to promote economic development in the region and to assist the struggle against the infiltration of the Dalai Clique”.13 The campaign urged Tibetans to stop the age-old custom of relying on divination or oracles or seeking advice from senior religious persons or using prayer beads or even wearing traditional Tibetan garments in offices. It announced restrictions on putting up prayer flags, burning incense, circumambulating holy places, going on religious pilgrimages, etc. These “superstitious acts”, the campaign trumpeted, stood as stumbling blocks to the advancement of society - particularly for the advent of a market economy.

The first targets of this campaign were Tibetan Communist Party members and public sector employees. They were warned against possessing religious objects - such as prayer books, photos, statues, thangkas (religious paintings) and altars - and against participating in religious festivals or services, including visiting monasteries and temples on sacred days. This was followed recently by a further decree ordering Party members and government workers to withdraw their children from monasteries and nunneries.

Earlier, in his November 8, 1997 speech to the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth “TAR” Party Committee, Chen Kuiyuan stated:

Religious believers, and even some Party members and cadres, are not able to free themselves from the shackles of their outlook on the world as seen from religious idealism. Instead of devoting their intelligence and endeavours to the welfare of society and the people, they waste their precious time in futile efforts praying for individual happiness in the next world; instead of using their limited financial resources to improve their economic condition, they unrestrictedly donate their money to monasteries; and instead of letting their children receive a modern education, they send them to monasteries to become a monk or a nun. Such negative thinking and behaviour prevents science and technology from spreading and impedes the development of productive forces.

The targeting of Party members and public sector employees reveals the Chinese authorities' sense of frustration with Tibetan cadres for dragging their feet on the anti-Dalai Lama campaigns. This became clear from a Tibet TV commentary of August 3, 1999 which stated that those members and cadres who do not support the campaigns “worry that Tibet, being the main region of Tibetan Buddhism, where lamaseries and monasteries are ubiquitous and where there are many Buddhist followers, propagating Marxist-
Leninist atheism here in a big way is incongruous with the Party's religious policy and propagating Marxist-Leninist atheism will hurt the religious sentiments of the vast numbers of monks, nuns and religious followers.

In sum, it is not difficult to assess why the Chinese authorities are intent on suppressing the religion, culture and language of Tibet. Anything that in any way can define Tibetans as a distinct people is viewed as a direct threat to the unity of China and the Communist Party leadership.

Chen Kuiyuan made this clear when he said, “They [the Dalai Clique] try to use language and culture as an excuse to create ethnic conflict. Their aim is to separate the Tibetan nationality from the rest of China’s nationalities... and to make the so-called ‘Tibetan culture’ opposed to the so-called ‘Han culture’.”¹⁴
The overriding goal of Beijing’s education policy in Tibet is to instill loyalty to the “Great Motherland” and the Communist Party. Speaking at the “TAR” Conference on Education in Lhasa in 1994, the then regional Party Secretary, Chen Kuiyuan, said:

The success of our education does not lie in the number of diplomas issued to graduates from universities, colleges... and secondary schools. It lies, in the final analysis, in whether our graduating students are opposed to or turn their hearts to the Dalai Clique and in whether they are loyal to or do not care about our great motherland and the great socialist cause...1

This policy has blinded the authorities to a number of core issues relating to human resource development on the plateau. Despite the authorities’ claim of having “taken on an important task over the past few decades to develop popular or mass education in Tibet”, education—the foundation for the development of human resources—has always been put on the back burner of priority programmes.

In pre-1959 independent Tibet, over 6,000 monasteries and nunneries served as centres of literacy. In addition, Tibet had many lay schools run by the government as well as by individuals. The Chinese Communist Party labelled these traditional learning centres as “fountains of “blind faith” and nurturing grounds for “feudal oppression”. They were, therefore, targeted for attack and closure soon after the “liberation” of Tibet.

In their place, the authorities forced...
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Tibetans in agricultural and pastoral areas to establish people-funded schools, known as mangtsuk lobdra. Not a single cent of Chinese Government grants was spent on these schools and the majority of them could not be regarded as schools by international standards. But these institutes did serve to create impressive statistics for China's propaganda purposes. This is clearly reflected in the following statements of three Chinese sociologists:

There are only 58 middle-level schools (in the “TAR”). Out of them only 13 are real middle schools. Altogether, there are 2,450 primary schools in Tibet. Out of them, only 451 are funded by the Government. Over 2,000 of these schools are funded by the people. These schools do not have a sound foundation and are not properly equipped. The level of education is either completely nil or extremely low. Therefore, the question of scientific skills can be ruled out among them. At present 90 percent of farmers and herders do not receive lower middle-level education.

In view of this, talking about upper-middle school and university education is like asking people to eat well when there is no food grains available. Only 45 percent of the children of school-going age go to primary schools. From them, 10.6 percent manage to graduate to the lower-middle school. In other words, 55 percent of the children do not even get primary-level education. In the whole of the “TAR”, there are over 9,000 teachers of various levels, far fewer than the actual number required. Fifty percent of these teachers are not qualified enough. Equality among nationalities will come about only if this is reformed and improved.2

In the 1980s, Beijing's liberalized policy encouraged a favourable atmosphere for development of an education system that catered to the felt-needs of Tibetans. Unfortunately, China's broader economic and strategic interests at that time led to a decrease in State funding for education. As a result, the decade saw the closure of 62 percent of primary schools, and 43 percent fall in the number of students.3

In the 1990s, the “TAR” was allotted more money for education as a result of the region having been declared a Special Economic Zone. And, in 1994 Beijing adopted a compulsory education policy for the “TAR”. But the budget allocation for education went mostly to State-run schools (shung-tsuk lobdra), where Chinese students predominate. Schools in rural areas—where the majority of Tibetans live—continued to be neglected. Qun Zeng, Vice-director of the Education Commission of the “TAR” said:

There are too many rain ban (errata: this should be ming ban meaning “people-funded”) schools, too many lower classes, too high a proportion of school dropouts and too few complete the primary school [wan quan xiao xue]. For instance, there are a total of 2,800 primary schools in the region, of which 1,787, or 74.5 percent, are rain ban (read ming ban)primary schools with crude facilities and low-quality teachers and which can operate no more than the first or second grades of schooling. Of the 500 or
so currently-existing government-run [gong ban] primary schools, more than half can operate no more than the first grades of schooling owing to limitations of facilities and teachers. There are only 100 or so complete primary schools actually capable of operating the six grades of elementary education, and most of these are situated in cities and townships above the county level whereas few are to be found in the agricultural and pastoral districts. There is, on average, fewer than a single complete primary school for each of 897 townships in the region, with the result that only about 60.4 percent of school-aged children are in school—the lowest rate in all of China.4

Besides, with the massive influx of Chinese immigrants on the plateau, the linguistic and cultural needs of the Chinese children have influenced the education system—particularly at secondary and university levels—so that the Chinese language has eclipsed Tibetan as the medium for schooling.

The evolution of Tibet’s education in the 1990s can be assessed from the situation of “mass education” in Chamdo prefecture—one of the “TAR’s” most affluent regions. An article by Shang Xioling, reporter for “TAR” Radio, and Tang Ching, special reporter on “TAR” education, gives an alarming insight into education conditions in and around Chamdo. Their article, headlined “Notes on the Sad Story of Education in Chamdo”, was published in the July 15, 1993 edition of one of Chamdo’s Chinese-language newspapers.

The authors revealed that of the 110,000 school-age children in Chamdo, more than 70,000 (63.64 percent) had no educational opportunity. They reported that illiteracy and semi-literacy rate of Chamdo prefecture was 78.8 percent. Shang and Tang wrote that although the claimed average school enrolment rate in the “TAR” was 60.4 percent, the enrolment rate in Chamdo prefecture was only 34 percent.

These revelations from Shang and Tang expose the dubious quality of Chinese government statistics. If Chamdo—as one of the most highly developed areas in the “TAR”—had an enrollment rate of only 34 percent, the “TAR” average in the same period could not be as high as 60.4 percent. Furthermore, what the authorities fail to admit is that the “TAR” and other Tibetan areas of Qinghai (Amdo) and Sichuan (Kham) are still at the bottom of China’s education index—lower even than Guizhou, China’s most backward province.5

According to China’s Fourth National Census of 1990, only 0.29 percent of Tibetans had a college-level education; 1.23 percent senior-middle schooling; 2.47 percent junior-middle schooling; and 18.52 percent primary school education. China’s national average was 1.42 percent with college level education, 8.04 percent senior-middle schooling, 23.34 percent junior-middle schooling, and 37.06 percent primary school education.

The census report showed that 62.85 percent of the productive population (between the age group of 15-40) was illiterate or semi-literate and 84.76 percent of women
in the work force was illiterate or semi-literate. Among Tibetans employed in the “TAR's” public sector industries, 80 percent were illiterate or semi-literate. China's Fifth National Census was conducted on November 1, 2000, but statistical data is not yet available.

Grooming Political Tools

In the late 1990s, more than one-third of Tibetan secondary students from the “TAR” were sent to China for education. In Beijing's Tibet Middle School alone, there are nearly 1,000 Tibetan students—760 in junior and 200 in secondary programmes. Students sent to China undertake seven-year courses; they return home only once for vacation. The aim of sending Tibet’s brightest youths to China is to groom them as tools for China’s political control in Tibet.

Tibetans rightfully resent this as a policy aimed at undermining their identity and culture. The late Panchen Lama stated that educating Tibetan children in China would only have the effect of alienating them from their cultural roots. Similarly, a Tibetan official in the “TAR” said that the aim of setting up “Tibetan secondary schools in central China is to assimilate the next Tibetan generation”.

By 1994 there were 13,000 Tibetans enrolled in 104 schools scattered across twenty-six Chinese provinces. The majority of these are normal Chinese schools with special classes designated for Tibetans. However, 18 of them are full-fledged “Tibetan Secondary Schools”; three of them—based in Beijing, Chengdu and Tianjin—have junior and senior secondary programs, while the remaining ones have junior secondary programmes only. Seventy-five percent of Tibetans graduating from these junior secondary schools were sent to technical secondary schools.

Such an elitist education programme consumes a large portion of the “TAR's” annual education budget while rural Tibet's allotment does not even provide for adequate basic education. Between 1984 and 1991, the “TAR” spent 53 million yuan on Tibetan secondary students in China. In 1994 alone, the “TAR” fixed a budget of 1,050 yuan on each Tibetan secondary student in China.

Eradicating Tibetan Language

Between 1959 and 1979 the Communist campaign to destroy the “Four Olds” targeted Tibetan language for elimination. In the 1980s, however, Beijing took some positive steps to promote literacy in Tibetan language and devised an education system that answered the Tibetan people’s needs.

In 1987 the “TAR” People's Congress in Lhasa passed a legislation making Tibetan the medium of instruction at primary school, and stipulating that Chinese language should be introduced only from age nine. The legislation promised to set up Tibetan-medium junior secondary schools in the “TAR” by 1993 and to make most university courses available in Tibetan shortly after 2000.
But this policy remained unimplemented due to an acute shortage of funding and, later, due to the lack of political will. As a result, the Tibetan language continued to be marginalized, causing concerns for its very survival among many Tibetans.

In 1988, the late Panchen Lama, while addressing the first meeting of China's Institute of Tibetology in Beijing, commented:

The land, which managed itself well for 1,300 years, from the seventh century, lost its language after it was liberated. Whether we remained backward or made mistakes, we managed our life on the world's highest plateau by using only Tibetan. We had everything written in our own language, be it Buddhism, crafts, astronomy, poems, logic. All administrative works were also done in Tibetan. When the Institute of Tibetology was founded, I spoke in the People's Palace and said that the Tibetan studies should be based on the foundation of Tibet's own religion and culture. So far we have underestimated these subjects. ... It may not be the deliberate goal of the Party to let Tibetan culture die, but I wonder whether the Tibetan language will survive or be eradicated.¹³

Dherong Tsering Thondup, another scholar in Tibet, raised a similar concern after conducting a detailed survey of the status of Tibetan language in many parts of Eastern Tibet, now part of China's Sichuan Province. In his report, published in the early 1990s, Dherong wrote that out of the 6,044 Tibetan party members and officials in the nine districts forming Karze Tibet Autonomous Prefecture, only 991 were literate in Tibetan. Similarly, the majority of the 25 Tibetan students in one class in Dartsedo could not speak Tibetan at all. Dherong cited three principal reasons for this: the Chinese Government's chauvinistic policy, which accelerates the process of Sinicization; the second is the notion of Tibetan being a worthless language in today's society; and the third, the inferiority complex suffered by Tibetans, which hampers their initiatives to protect their own language.

Elaborating on Beijing's chauvinistic policies, Dherong wrote that the socialist era calls for joint efforts to promote all nationalities, and not wipe out any particular
nationality. The Chinese constitution guarantees each nationality freedom to manage its own education, science, culture, health and hygiene, and the right to protect the nationality’s cultural heritage. However, these constitutionally-enshrined rights, he argued, had never been fully implemented for Tibetans.

“The failure to promote the significance and use of the nationality language, in effect, represents a slight on the nationality. If Chinese is used as the lingua franca to the neglect of the nationality language, if all are Sinicized through the policy of nationality chauvinism, and if the nationalities are pushed to... assimilate into one another for the purpose of helping to bridge economic and cultural disparities, this is totally against the provisions of the constitution regarding the freedom to use and promote one’s language.”

In 1993 a special committee—the TAR Guiding Committee for Written and Spoken Tibetan—was set up to implement the 1987 legislation on education. At the inaugural ceremony of the Guiding Committee, “TAR” Deputy Party Secretary Tenzin commented, “There is conclusive evidence that nothing can substitute the effect of using Tibetan language to raise educational quality and to improve the nationality’s cultural level.”

In 1996 Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok, Abbot of Serthar Buddhist Institute in Karze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan, wrote:

Actually, the Tibetan language has no value in present-day Tibet. For instance, if a letter were mailed with an address written in Tibetan, it wouldn’t reach its destination even within Tibet, let alone outside. In the case of travels, no matter how literate a person is in Tibetan, he would not be able to know the bus timing or read the seat number on his ticket. Even if one has to look for a hospital or a shop in the county headquarters or a city, the knowledge of Tibetan is useless. A person who knows only Tibetan will find it difficult even to buy daily necessities.

If our language is useless in our own country, where else will it have any use? If the situation remains like this much longer, the Tibetan language will become extinct one day. ... Rare in Tibet are schools where one can study Tibetan language and culture. ... Moreover, parents have developed the habit of not sending their children to school. This is because the primary school teaches Chinese rather than Tibetan. Even if the students learn Chinese and graduate from the middle school, there is no employment scope in Tibet. They end up herding cattle and working in fields. There is, of course, a slight opportunity for learning Tibetan. But the parents know that Tibetan language is useless in day-to-day life. Therefore, they have no motivation to send children to school.

... In the cities and county headquarters there are serious cases of people being unable to speak Tibetan, although both their parents are Tibetans. Many of them have lost their Tibetan characteristics. Moreover, Tibetan officials cannot speak pure Tibetan. One-fifth or two-thirds of the words they use are Chinese. That’s why ordinary Tibetans can’t understand their speech.
These critical observations went unheeded. Instead, a number of retrograde steps were taken in 1996 in line with the recommendations of the Third Work Forum on Tibet. The budget for Tibetan academic and literary publications was drastically reduced. The Guiding Committee was disbanded and its senior members transferred to the Regional Translation Bureau. Pilot projects for extending Tibetan medium education to secondary schools, along with the four experimental classes, met a similar fate. Around the same time, Tibetan language courses at Lhasa's Tibet University were discontinued and lecturers were ordered to rewrite textbooks to expurgate their religious content.

The situation deteriorated further in 1997 when the “TAR” Deputy Party Secretary Tenzin disclosed a decision to make Chinese mandatory for Tibetan students right from primary school.

In a meeting with James Sasser, US Ambassador to China, Tenzin said that the 1987 policy was “impracticable” and “not in conformity with the reality of Tibet” and that “the decision to allow grade one to three boys and girls to be taught only in the Tibetan language will do no good to the children's growth.” In the same vein, “TAR” Deputy Party Secretary Raidi stated that “an ethnic nationality which studies and uses only its own spoken and written language definitely is an insular ethnic nationality which will have no future or hope”. Within a decade, the 1987 legislation had been revoked.

Beijing's policy to undermine Tibetan language and culture is implemented in all regions of Tibet—not only in the “TAR”. Zhou Yong-kang, Communist Party Secretary for Sichuan province (which incorporates large parts of Eastern Tibet), said at a meeting of China's National People's Congress in March 2000 that the teaching of Tibetan in schools was “a drain on government resources”.

Escaping To Be Educated

All the evidence suggest that the educational opportunity created in Tibet by China's “earth-shaking” advancement over the past five decades is woefully inadequate for the needs of Tibetans; it lags far behind what the exile Tibetans, who came empty-handed to India in 1959, have developed.

The exile Tibetan community today has 87 schools with an enrolment of 30,000 students, constituting about 85 percent of school-age children. Today, education in exile has produced medical doctors, administrators, Ph.D's, M.Phils, engineers, post-graduate teachers, journalists, social workers, lawyers, computer programmers, etc. This is due mainly to the support of the Government of India, which, in contrast to Beijing, takes no credit for its role.

In addition, there are over 200 monasteries and nunneries in exile with around 20,000 monks and nuns. Small wonder, then, that young Tibetans continue to undertake
hazardous, heart-breaking journeys over the
Himalayas to come to India where they and
their parents see the only hope for a
meaningful and free education.

The Australian Human Rights Delegation
to China and Tibet in 1991 stated: “Young
people, while speaking of their desire for
education, saw their only choice being to
attempt to reach the Tibetan communities in
India where, they said, at least education was
freely available irrespective of all the other
hardships.” According to a report by the
Dharamsala-based Tibetan Center for Human
Rights and Democracy, between 6,000 to
9,000 Tibetan children and youths have fled
Tibet since 1984 to seek educational
opportunities in India and Nepal.

A Skewed Health Service

Between 1959-1979, the Communist
campaign against the “four olds” also targeted
the traditional Tibetan healing system.
Tibetan medical institutes were closed down.
Traditional medical professionals, who had
learned their skill all their lives, were replaced
by “barefoot doctors”, who had only six
months to one year of training. Most of these
paramedics—between the age group of
15-19—had no formal education before their
training.18 Foreign visitors to Tibet during
that period recorded an increase in the
incidence of cancer, dysentery and
diarrhoea.19

After the economic liberalization in 1979,
there has been a noticeable improvement in
health care facilities, at least in urban areas.
Nevertheless, the standard of health care
remained much lower than in the rest of
China.20 Dawa Tsering—a young Tibetan
who returned to Tibet from exile and studied
at the National Minorities Institute in Siling,
Amdo, between 1979-1981—said that the
hospitals in Siling provided free treatment to
students and cadres, but ordinary people had
to pay. “Except for emergency cases,
treatment of ordinary Tibetans in these
hospital is very casual”, he said.21 A British
Voluntary Service Overseas personnel, who
spent a year at Lhasa University in 1987, said
that the medical service in Lhasa City was so
appalling that “Chinese people would rather
fly home than be admitted in Lhasa.”

Recollecting her visit to a hospital in Lhasa,
she said: “I never saw a nurse in the three days
I visited. Visitors wandered in at any time in
any numbers. The doctor attending her
smoked. There was no curtain for privacy
when she used the bedpan—neither from
other patients and their relatives, nor from the
outside world through the window. She was
afraid to eat the food provided or drink the
water, and lived on biscuits and sweets
brought by friends.”22

Tuberculosis is widely prevalent in Tibet. A
journal of the International Union Against
Tuberculosis and Lung Diseases reported in
early 1988 that the prevalence of tuberculosis
was highest in Xinjiang and Tibet. The report
added that the “TAR’s” prevalence rate of
1.26 percent and smear positive rate of 0.316
percent were twice as high as the entire China's prevalence rate of 0.72 percent and smear positive rate of 0.19 percent.\textsuperscript{23}

The status of health in Tibet, particularly among the children, is clearly revealed in the findings of the survey conducted between 1993 and 1996 by the Tibet Child Nutrition and Collaborative Health Project. The TCNP found evidence of chronic malnutrition and severely compromised health status. “Fifty-two percent of children examined showed signs of severe stunting (low height-for-age); over 40 percent of the children showed signs of protein energy malnutrition; and 67 percent were diagnosed with clinical rickets (a bone disease most frequently caused by vitamin D deficiency)”.\textsuperscript{24}

Despite these reports, Chinese official publications continue to claim great improvement in health care system. According to the Chinese authorities, there were 1,300 medical establishments and 6,700 hospital beds in the “TAR” in 1998.\textsuperscript{25} The authorities also maintain that “medical institutions can be found everywhere” in Tibet.\textsuperscript{26} But the fact is that health service in Tibet is highly skewed in favour of urban dwellers, who are predominantly Chinese. The inhabitants of agricultural and pastoral areas have to travel for a whole day or so by horse or yak to county capitals or larger towns for treatment. Even in urban areas, admission to an in-patient department of the government hospital demands an initial deposit of 500 to 3,000 yuan—an unreasonable sum for ordinary Tibetans whose average per capita income now is 1,258 yuan (about US$151.56).\textsuperscript{27}

One consequence of poor health service for Tibetans and the bad state of public hygiene are higher mortality rates for Tibetans than Chinese. In 1981, according to the reports of the World Bank in 1984 and of the UNDP in 1991, crude death rates per thousand were 7.48 in the “TAR” and 9.92 in Amdo, as against an average of 6.6 in China. Child mortality rates are also disproportionately high: 150 per thousand against 43 for China. The TB morbidity rate, according to the World Bank, is 120.2 per 1,000 in the “TAR” and 647 per 1,000 in Amdo.

Similarly, in 1995, Tibet ranked lowest on China’s life expectancy index and education index with 0.58 and 0.32 respectively, which are well below China’s national average of 0.73 and 0.68 respectively.
Beijing’s policy of Sinicizing Tibet by transplanting a Chinese majority onto the plateau has been consistent since the early period of the Communist takeover. Beijing encourages Chinese settlers to migrate to western regions—including Tibet—by offering discriminatory incentives, such as preferential schooling and business opportunities and a more lenient childbearing policy in view of “the sparse population of those regions”.

Mao Zedong gave the first public indication of Beijing’s population transfer policy in 1952 when he proposed a five-fold population increase in the western half of Tibet, later named the “Tibet Autonomous Region”. Mao pronounced, “Tibet covers a large area but is thinly populated. Its population should be increased from the present two or three million to five or six million, and then to over ten million.”

In 1955 Chinese President Liu Shao-chi told the late Panchen Lama that Tibet was a big unoccupied country and China had a big population which could be settled there.

Five years later, in 1960, Premier Zhou Enlai explained, “The Chinese are greater in number and more developed in economy and culture but in the regions they inhabit there is not much arable land left and underground resources are not as abundant as in the regions inhabited by fraternal nationalities.” In that same year, an internal Chinese document advised that “Tibet’s population of 1.2 million” should be increased to three million.
and should include settlers from China.5

In February 1985 the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi announced its government’s intention to “change both the ecological imbalance and the population lack” not just in Tibet but also in other “sparsely populated outlying regions”. Chinese “migration should be welcomed by the local population, and should result in a population increase of 60 million over the next 30 years in those regions”. The announcement went on to say, “This is a very conservative estimate. As a matter of fact, the increase might swell to a hundred million in less than 30 years.”6

Two years later, in June 1987, Deng Xiaoping admitted that Chinese were being encouraged to move to Tibet because, as he put it to Jimmy Carter, the local population “needs Han immigrants as the (Autonomous) Region’s population of about two million is inadequate to develop its resources”.7

Then, on May 12, 1993, Beijing’s high-level secret meeting—code-named 512 and held in Sichuan Province—envisaged that the further flooding of Tibet with Chinese nationals would offer the final solution to the Tibetan problem. This “solution” is aimed at making it demographically “impossible for Tibetans to rise as in the case of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang (East Turkestan).8

Demographic Conundrum

Before 1959 the government of independent Tibet estimated the total population of Tibet—which includes Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang—at six million. In 1959, the Chinese Government indicated that the population of Tibet was over six million—nearly 1.3 million inside the “TAR” and nearly five million in Tibetan areas outside the “TAR”.9 Again, in 1988, Beijing Review stated that of the total Tibetan population of six million, two million were living in the “TAR” and four million in the Tibetan regions outside the “TAR”.10

However, data compiled from Chinese publications issued between 1990 and 1995 put the Tibetan population across the plateau at only 4,906,500.11 These are rather confusing statistics. It is fair to assume that the death of 1.2 million Tibetans and escape of over 100,000 must have resulted in the decrease of one million between 1959 and the 1990s. But such a steep decline between 1988 and the 1990s is hard to account for.

In addition, it has not been possible to get reliable data regarding the number of Chinese settlers in Tibet. Many Tibet-watchers believe that Beijing understates the size of the Chinese population on the plateau due to its increasing sensitivity to international criticism. Independent research carried out in the early 1980s showed over seven million Chinese settlers in Tibet. Since then, there has been a very visible increase in the number of Chinese economic migrants. However, official Chinese publications issued between 1990 and 1995 show only 5,280,500 non-Tibetans (Chinese and other minorities) in Tibet.

According to these statistics, the total
population of Tibet is 10,102,000, out of which Tibetans constitute 4,821,500 (48 percent). In the “TAR”, official Chinese publications of 1995 show a miniscule Chinese presence. The publications show Tibetans constituting 2,275,000 (96.4 percent) out of the total population of 2,360,000. The largely barren and inhospitable terrain of the “TAR” explains why the proportion of Chinese settled in this region is substantially lower than in other parts of Tibet. Nevertheless, resident Tibetans and foreign visitors to the “TAR” maintain that the true number of Chinese population is many times more than the official claim. The Alliance for Research in Tibet states: “Given significant populations of Chinese in all TAR prefectural capitals and most county seats, a pattern identical to that observed outside the TAR, the true proportion of Chinese in the TAR is more likely to be nearer that of other autonomous Tibetan areas.”

The Chinese population transfer to the “TAR” was carried out in earnest in the 1980s when Beijing launched the campaign to “Help Tibet Prosper”. In May 1984 Radio Beijing reported that, “Over 60,000 workers, representing the vanguard groups to help in the construction work in the TAR, are arriving in Tibet daily [number of days not specified] and have started their preliminary work. They will be helping in the electricity department, schools, hotels, cultural institutions and construction of mills and factories.” Another 60,000 Chinese “workers”—mainly from Sichuan Province—arrived in the “Tibet Autonomous Region” in the summer of 1985. By 1985 there were 50,000 to 60,000 Chinese civilian residents in Lhasa alone; and within three years this figure doubled.

The influx of Chinese settlers into the region accelerated further in the early 1990s due to Deng Xiaoping’s personal encouragement of the movement of larger numbers of Chinese “comrades” into Tibet to “impart scientific and technological know-how and share their scientific expertise”. In January 1991, Beijing Review reported that about 300,000 workers were prepared to join new construction projects in the “TAR”. In Lhoka alone about 28,000 Chinese settlers arrived between 1987 and 1992; some 27,000 arrived in Nagchu between 1989 and 1992; and 43,860 in Ngari between 1986 and 1992.

During this boom period, Lhasa was described by resident Chinese entrepreneurs as the “Land of Gold”, and few were inclined to leave. In one telling example, a Chinese official—having met with surprising success in an informal business venture—was prompted to send his wife back to China to sound out his friends and relatives. She returned with 30 of her enterprising compatriots. Around the same time, Mao Rubai, Vice-Chairman of the “TAR” government, was quoted as saying that there were one million Chinese settlers (excluding military personnel) in the region.
But it is the fertile borderland Tibetan territories outside the “TAR” which have the highest concentration of Chinese migrants. These territories include the whole of Amdo and a substantial portion of Kham. Official Chinese statistics published between 1990 and 1995 show the total population of these regions as 7,742,000, of which Tibetans constitute 2,546,500 (32.89 percent). The publications show the break-up of population in these regions as follows:

- Qinghai (Amdo) Province, total population 4,749,000, Tibetans 972,600 (20.48 percent).
- Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Kaniho and Tibetan Autonomous County of Parig in Gansu Province, total population 837,000, Tibetans 357,700 (42.74 percent).
- Ngaba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Karze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and Mili Tibetan Autonomous County in Sichuan Province, total population 1,820,000, Tibetans 1,105,000 (60.71 percent).
- Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province, total population 336,000, Tibetans 111,200 (33.10 percent).

Chinese settlement in these non-“TAR” Tibetan regions followed close on the heels of the invading PLA troops in 1949. Soon after Beijing’s military incursion, a contingent of civilians—administrators, staff and their families—arrived in these areas, paving the way for more civilians to establish themselves in larger towns. During three mass migrations— in 1955, 1959 and 1965— about 175,000 Chinese entered Amdo.

Apart from these conspicuous migrations, between 1962 and 1976 Beijing sent such a large numbers of prisoners to Amdo that the area acquired the sobriquet “China’s Gulag”. According to the human rights activist, Harry Wu, over one million prisoners were shipped to Amdo’s labour camps and jails which served as “human storehouses for victims of successive Chinese purges”. Most of the prisoners were not permitted to return to China on release. Instead, they were given employment in 26 prison-run factories in Amdo. Although the total number of employees in these factories is not known, some of them have a labour force numbering up to 100,000 each.

In the Kham area outside the “TAR”, the influx of Chinese escalated from 1962 onwards when thousands upon thousands of migrants from neighbouring Chinese provinces were sent there as “builders, workers, and technicians”, particularly to work clear-felling the region’s ancient forests in the state lumbering industries.

Beijing claims that the migrants are needed to help develop Tibet’s economy. Tibetans, on the other hand, see no obvious benefits from their presence; they consider the mass migration of Chinese a drain on the economy and insidious attempt to Sinicize their country. In this context, the late Panchen Lama stated that, “The expense of keeping one Chinese in Tibet is equal to that of four in China. Why should Tibet spend its money to feed them? ... Tibet has suffered greatly because of the policy of sending a large
number of useless people. The Chinese population in Tibet started with a few thousand and today it has multiplied manifold.”

**Acceleration Of Population Transfer**

During Beijing's Third Forum on Work in Tibet, decisions were made to accelerate the integration of Tibet into China's economic needs. The major thrust of the strategy was "to open Tibet's door wide to inner parts of the country and encourage traders, investment, economic units and individuals from China to Central Tibet to run different sorts of enterprises." In recent years Beijing has conceived massive projects to help the migration of the poor or displaced Chinese population to Tibet. One of them is the Western Poverty Reduction Project. A component of this project is to develop agriculture in the Dulan area of Amdo and relocate 58,000 Chinese settlers there. In the year 2000 the World Bank withdrew its US$40 million loan to this project in the face of protests from Tibetans and their international supporters. However, China is adamant to go ahead with the project using its own finances.

The transfer of Chinese settlers into Tibet has had devastating economic effects on Tibetans. Settlers threaten the livelihood of Tibetans; they are central to the government's policy of integrating Tibet into the Chinese economy. Over the years, the settlers have come to dominate the Tibetan economy; they own virtually all the businesses in Tibet. In 1992 a western tourist conducted a covert survey in Tibet. He observed that there were 12,227 shops and restaurants in Lhasa city (excluding the Barkhor), of which only 300 were owned by Tibetans. In Tsawa Pasho, southern Kham, the Chinese owned 133 business enterprises whereas the Tibetans owned only fifteen. The ownership ratio was similar in other Tibetan towns: 748 to 92 in Chamdo, 229 to three in Powo Tramo. The situation is far worse in the urban centres of Amdo, where, according to one British journalist, Tibetans are reduced to “tourist curios”.

Population transfer has also greatly impacted the kind of development that takes place in Tibet. Beijing's subsidies, and much of the infrastructure in place, are directed towards maintaining a distinct, controlling Chinese community in Tibet. This can be seen to be mainly urban, administrative, mercantile or military, and segregated from the bulk of Tibetan communities.
TIBET UNDER COMMUNIST CHINA

Tibet’s landmass is 2.5 million sq km, roughly a quarter the area of continental Europe. The Tibetan plateau is the prime source of Asia’s great rivers, sustaining 47 percent of the world’s population—in India, Nepal, Pakistan, China, Thailand, Burma, Laos, Thailand and Bangladesh. Over 5,000 higher plant species and more than 12,000 species of vascular plants, 532 species of birds, and 126 identified minerals are found in Tibet. The plateau also has the earth’s loftiest mountains, ancient forests, and deep valleys, which remained virtually untouched by human disturbance for thousands of years before the Chinese invasion.

The governments of Bhutan and pre-1949 independent Tibet were perhaps the first in the world to evolve a functioning environment protection ethos. Traditional economic and religious value-systems of the two countries stressed the importance of “contentment” against over-consumption. The tradition teaches that over-exploitation of the earth’s natural resources will anger the guardian deities, deplete the soil’s nutrition, and harm other living beings and their habitat. Based on this belief, both governments issued decrees in past centuries, enshrining protection of their environment. Tibet’s Great Fifth Dalai Lama issued the first recorded Decree for the Protection of Animals and the Environment in 1642, and since then, such decrees were issued annually by the government of Tibet.

While Buddhist Bhutan still boasts the

M ammon at Earth’s Altar

M ammon at Earth’s Altar
world’s best-protected eco-system, Tibet’s environment has suffered— and continues to suffer— irreparable damage since the country’s annexation by China. In 1958 China established a nuclear weapons facility on the Tibetan plateau. The Northwest Nuclear Weapon Research and Design Academy in Amdo is reported to have disposed of nuclear waste on the plateau throughout the 1960s and 1970s.1

Over the past half a century, the Chinese rulers of Tibet have ignored the fragile nature of the plateau’s eco-system; they perceive the majestic mountains and verdant valleys and rushing rivers merely as inexhaustible sources of energy, timber, wildlife products and mineral resources. This has devastated the ecological balance on the altar of the earth. The environmental degradation is most conspicuous in grassland areas, forests, water resources and the wildlife.

Grassland and Chinese Policies

Grassland covers 70 percent of the total Tibetan landmass. Pastoral-nomadism forms the backbone of the plateau’s agrarian economy, which supports 70 million animal population and nearly a million herdsmen.

Over the millennia, Tibetan nomads evolved an elaborate and complex livestock and grassland management system in answer to the needs of the plateau’s fragile eco-system. Grasslands were held as community property and the low-lying lands distributed in close consultation among the nomads themselves. The number of animals owned by a household was used as the criterion for determining the pastureland allotment. Every one to three years, the grasslands were redistributed to suit the needs of the fluctuating number of livestock owned by different households. However, the upper mountain slopes were basically open to all to graze in summer and autumn.

This system allowed nomads seasonal migration over wide territorial expanses. The migration could be of two or three cycles depending on the regional quality of grazing. In a three-cycle migration, nomads moved their herds higher up to the mountains in summer, gradually descending on mountainsides in autumn, and then on the valleys in winter/spring, where grass was richest and where the nomads themselves were based. Such migratory patterns allowed the vegetation adequate time to regenerate.

Owing to the division of winter grazing lands, some herds would have to pass through the territory of other nomads to reach water and seasonal pastures. So a system was devised whereby encroaching herds could graze on any land for a day or two, either free or for a small fee.

The nomads also divided their mixed herds to apportion different grazing grounds to different species, depending on their respective capacities and needs. Generally, it was only the sheep and goats that returned to home base in December. The yaks moved to a series of different winter locations situated
higher up in the mountains; the yaks finally returned to the home base only in spring. This is because yaks, unlike sheep and goats, are able to graze on short grass lying under the snow cover.

A critical balance between livestock and pastureland was maintained by these and other traditional methods.

However, from China's sedentary agricultural viewpoint, this traditional migratory system is seen as “primitive and undeveloped”. Beijing's State planners and authorities view nomadic pursuits as “neither beneficial to the development of animal husbandry, nor to the prosperity of the human population”.2 In 1998, China's Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Qin Jingfa, was quoted as saying that nomadic life in “China” would cease to exist by the end of the century.3

Over the decades of Chinese rule, the authorities have taken a number of steps to dismantle nomadic grazing traditions on the plateau. The grasslands have been redistributed to village administrations according to their respective territorial jurisdictions. This means some villages were allotted low-lying pastures and others mountainous grazing lands only. The village administration, in turn, has distributed pasturelands to the nomadic households under its jurisdiction. Unlike the traditional system of redistributing every one to three years, pasturelands have been redistributed only three times in five decades—during the periods of Democratic Reform, Cultural Revolution and Economic Reform. This disregard for fluctuation in herd sizes has created an inflexible and unworkable situation.

Redistribution has also proved less favourable to nomads with pasturelands in the vicinity of towns, as Tibet's rapidly-expanding urban centres keep nibbling away their lands. In recent years, a number of large-scale towns and farming communities have been established in fertile valleys of erstwhile pastoral areas. Additionally, distribution has been carried out with absolutely no consultations with the nomads. This means those who paid bribes or enjoyed good relations with government officials received better or bigger lands.4

Finally, in the last decade, the Chinese authorities reintroduced a fencing system to limit pasturelands. According to a 1996-report, 600,000 hectares of grasslands in Amdo had been fenced, facilitating the settlement of 56,000 of the 100,000 households in the province.5 As the traditional grazing system shows, such enclosure is not at all suitable to the environment and ecology of the Tibetan plateau. In the fragile and harsh environment of Tibet, nomadic mobility is essential to the sustenance of the grassland eco-system.

Resource Exploitation

Deforestation: On the eve of China's invasion, Tibet's ancient forests covered 221,800 sq km. By 1985 they stood at
134,000 sq km—almost half. Most forests grow on steep, isolated slopes in the river valleys of Tibet’s low-lying southeastern region. They are principally tropical montane and subtropical montane coniferous, with spruce, fir, pine, larch, cypress, birch, and oak among the main species. The tree line varies from 3,800 metres in the region’s moist south to 4,300 metres in the semi-dry north.

Tibet’s forests are primarily old growth, with trees over 200 years old predominating. The average stock density is 272 cubic metres/ha, but U-Tsang’s old growth areas reach 2,300 cubic metres/ha—the world’s highest stock density for conifers.

Although researchers have documented historical deforestation over the millennia on the Tibetan plateau, caused mainly by climatic factors, they agree that human activity has not had any significant historical impact on the vegetation. Almost all deforestation on the Tibetan plateau over the past five decades has occurred as a result of planned commercial timber extraction. The authorities encouraged the over-exploitation of forest resources by imposing a State procurement quota, which was not based on ecologically and economically sustainable principles. “Annually-prescribed timber procurement quotas, which had to be met by the State-controlled county forest bureaus, for decades exceeded annual growth by a factor between two to three. In addition, this timber had to be sold below production prices, forcing the forestry bureaus to cut even more to balance the losses and secure income for active and retired employees.”

In the Nyingtri area of south-eastern “TAR”, over 20,000 Chinese soldiers and Tibetan prisoners were engaged in felling trees and transporting timber for about two decades till 1980. Outside the “TAR”, Amdo’s Ngaba region had 2.20 million hectares under forest cover in 1949. Its timber reserves then stood at 340 million cubic metres. In the 1980s it was reduced to 1.17 million hectares, with a timber reserve of only 180 million cubic metres. Similarly, it was observed that by 1985 China had extracted 6.44 million cubic metres of timber from Kanlho, now incorporated into Gansu Province. If the trees were cut into logs measuring 30 centimetres wide by three metres long, and laid end to end, they would encircle the globe twice. By the early 1980s, forest resources in the more accessible Tibetan areas outside the “TAR” had dwindled to such an extent that felling activities had to be moved to more and more remote areas.

At the same time, natural forest regeneration has been minimal due to the extreme degree of land slope, low soil moisture, extreme day-night temperature variations and high soil surface temperatures. Forest regeneration in Tibet takes anything between 70 to 100 years. Therefore, the destructive effects of tree-felling on the Tibetan plateau are irreversible. As well as causing extensive desertification, deforestation has resulted in siltation, pollution and
flooding of the 10 major rivers that feed China and South Asia. Beijing woke up to these problems in 1998 when flooding along the Yangtze River caused a national disaster in China. In August 1998 Beijing ordered 151 forestry enterprises to halt all logging in the non-“TAR” Tibetan areas. On December 9 of the same year, the “TAR” government ordered the closure of all lumber processing mills in Nyingtri and Chamdo—an area of nearly 200,000 sq km, containing over 80 five percent of the “TAR’s” approximately 1.5 billion cubic metres of standing timber volume. Despite this ban, logging trucks were still a common sight in Tibetan areas of Sichuan in February 1999.12 The ban on tree-felling in the Tibetan areas outside the “TAR” began to be enforced seriously only in 2000. However, the ban in the watersheds of the “TAR”, whose downstream areas constitute rivers outside China, is reported to be of a transient nature. Besides, there is a risk that logging activities from the eastern Tibetan areas will be shifted to the “TAR”,13 which will escalate the menace of flooding in the Indian sub-continent in future.

**Water Resources And Hydropower:** With their abundant stable flows and steep gradients, Tibet’s rivers offer a hydropower potential that is among the world’s highest. For the colonial power, China, this means that two-thirds of its possible hydropower resources lie in Tibet. The Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo in the “TAR” alone is calculated to offer the biggest hydro-power potential known on earth at 70,000MW, the output of 70 large nuclear power stations. As Asia’s principal watershed, Tibet is also the source of the world’s 10 greatest river systems—a substantial proportion of which have stable or base flows coming from ground water and glacial sources. In marked contrast, river flows in most neighbouring countries are determined by seasonal rainfall patterns. China’s policies of development, industrialization, energy exploitation, resource extraction and population transfer have all led to massive intervention in Tibet’s rivers as well as in some 2,000 natural lakes with a combined area of more than 35,000 sq km. Amdo is already home to massive dams, providing power to burgeoning cities in Western China and serving the growing Chinese settlements in the region. Dams in Kham have resulted in river fragmentation while wholesale deforestation is destroying hydro-ecology. Experts say that deforestation and intensive land development contributed to the disastrous flooding in 1998 in the Yangtze basin, China’s worst in 44 years. Kham, which is the source of the Yangtze River, has lost 85 percent of its pre-1949 forest cover. The forests that once absorbed and held huge quantities of monsoon rainfall are now largely gone.14
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dam projects and water pollution from urban industrial and agricultural waste. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) says that the floods which damaged large tracts in the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Arunachal in 2000 were caused by China releasing excess water accumulated in man-made and natural water bodies in the Sutlej and Siang river basins in Tibet.\(^{15}\)

Now, with mining designated as one of Beijing’s “Four Pillar” industries in Central Tibet, the Indus, Salween, Brahmaputra and Mekong rivers will face pollution from toxic wastes infiltrating soil and so contaminating downstream flows. Rivers around Lhasa already report mounting pollution problems from untreated sewage, industrial waste and salts and nitrates leaked from fertilizers.

**Mineral Exploitation:** According to official Chinese surveys, Tibet has proven deposits of 126 minerals, with a significant share of the world’s reserves of uranium, lithium, chromite, copper, borax, and iron. Over the past four decades, the PRC government has steadily escalated its mining activities on the plateau. During Mao’s Great Leap Forward, thousands of prisoners and forced immigrants were dispatched to mining camps in Tibet, particularly in Amdo. The Tsonub area of Amdo— which includes the mineral-rich Tsaidam Basin— had the biggest network of mining labour camps spread over Gormo, Terlenkha, Dulan and Mangya. Petroleum, asbestos, borax, lithium, coal, tin and iron and sylvite are some of the minerals extracted from the region.

Although the known major resources are concentrated in Tsaidam Basin, Nagchu, Golok, Chamdo, Chang T hang, Karze and Lhoka, mineral reserves are distributed throughout the plateau. Tsaidam Basin has immense and diverse reserves spread across its 220,000 sq km region, an area almost the size of Britain. More than 50 salt and chemical plants have been built around the Tsaidam Basin, whose products are exported to the Middle East and Europe.\(^{16}\) In addition to the estimated 42 billion tons of oil reserves, Tsaidam’s natural gas reserves of 1,500 billion cubic meters are becoming a necessary source of energy for China. At current consumption levels, these reserves will meet China’s total needs for seven year.

Steven Marshall and Susette Ternent Cooke, who conducted extensive research in the Tibetan areas outside the “TAR”, stated that the exploitation of natural resources occurred throughout non-“TAR” Tibet.

Unchecked mining practices have already led to environmental degradation, often permanently altering landscapes. Massive debris, slag heaps, abandoned mines and slope destabilization blight the ground surface while the soil beneath is polluted with mining tailings and toxic wastes from materials used in extraction. This destruction is going to be exacerbated in coming years when Beijing’s Western Development Program diverts the focus of its mining activities to Tibet.
When the People’s Liberation Army first crossed Tibet’s eastern border, the Indian Representative in Lhasa cabled a prophetic report to New Delhi: “The Chinese have entered Tibet; the Himalayas have ceased to exist.” The Indian diplomat understood that the world’s greatest mountain range no longer guaranteed security to India and other South Asian countries. The fall of Tibet in 1949 wiped a gigantic, tranquil buffer zone between India and China off the world map.

For the first time in history, the two Asian giants were brought face to face. And, in 1962, the PLA incursion on Indian territories resulted in the first war in the two nations’ millennia-long history. Since then the mountainous border between Tibet and India has become one of the most fortified regions in Asia—bleeding the two needy nations of funds needed in development. India’s daily defence expenditure to guard the Himalayas is Rs. 50 to 60 million per day—over a million US dollars; China’s could easily be much more. This daily outlay to arm the Indo-Tibetan border would go a long way to providing safe drinking water, universal education and health services to the poor communities of the world’s two most populous nations.

Until independence in 1947, 75 Indian policemen were the sole guardians to the south of the Indo-Tibetan border; now India permanently deploys seven to eight military divisions in the Himalayas. North of the border, China has 500,000 soldiers stationed
on the Tibetan plateau—350,000 in the “TAR” bordering India and 150,000 in Tibet’s eastern and northern regions. Tibet now represents an advance base of Chinese penetration to Southeast Asia and a forepost of Chinese military power in that continent’s strategic heartland.

Conquest By Road And Rail

On November 8, 1950, the Southwest Bureau of the CCP’s Central Committee, the Southwest Military Region Command, and Command Headquarters of the 2nd Field Army jointly issued a “Political Mobilization Directive” on China’s armed invasion of Tibet. The directive stated: “The tasks of marching into Tibet were to liberate the Tibetan people, to complete the important mission of unifying the motherland, to prevent imperialism from encroaching on even one inch of our sovereign territory, and to protect and build the frontiers of the motherland.” The mobilization directive also called upon every officer and man of the PLA to “take every care in their march forward to preserve and save manpower and materials, actively repair and build roads to develop communication and transportation, immediately after the cessation of military action.”

Even before issuing this mobilization directive, the PLA had started constructing first arterial road (Chengdu-Lhasa) linking China and Tibet. Construction of the 2,400-km Chengdu-Lhasa Highway took over four years and nine months and cost the lives of 3,000 PLA soldiers. On May 1, 1953, construction work on the 2,100-km Siling-Lhasa Highway was flagged off at Huang Hoyen in present-day Qinghai Province. Both these arterial roads were put into service on December 25, 1954.

The construction of these two arterial highways not only secured the PLA’s occupation of Tibet but also brought Chinese troops and armaments to the doorsteps of India, Nepal and Bhutan. Later, the two highways were linked with busy subsidiary roads both in the eastern and western regions of the plateau. In the eastern section, the Chengdu-Lhasa Highway was connected by a subsidiary road southwards to China’s Yunnan province; to the west, the Siling-Lhasa Highway was connected by a secondary road to Ngari, which borders Ladakh region in Ladakh. This was followed by the construction of the Southern Highway, stretching from Ngari in the west to Sichuan and Yunnan provinces in the east, running parallel to the entire Indo-Tibetan border from Ladakh in the west to Arunachal Pradesh in the east. On October 6, 1957, the PLA completed construction of the 1,100 km Xinjiang-Tibet Highway connecting Yecheng in Southern Xinjiang with Ngari. This highway passes through the disputed Aksai-Chin region—an area annexed by China. With the construction of the Southern and Xinjiang-Tibet Highways, and the annexation of Aksai Chin, China has effectively sealed off any entry point along the western and southern borders with India.
Over the past five decades, Beijing has built a 22,000-km highway network radiating from Lhasa consisting of 15 main highways and 315 subsidiary roads. In constructing these strategic highways and roads, the PLA had to face formidable challenges. In his August 1, 1957 speech, “Struggle for the sacred task of national defense, internal security, and consolidation of fatherland’s unification”, Gen. T’an Kuan-san, Political Commissar of the Tibet Military District, said:

In response to Chairman Mao’s call for building highways...all comrades of the PLA units have fervently carried out their difficult task of building highways and engaging in production for self-support. In the extremely cold wintry seasons, they built highways over grasslands that are around 5,000 meters above sea level, in forests and on high mountains. Over the deserted grasslands, they reclaimed virgin land for production and for building their barracks. Under the leadership of the Party, all comrades of the PLA units launched an engineering and technical creation movement with their high-grade activism and creativeness.

China maintains that “military necessity” justifies the enormous costs of building these roads and maintaining and keeping them open year-round under severe climatic conditions. It was only after completion of the above network of strategic roads that the PRC formally established the Military Control Commission in Lhasa on March 23, 1959.

China has now embarked on a project to upgrade and expand highways and roads in Tibet. In the “TAR” alone, Beijing has spent nearly four billion yuan during the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) for this work. The key routes chosen for renovation and expansion were Chengdu-Lhasa, Siling-Lhasa, No 219 and No. 214 highways.

Right from the early 1950s, Communist China’s central strategists realized that a railroad to Lhasa would bring Tibet firmly into Beijing’s grasp and also solve the logistical problem of maintaining the security infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau. The plan to connect Central Tibet with China by railway was first conceived in the 1950s. But then the obstacles to the implementation of this project were thought to be insurmountable. However, the railway is now forging ahead and upbeat Chinese engineers express their conviction that they can overcome all natural barriers on the plateau.

When the railway is completed in 2007, China will be able to double its military deployment in the “TAR” and sustain it logistically. It will also facilitate China stepping up its missile deployment in the “TAR”. This will put enormous pressure on India to strengthen its own defensive deployment along the Himalayan border.

**Conventional Build-up on the Plateau**

Until 1986, Beijing had 11 military regions with Tibet falling under the control of the Southwest Military Region headquartered in Chengdu, Sichuan Province. In 1986,
when the total number of military regions was reduced to seven, Tibet was put under two military regions—the Southwest Military Region based in Chengdu and the Lanzhou Military Region based in Lanzhou, Gansu Province.

The “Tibet Autonomous Region”, “Karze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” and “Ngaba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” in Sichuan Province, and “Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” and “Mili Tibetan Autonomous County” in Yunnan Province fall under the Southwest Military Region. Amdo (Qinghai Province) and “Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” and “Parig Tibetan Autonomous County” in Gansu Province are placed under the Lanzhou Military Region.

The “Tibet Autonomous Region” itself is divided into seven military districts—Lhasa, Shigatse, Nagchu, Chamdo, Ngari, Lhokha, and Kongpo. The military presence in these districts includes:

1) two independent infantry divisions
2) six border defence regiments
3) five independent border defence battalions
4) three artillery regiments
5) three engineers’ regiments
6) one main signals station and three signals regiments
7) three transport regiments and three independent transport battalions
8) four air force bases,
9) two radar regiments
10) one independent division
11) 12 independent regiments of People’s Armed Police

The frontline PLA troops in the “TAR” are deployed—along the borders of India, Nepal and Bhutan—in Ruthok, Gyamuk, Drongpa, Saga, Kyirong, Drangso, Gampa-la, Dromo, Tsona, Lhuntse Dzong, and Zayul. The second line of defence stations are concentrated in Shigatse, Lhasa, Nagchu, Tsethang, Nangartse district, Kongpo Nyintri, Metok Dzong, Miling, Powo Tramo, Tsawa Pomdha, Chamdo, etc. As a rapid reaction force back-up, China regularly deploys the Sichuan-based Nos. 50 and 149 Airborne Divisions in the “TAR”, as it did in the wake of Tibetan independence demonstrations in Lhasa in 1987 and thereafter.

The sole function of the Southwest Military Region headquartered in Chengdu is to maintain security in Tibet. This Military Region comprises of six divisions with about 600,000 to 700,000 soldiers on stand by for immediate deployment in Tibet in the case of large-scale internal disturbances or the outbreak of a war with India.

The Southwest Military Region also has 300 combat aircrafts with 14 major air bases and about 20 tactical airstrips in Tibet. In addition, new air bases are planned for Kongpo Nyintri, Chimg Tsalthang (near Taktse on the outskirts of Lhasa), N gari and in the Zitoe Rhang hills near Dhartsedo. These, according to official pronouncements, will have strategic significance due to their
high altitude.

In order to solve Tibet’s fuel supply problem, China built a 1,080-km refined oil transmission pipeline from Gormo (in Amdo) to Lhasa. The pipeline has a designed annual capacity of 250,000 tons and an actual annual load of 100,000-120,000 tons.15

**Nuclear Presence**

Until the mid-1960s China’s strategic military industries and arsenals were based in Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jiling and Xinjiang. Today, most of China’s nuclear missiles and nuclear research centres are based on the Tibetan plateau.16

All the nuclear arsenals in Tibet’s north-eastern region are based in “Tsojang Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” and “Tsonub Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” in Amdo. In the early 1960s China built a nuclear weapons research and development centre at Dhashi (now known as Xihai City)—10 miles east of Lake Kokonor—in “Tsojang Tibetan Autonomous Region”. With construction starting in 1958, the facility was given the formal designation of “221 Bomb Factory”, also known as the “two-bomb base” since China’s first atomic and hydrogen bombs were developed there in 1958 and 1964 respectively.17 The facility is also referred to as the Northwest Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy, or the Ninth Academy.18

This facility was responsible for designing all of China’s nuclear bombs through the mid-1970s. It also served as a research centre for detonation development, radio-chemistry and many other nuclear weapons-related activities. It also assembled components of nuclear weapons.19

The 1,100 sq km base was a closed city, and all activities of its personnel were conducted within the facility. The facility included 560,000 sq m of buildings inside the plant premises, 330,000 sq m of production buildings, more than 40 km of special railway lines which converged with the Siling-Gormo Line, nearly 80 km of standard highways, 1,000 six-digit computer controlled telephones, and one thermal power plant with an annual generating capacity of 110 million kwh.20

In 1987 the State Council approved the closure of the facility and personnel were gradually shifted to other centres. Today, the site is designated as a “small zone for national economy development” and is a popular tourist destination for Chinese.

China currently has 300 to 400 ready-to-fire nuclear warheads, all of which are based on the plateau. In addition, it has the capability to assemble about 1,000 warheads at short notice.21 There is a DF-3 missile garrison in Serkhog (Ch: Datong)—near Siling in Haidong Prefecture—from where the missiles can strike targets in India and Russia. The DF-3 is an older missile with a 2,780 km range. In 1997 American Air Force reconnaissance spotted demolition activity at the site, probably indicating that it was undergoing conversion for “deployment of China’s most high altitude...
modern IRBM, the DF-21 [CSS-5 Mod 2]. The DF-21 is a newer missile with 1,800 km range. The facility is headquarters for one of the three launch brigades, each with up to three launch battalions.

There is another site in Terlenkha (Ch: Delingha), located 200 km southeast of Greater Tsaidam in “Tsonub Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.” Housing DF-4s (Strategic missile with a range of 4,500 - 7,500 km) with four associated launch sites, it is the missile regimental headquarters for Qinghai province (Tib: Amdo). The site’s layout is said to consist of missiles stored horizontally in tunnels near the launch pad, with fuel oxidizers stored in separate tunnels with lines to the launch pad. Terlenkha is “one of the five locations at which a total of between 10 and 20 DF-4s were deployed as of early 1998”. This is the second headquarters of one of the three launch brigades. Like Serkhog, the Terlenkha base is located to strike targets in Russia and India. There are indications that it may be upgraded to the DF-21.

Not far from Terlenkha, there is a third missile site—414 Brigade of 80306 Unit in Greater Tsaidam—where DF-4s are deployed.

In the “Tibet Autonomous Region”, nuclear missile bases are located in the central region of Nagchu and in the western region of Ngari on the border of Ladakh, India. At Nagchu’s nuclear missile base, weapon parts are designed and manufactured. China has conducted nuclear tests in several regions of the Tibetan plateau using the local populace to determine radiation levels.

All nuclear missile facilities fall under the jurisdiction of the Second Artillery Corps headquartered in Qinghe, near Beijing. This Corps is staffed by 90,000 personnel (some estimates place this as high as 120,000), most of whom are in engineering and construction units. “According to one estimate the missile troops number some 50,000 persons; the technical-equipped force about 17,000; the construction troops some 20,000; the anti-chemical and communication troops 50,000 for each; the training units some 10,000 persons; and the logistic support troops some 20,000 persons. This total of some 217,000 is about twice as large as typically reported aggregate troop strengths, and may reflect the assignment from other branches in support of the Second Artillery.”
In the aftermath of the bloody Tibetan National Uprising in 1959, it seemed inconceivable that Tibetans would ever seek a negotiated settlement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC was then bent on annihilating every vestige of Tibetan civilization from the Roof of the World. Probably the only person who remained hopeful of finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Tibet was the Dalai Lama. In June 1959 he said, “We Tibetans, lay and monk alike, do not cherish any feeling of enmity and hatred against the Great Chinese people... We must insist on the creation of a favourable climate by the immediate adoption of the essential measures as a condition precedent to negotiations for a peaceful settlement.”

But on March 10, 2001—after 42 years of striving for that “favourable climate” and proposing many initiatives to create a “condition precedent to negotiations for a peaceful settlement”—the Dalai Lama admitted that China’s recent refusal to even receive a delegation from him indicated a “lack of political will to resolve the Tibetan issue”.

Rather than consider a resolution, China has taken its cue from a statement by Jiang Zemin on January 14, 1998 during the third session of the Fifteenth Central Committee of CCP, when he advised awaiting the demise of the Dalai Lama. “When he dies, the issue of Tibet is resolved forever. Then, there will be no one to create problems for us. We,
therefore, have to use skilful means to prevent his return." The skilful means translates into feigning willingness to hold a dialogue, on the one hand, while multiplying unrealistic preconditions for talks, on the other hand. This serves to deflect international pressure and criticism while also biding time.

The old guard in Beijing calculate that removing the Dalai Lama is the final solution to the ongoing unrest in Tibet. But new and younger voices in the Chinese capital feel, conversely, that the Dalai Lama is the very key to a lasting solution. A prominent Beijing writer suggests that China must seize the opportunity presented by the Dalai Lama and "start the process of finding a solution to the Tibetan issue while the 14th Dalai Lama is alive and in good health." Biding time, he says, "is neither in the interest of the Dalai Lama, nor of China".2

The Dalai Lama's initiative to reach out to Beijing in 1959 showed extraordinary vision, considering the situation at that time. He had just escaped from Tibet and his country was undergoing a nightmarish wave of death and destruction.

However, the Maoist leadership in Beijing—swallowing its own propaganda—chose to believe that the sole opposition to their "glorious liberation" came from a handful of "upper-class reactionaries". Campaigns were put in place to eradicate "class enemies". With a socialist order in control, there could be no problems, they believed, to discuss with the Dalai Lama.

History moved on. The change in China's leadership in the late 1970s brought a number of positive changes both in Tibet and China. This brought a new beacon of hope for resolving the problem of Tibet. On March 10, 1978 the Dalai Lama made a public statement, asking Beijing to allow Tibetans in Tibet and those in exile to visit each other so that the Tibetans in exile could see the true situation inside Tibet.

This suggestion did not go unnoticed in Beijing. In December 1978 Li Juisin, Xinhua director in Hong Kong, contacted Gyalo Thondup, an elder brother of the Dalai Lama, and told him that Deng Xiaoping would like to meet him in Beijing to discuss the problem of Tibet. Thondup sought the Dalai Lama's approval and visited Beijing in March 1979. The Chinese leaders told him that it had been a mistake to hold the Dalai Lama and Tibetans accountable for the 1959 uprising in Lhasa. They blamed the Maoist Gang of Four for past excesses in Tibet and expressed their wish to improve the situation. Deng, in particular, said that China was willing to discuss and resolve every issue as long as Tibetans did not demand independence. He invited exile Tibetans to visit their homeland and see the actual conditions, saying that it was "better see once than to hear a hundred times". Around the same time, Beijing allowed Tibetans in Tibet to visit their relatives in exile.

The Dalai Lama appreciated these reassuring gestures from Beijing and
reciprocated by sending three fact-finding delegations to Tibet in 1979-1980. To the bafflement of China, crowds besieged the delegates wherever they went and poured out stories of “hell-on-earth” tragedies that had befallen them and their families over the past two decades. The communist leadership was completely taken aback by this; it had deluded itself into believing that Tibetans were happy with the “great progress” over the past decades of Chinese rule. It sincerely expected Tibetans to display indifference at best—or contempt at worst—to the delegates. One Chinese official is reported to have advised the populace against throwing rocks or spitting at the delegates.

While the second and third delegations were touring various regions of Tibet, Dharamsala named 16 members—including high-ranking lamas—as its fourth delegation. But Beijing’s embarrassing experiences with the earlier delegations meant that it was not prepared to risk receiving another Dharamsala fact-finding group. On August 6, 1980 Beijing expressed its inability to receive the fourth delegation on the flimsy excuse that it would not be able to accord the delegates a suitable reception as “the weather in Tibet is going to be cold ... and some development works are in progress”.

Undaunted, Dharamsala continued to press for the delegation’s visit by invoking Deng’s invitation of 1979. Finally, in July 1985, Beijing allowed a six-member delegation into Tibet, conditioning that the visit should be confined only to the northeastern Amdo region. At the end of this visit, the delegation informed the Chinese Government of the problems they had witnessed in Tibet and asked for their rectification. Beijing was now left in no doubt that accepting Dharamsala delegations had been a serious mistake. Since then no fact-finding delegation has been allowed onto the plateau.

The Dalai Lama, on his part, continued to adhere firmly to the belief that the problem of Tibet could be resolved only through face-to-face meetings between the two sides. He was keenly aware that the deep distrust and suspicion that had developed over the past decades could not be removed overnight. He felt that consistent and frequent interaction was necessary to build confidence and trust so as to pave the way for a mutually-acceptable solution to the problem of Tibet.

On July 21, 1980 Dharamsala asked Beijing to take further steps to make it easier for Tibetans on both sides of the Himalaya to visit each other. In September 1980 the Dalai Lama repeated his offer to send about 50 trained Tibetan teachers to work in Tibet. At the same time, he offered to open a liaison office in Beijing to foster closer ties with the Chinese government and people. Then, on March 23, 1981 the Dalai Lama wrote directly to Deng Xiaoping and said:

The time has come to apply our common wisdom in a spirit of tolerance and broad-mindedness to achieve genuine happiness for the
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Tibetan people with renewed urgency. On my part, I remain committed to contribute to the welfare of all human beings and, in particular, the poor and weak, to the best of my ability, without making any discrimination based on nationalities.

Beijing’s response came in the form of a “Five-point Policy Towards the Dalai Lama”. Chinese General-Secretary Hu Yaobang gave this document to Gyalo Thondup on July 28, 1981. It asked the Dalai Lama and members of the exile Tibetan administration to return home. The Dalai Lama, it said, should live in China. He was promised the “same political status and living conditions as he had before 1959”. Similarly, the members of the exile government were promised jobs and living conditions that were “better than before”. The problems of Tibetans living in Tibet were not addressed.

This made it clear that the two sides were thinking on entirely different wavelengths. While Dharamsala was concerned with discussing the wellbeing of Tibetans living in Tibet, Beijing was interested only in securing the return of the Dalai Lama and consigning him to oblivion in the Chinese capital. Dharamsala viewed the Chinese proposal as aiming to reduce the issue of six million Tibetans to merely that of the personal status of the Dalai Lama.

Despite such an ideological gulf, the Dalai Lama remained convinced that a peaceful solution was the only viable option for both sides. Towards the end of April 1982, he sent a delegation, consisting of three members of the exile Tibetan administration, for exploratory talks. The delegates asked for the unification of all Tibetan areas—Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang—as a single political and administrative entity. Referring to the nine-point proposal, which Beijing had offered to Taiwan as the basis for unification with the PRC, the delegates suggested that Tibet deserved an even more Special Status since its history, language, culture and people were completely different from the Chinese.

Beijing responded that the only basis for negotiations was the “Five-point Policy” proposed in 1981 by Hu Yaobang. It rejected Tibetan demands by stating that Tibet—unlike Taiwan and Hong Kong—had already been liberated and unified with China. The underlying message was clear: China has consolidated control over Tibet and saw no reason to make any concessions.

The Wooing Stops

Despite this rejection, the overall situation inside Tibet was improving. Hu Yaobang’s recognition of the special status of Tibet, and steps being undertaken to improve the situation on the plateau, were seen as encouraging signs. In February 1983 the Dalai Lama, while addressing pilgrims from Tibet in Bodh Gaya, expressed his wish to visit Tibet around 1985 if the situation continued to improve.

A year later, during China’s Second Work Forum on Tibet—held in Beijing in March-April—Hu Yaobang announced a decision to
encourage Chinese to move into Tibet. General Secretary Hu said China would not budge from the “Five-point Policy” for the Dalai Lama’s return. This top-level policy forum also decided that it was no longer necessary to woo the Dalai Lama back. In May of 1984, “TAR” Party Secretary Yin Fatang accused the Dalai Lama of treason and said that Beijing would welcome him back only if he admitted his “mistakes”. Obviously, the attitude in Beijing was hardening.

Nevertheless, the Chinese that year accepted another three-member exploratory team from Dharamsala. The team reiterated the demands of the 1982 delegation and raised concerns over the influx of Chinese settlers onto the plateau. They also asked the Chinese leadership to accept the Dalai Lama’s proposal to visit Tibet in 1985. The Chinese rejected these demands and asked the Tibetans to keep the proceedings confidential. However, when the delegates reached India, foreign correspondents interviewed them for their reaction to Beijing’s announcement that it had rejected their demands for Greater Tibet and a status akin to one promised to Taiwan if it accepted unification. This was a case of misreporting. The Tibetans had actually asked for a more Special Status, and certainly not the same as the one promised to Taiwan. Naturally, the delegates were taken by surprise; their interlocutors had acted in bad faith.

Signals emerging from the Chinese capital in the subsequent months were to reinforce Tibetan suspicions about Beijing’s reluctance to resolve the problem through dialogue. Dharamsala now decided to appeal for international support to pressure the Chinese leadership into holding negotiations.

In September 21, 1987 the Dalai Lama addressed the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus and unveiled his Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet. In this, he asked for a) Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; b) Abandonment of China’s population transfer policy, which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a people; c) Respect for the Tibetan people’s fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms; d) Restoration and protection of Tibet’s natural environment and the abandonment of China’s use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; and e) Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

The Chinese reacted by triggering another campaign to vilify the Dalai Lama, accusing him of widening the gulf between himself and Beijing. This campaign inflamed the Tibetan people’s simmering resentment, leading to the Lhasa demonstration of September 27, 1987.

In order to assuage Chinese fears over the Five Point Peace Plan, the exile Tibetan administration, on December 17, 1987, sent a 14-point memorandum, explaining the Dalai Lama’s thoughts and efforts for resolving the issue of Tibet in the interests of both sides.
On June 15, 1988, the Dalai Lama made another proposal—this time before the European Parliament in Strasbourg—in which he elaborated on the last point of the Five Point Peace Plan and said that he was willing to forego the idea of Tibetan independence. In return he asked for a unified Tibet—consisting of Kham, Amdo, and U-Tsang—to be made a self-governing democratic political entity in association with China. China, the proposal envisaged, could continue to remain responsible for Tibet’s foreign relations and defence. An advance copy of the speech had been handed to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi.

**Questing Independence**

The first reaction to the proposal came from the Tibetan Youth Congress, the largest Tibetan non-governmental organization in exile. Its president announced that no one had the right to give up Tibetan independence. This was perhaps the first time that the Dalai Lama’s decision had triggered dissenting voices in the Tibetan community. Many Tibetans—despite their tremendous reverence for the Dalai Lama—openly began to express misgivings about the idea of compromising Tibetan independence. In that, and subsequent years, annual meetings of the Youth Congress made a point of passing resolutions reaffirming its commitment to the independence of Tibet.

Beijing, on the other hand, did not come out with the characteristic prompt reaction to the Strasbourg Proposal. When the response did come, it accused the Dalai Lama’s proposal of envisioning independence for Tibet. On June 23, 1988 China’s foreign ministry issued a press statement, saying that the PRC would not accept Tibet’s “independence, semi-independence or independence in a disguised form”. Although the Strasbourg Proposal was not named, the allusion was unmistakable.

On July 27 the exile administration issued a press statement, proposing dialogue on the Strasbourg Proposal and naming the members of its negotiating team. Half of the six delegates were members of the exile Tibetan administration. Two overseas representatives of the Dalai Lama were named to assist the team while Michael van Walt van Praag, a Dutch expert in international law, was appointed legal advisor.

It took the Chinese Government two months to react to this initiative. On September 21, 1988 the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi told the Dalai Lama’s representatives that its government was interested in direct talks with the Dalai Lama. A press statement to this effect was issued the following day. The Embassy said the Dalai Lama could choose the date and venue for talks. “The talks may be held in Beijing, Hong Kong, or any of our embassies or consulates abroad. If the Dalai Lama finds it inconvenient to conduct talks at these places, he may choose any place he wishes.” The Embassy, however, put three preconditions:
TIBET UNDER COMMUNIST CHINA

a) Beijing would not talk to the members of the exile Tibetan administration; b) No foreigner should be involved in the talks; c) The Strasbourg Proposal could not be the basis for talks as it had not relinquished the idea of Tibet's independence.

While Dharamsala welcomed the Chinese offer of talks, it could not agree to the preconditions. A statement issued by Dharamsala said, “Though we have different views and stands on many issues, we are prepared to discuss and resolve these through direct dialogues.”

On October 25, 1988 Dharamsala informed the Chinese Embassy that it would be ready to hold talks in Geneva in January 1989. Hours later the Dalai Lama's Representative in New Delhi issued a press statement to this effect.

Around the same time, Gyalo Thondup, while on a personal visit in Beijing, was met by United Front Department head Yang Mingfu, who expressed China's displeasure with the exile Tibetans for publicizing the venue and names of the delegates. Yang rejected the members of the Tibetan team, accusing them of having engaged in “splittist activities”. He suggested that the talks should be held either in Beijing or Hong Kong. Then, sounding a positive note, Yang added that although the Chinese Government did not agree with some aspects of the Strasbourg Proposal, these could be discussed and resolved mutually.

However, on November 18, 1988 the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi presented a repackaged version of Yang Mingfu's proposal. This version rejected the Strasbourg Proposal in toto. Members of the Tibetan negotiating team, including the Dutch lawyer, were not acceptable. The Dalai Lama's act of publicizing the names of the negotiating team and venue reflected his insincerity regarding the talks, the Embassy said.

The Panchen Lama's Death

Two months later, the Panchen Lama died suddenly at Tashilhunpo Monastery in Tibet. On February 7, 1989 China invited the Dalai Lama to attend the Panchen Lama's cremation ceremony, due to take place on February 15. Visiting Beijing at that time would have been tantamount to condoning the martial law then imposed in Tibet. Moreover, one week was certainly not enough time to prepare for such a potentially significant visit. However, the Dalai Lama proposed to send a 10-member religious delegation to Tibet to offer prayers. China said that there was no precedence for prayers on this scale and that it would not accept two leaders of the delegation who, it said, were officials of the Kashag (Tibetan Cabinet). The exile administration agreed to withdraw the two members and again contacted the Chinese Government.

On March 17, 1989 the Chinese Embassy said that Beijing would receive only two or three lamas as representatives of the Dalai Lama, and that they could travel only to Tashilhunpo. In the same message, the
Chinese Government accused the exile Tibetan administration of having plotted the “troubles” in Lhasa and smuggled arms into Tibet. Dharamsala denied these allegations and challenged the Chinese Government to produce evidence to back its claims. Against this background, no religious delegation visited Tibet.

In June 1989 China was rocked by the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, leading to the ascendancy of the then Premier Li Peng and his hardline group. Two years later, when the Dalai Lama expressed his wish to assist in the search for the Panchen Lama reincarnation, Beijing said there was no need for “outside interference”. A number of subsequent initiatives by the Dalai Lama to break the stalemate were cold-shouldered with outright disdain.

Among the exile populace there was now a growing feeling that the Chinese leadership was incapable of appreciating the Dalai Lama’s gestures, however reasonable and conciliatory they may be. On January 23, 1992 the Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies, elected representatives of the Tibetan diaspora, passed a resolution stating that the exile Tibetan administration should not initiate any new move towards negotiations with China unless there was a positive change in the attitude of the Beijing leadership. However, in deference to the Dalai Lama’s on-going initiatives, the Assembly’s resolution stated that the exile Tibetan administration would have no objection to negotiations if overtures came from the Chinese Government—either directly or through a third party.

This materialized three months later, when the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi called on Gyalo Thondup and said that the Chinese Government’s position in the past had been “conservative”, but that it was willing to be “flexible” if the Tibetans were prepared to be “realistic”. He invited Thondup to visit China to explore possibilities for talks. In June Thondup went to Beijing with the approval of the Dalai Lama and the exile Tibetan administration. His subsequent report was discussed by the Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies. Its contents showed no signs of flexibility in the Chinese Government’s stand; it was merely a list of accusations against the Dalai Lama and the exile Tibetan administration.

On September 1, 1992 the Dalai Lama wrote a personal letter to Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. He also enclosed a detailed memorandum, explaining his views on the points raised by the Chinese Government. Since the proposals made by him were not accepted by Beijing, the Dalai Lama asked the Chinese to come out with their own proposal to resolve the Tibetan political impasse. He stated:

If China wants Tibet to stay with China, then it must create the necessary conditions for this. The time has come now for the Chinese to show the way for Tibet and China to live together in friendship. A detailed step by step outline regarding Tibet’s basic status should be spelled out.
If such a clear outline is given, regardless of the possibility and non-possibility of an agreement, we Tibetans can then make a decision whether to live with China or not. If we Tibetans obtain our basic rights to our satisfaction, then we are not incapable of seeing the possible advantages of living with the Chinese.

The Dalai Lama also decided to dispatch a three-member delegation to China to clarify his views. Beijing accepted only two members of this delegation. In June 1993 the delegates discovered in Beijing that the leadership's hardline attitude towards the Dalai Lama had remained unchanged.

Faced with the PRC's intransigent stance, the Dalai Lama said in his March 10 statement of 1994:

I must now recognize that my approach has failed to produce any progress either for substantive negotiations or in contributing to the overall improvement of the situation in Tibet. Moreover, I am conscious of the fact that a growing number of Tibetans, both inside as well as outside Tibet, have been disheartened by my conciliatory stand not to demand complete independence for Tibet.

In the same year, the Chinese Government unleashed a new campaign of intensified repression, aimed at eliminating the influence of the Dalai Lama and Buddhism among the people in Tibet. By the end of 1996, even photographs of the Dalai Lama were banned; those found possessing his photographs or watching him on video films were given jail sentences of six to seven years. The rhetoric of this official campaign vilified the Tibetan leaders in harsher terms than during the Cultural Revolution.

Clinton Intercedes

In June 1998, US President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin held a live televised joint press conference in Beijing. During this TV appearance—broadcast worldwide—Clinton asked Jiang to open dialogues with the Dalai Lama. Jiang replied, “As long as the Dalai Lama makes a public commitment that Tibet is an inalienable part of China and Taiwan is a province of China, then the door to dialogue and negotiation is open.” The Taiwan issue surfaced this time as a new pre-condition to dialogue.

President Clinton was lauded by the exile Tibetan administration for the high-profile request to the Chinese Government to enter into dialogue and negotiations with the Dalai Lama. “We also applaud President Jiang Zemin for publicly recognizing the fact that Tibet is an important issue needing a solution and for indicating his willingness to have an exchange of views and discussion on this”. However, the question of Taiwan's status, the exile government said, was for the people of Taiwan and the PRC alone to decide. Later, on November 10, 1998, the Dalai Lama responded by issuing a statement:

I am not seeking independence for Tibet, nor do my actions seek its separation from the People's Republic of China. I am for autonomy, genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people to preserve their distinct identity and way of life. I do not seek any
privileges or position for myself; on the contrary I have made it categorically clear many years back that I do not wish to hold any official position once we have found a solution to the Tibetan issue. I sincerely believe that my Middle Way Approach will contribute to stability and unity of the People's Republic of China. This basic approach was conceived in the early seventies even when there was no immediate possibility of a dialogue with the Chinese leadership as China was then in the midst of the Cultural Revolution. I adopted this approach because I believe that this was to our long-term mutual interest.

After the experiences of the past four decades or so it is not surprising that there is an atmosphere of deep distrust between Tibetans and Chinese. This distrust will not disappear in a day. It will dissipate only through sincere dialogue and I am ready to respond to President Jiang's offer to engage in such dialogue. With goodwill on both sides, with a commitment to non-violence and reconciliation, we can together bring peace and stability to Tibet and lasting harmony between the Tibetan and Chinese people.

On the same day, the People's Daily, in its front-page commentary, accused the Dalai Lama of "playing tricks" and of "insincerity" in publicizing the Tibetan issue on the international stage. The official organ said that, "The zigzagging on the issue of declaration indicates that the Dalai Lama has merely made tactical readjustments and played tricks, while his stance on Tibetan independence has remained unchanged in principle."

On October 25, 1999 President Jiang Zemin spoke to the French daily, Le Figaro, in which he repeated all the earlier preconditions and added one more: The Dalai Lama must "openly declare that the People's Republic of China is the legitimate government representing whole China". By the end of December 1999, the Chinese authorities had closed down all channels of communication with the Dalai Lama. Then, in July 2000, the Chinese Government invited Gyalo Thondup for a private visit to China. In Beijing, he met three key officials of the CPC's United Front Department. It transpired that Beijing wanted nothing other than the unconditional return of the Dalai Lama; there was absolutely no interest in discussing the issue of Tibet.

Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama did not lose hope. In September 2000, he proposed to send a delegation with a memorandum, asking Beijing for dialogue on the issue of Tibet and outlining his own thoughts on the issue. This failed to interest the Chinese leadership.

The new millennium has brought no advances to the quest for negotiations with Beijing.

In all the vicissitudes of Dharamsala-Beijing dialogues, one fundamental difference has remained constant: To the Chinese leadership, the issue boils down to defining the personal status of the Dalai Lama, and even offering better jobs and living conditions to members of the exile government; they refuse to acknowledge that the people in Tibet
have any problem. To the Dalai Lama and exile leadership, the sole issue is the wellbeing of Tibetans in Tibet; the status of the Dalai Lama and members of the exile administration is a non-issue.

This—the crux of the matter—is enshrined in the Dalai Lama’s manifesto for future Tibet’s administration, issued in 1992. The Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity and Basic Features of its Constitution suggested unambiguously that the exile government and leadership would not be transplanted in Tibet. It stipulated that as soon as Tibetans gain freedom, the Dalai Lama would relinquish his traditional position in favour of an elected government. The exile administration, it said, would then be dissolved and Tibetans inside Tibet would run the government of a new Tibet. Members of the exile administration would then become ordinary citizens.

This is a message that Beijing chooses not to hear. In 1998 Jiang Zemin calculated that the Dalai Lama would pass away within a decade. So stalling is seen as the safest strategy for Beijing to “resolve the issue of Tibet”.
The Kosovo crisis and NATO’s involvement in it alarmed the leadership in Beijing who thought that this scenario could be repeated in restive Tibet and Xinjiang. In November 1998, Beijing established two high-level Working Groups directly under the CCP’s Central Committee—one to supervise Beijing’s policy towards Tibet and another towards Xinjiang. Simultaneously, the fourth plenary session of the Fifteenth CCP Central Committee decided to launch a massive campaign to “develop” what it sees as China’s western region.

Chen Dongsheng, one of China’s master planners for the Western Development Program, revealed that the aim of the scheme was to “guarantee the inviolability” of the borders and “smash our enemies who want to use the poverty and the contradictions between races to create a Kosovo-style crisis in Asia”.¹ A western scholar teaching at Beijing University summed up the objective of China’s Western Development Program “as an effort to consolidate imperial and communist conquests”.²

China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) selected four key projects to expedite the western development—“west-to-east gas transfer, west-to-east power transmission, south-to-north water diversion and Qinghai-Tibet railway projects”. All these four major projects are directly or indirectly connected with Tibet. In March 2000 Renmin Ribao quoted Chen Kuiyuan, the then “TAR” Party Secretary, as having said that this large-scale
Western Development Program was a chance to take "advantage" of Tibet's natural resources "both on and under the ground".

**West-to-East Gas Transfer**

China's rapid economic development over recent decades has led to increasing energy consumption, which is being mainly drawn from coal. Chinese planners are becoming aware of the enormous environmental costs associated with pollution and are, therefore, turning towards "cleaner" energy—oil and natural gas. At the moment, China is heavily reliant on the importation of oil. The PRC imported 40 million tons of oil in 1999 and 60 million tons in 2000. Experts believe that China's energy needs will further escalate in the years to come. To meet this situation, Beijing places a high priority on the development of oilfields in the Tarim Basin in Southern Xinjiang, the Tsaidam Basin in northeastern Tibet, and Ordos Basin in Inner Mongolia.

The "west-to-east gas transfer" is currently focussed on the development of oilfields in the Tarim and Tsaidam Basins and the construction of pipelines to take natural gas from Xinjiang to Shanghai City and from Sebei in the Tsaidam Basin to Lanzhou, capital of Gansu Province. Construction of a 4,200-km gas transmission pipeline from Xinjiang's Tarim oil field to Shanghai City was targetted to start in 2001 and reach completion in three years. The pipeline will cross nine Chinese provinces and will cost approximately 120 billion yuan (US$14.5 billion). The Tarim Basin, located in the south-central part of Xinjiang, is the largest onshore basin in the world. It covers 560,000 sq km and contains some of China's oldest oil fields.

Construction of the 950-km gas pipeline from Sebei in the Tsaidam Basin to Lanzhou was launched in April 2000 and was slated for completion in 2001. The execution of the project, costing approximately US$300 million, is in collaboration with America's Enron and Italy's ENI/Agip oil companies. Tsaidam Basin is today the most intensively explored and exploited region of the Tibetan plateau. Lying at the far end of northeastern Tibet, it covers 220,000 sq km—slightly smaller than Great Britain. The area has 16 oil production fields, five gas production fields and one oil and gas field spread across a distance of 400 km. The Basin produces around 300,000 tons of crude oil annually, which is enough to supply the major oil refineries and petrochemical plants nearby at Gormo in Amdo and Lanzhou in Gansu.

**South-to-North Water Diversion**

Densely-populated northern China has been experiencing chronic water shortages. Decades of intensive agriculture, rapid population growth, and an expanding industrial sector have drained all the available water resources in the region, resulting in sinking water tables, increased salinity, and dry rivers and lakes. According to the South
China Morning Post, of China’s 668 cities, more than 400 face water shortages; some 700 million people drink contaminated water; and rural farmers have rioted over precious water supplies.6

With shrinking reservoirs and rivers, China’s agricultural output is expected to drop. By 2025, China will import much more grain than it does now—nearly 175 million tons a year.7 Today, the water crisis in northern China is a sensitive issue in Beijing, where an increasing number of sandstorms sweeping into the capital from Mongolia are a vivid and constant reminder of how large areas of the north have been reduced to desert.8 In order to resolve this chronic water crisis, the Chinese leadership last year revived the long-abandoned project, South-to-North Water Diversion Project—initially conceived by Mao Zedong in 1952.

According to the project plan disclosed by China’s Ministry of Water, at least 48 billion cubic metres of water will be drained annually from the Yangtze (Tib: Drichu) River to northern China along three alternate routes or channels—western, central and eastern routes. The Western Route will connect the tributaries of the Drichu (Ch: Yangtze River)—the Drichu Toe (Ch: Tongtain), Gyerong Gyamo N gochu (Ch: Dadu) and Nyagchu (Ch: Yalong)—to the Machu (Ch: Yellow River) from upper streams in the Tibetan Plateau. During the past 40 years, China’s Yellow River Water Conservancy Committee has conducted surveys to locate the best possible diversion route somewhere in a 300,000-sq-km area in southern Amdo near Yushu/Kyegudo.9 Chinese experts have identified eight possible routes through the area for diverting water from the Drichu Toe, Gyerong Gyamo N gochu, and Nyagchu.

This route is the shortest, but it presents the greatest engineering challenge. Although the headwaters of the Drichu (Yangtze) and Machu (Yellow River) are closest to each other at the Mt. Khawa-la (Ch: Bayanhar Mountain Range), they are separated by this mountain range. The diversion scheme at the headwaters will require construction of high dams and long tunnels through Mt. Khawa-la. Chinese experts explain that the dams would elevate water to a required height, allowing the transfusion to flow by gravity to the Machu River through tunnels under the mountain range.

The US Embassy in Beijing believes that the Western Route will face numerous engineering challenges for which China currently has no answers. The challenges include how to tunnel through high mountains in remote locations; modes for construction at high altitudes (well above 10,000 feet); the impact of the short work season on construction; and how to transport water through a sub-zero environment.10 However, Chinese scientists maintain that such a project is quite feasible. They point out that, technically, there is no insurmountable barrier preventing
construction of a 200-meter-high dam across a river on the Tibetan Plateau or the boring of a tunnel more than 100 km in length. The total estimated cost for this gigantic project is around 150 billion yuan (US$18 billion), at 1995 costings.

The project is right now at the preliminary survey and pre-construction planning stage. More concerted planning for the route is likely sometime after 2010. When completed, the project will divert 19.5 billion cubic metres (BCM) of water annually, one half of the annual water provision of the Machu or Yellow River.

The **Central Route** will carry water from the middle section of the Yangtze River in Sichuan or Hubei Province to North China via Henan Province. It entails raising the current Danjiangkou Dam on the Hanjiang River in Hubei Province to 175m, then building a 1,240-km channel crossing more than 360 rivers to Beijing and Tianjin cities.

The project will be executed in two phases. The first phase, with a flow of nine to 13 BCM per year is aimed at relieving the immediate water shortage in northern cities, including Beijing. The second phase, raising flows to 20 BCM per year, is hoped to provide more water for agriculture and "ecological re-balancing" (replenishment of northern aquifers).

The first phase of the project is expected to be completed by 2010. The US Embassy in Beijing sees the biggest engineering challenge for this route as how to move water over or under the Yellow River. The Ministry of Water Resources has decided to tunnel under the river. Other problems are controlling flow and accumulation along the route, and keeping water moving along the long, gentle slope. Construction of the central route will cost Beijing US$9 to 10 billion, adding accessory costs.

The major environmental and social impact of the project will be the displacement of roughly 250,000 people (200,000 people around Danjiangkou Reservoir and 50,000 or so along the route itself) and a decrease in water flow along the middle and lower reaches of the Han River, between Danjiangkou Reservoir and Wuhan City.

The **Eastern Route** will draw water from Jiangdu in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River to Dongping Lake in Shandong Province via the Grand Canal (Beijing-Hangzhou). Then the water will continue by two routes—north to areas east of Huabei Plain and east to Jiaodong Peninsula. The route will span 1,164 km, with the Jiaodong canal covering 681km. This project is the cheapest and easiest to undertake. According to the Ministry of Water Resources, the estimated cost is 25 billion yuan (US$ 3 billion), but adding "accessory costs", the total will swell to 60 billion yuan (US$ 7.25 billion).

A section of the project, notably the channel within Jiangsu Province, has already
been completed and the second-round expansion of the route can be completed by 2010. Its biggest drawback is the poor quality of water due to many polluting sources along the way.

**West-to-East Power Transmission**

According to a report, the PRC was planning to develop a total hydropower capacity of 70,000 MW by the end of 2000 and this figure was to increase to 125,000 MW by 2010. The *People's Daily* reported that the Tenth Five-Year Plan is undertaking power projects with a combined installed capacity of 29.2 million kilowatts in 12 western Chinese provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, accounting for over one-third of China's new power projects. The daily added that hydropower projects would have an installed capacity of 14.84 million kilowatts, representing 59.7 percent of the projects to be built in western China.

Currently, of the potential hydropower resources of 378 million kilowatts installed capacity, only nine percent of the resources have been developed. Seventy percent of China's hydropower resources and 64 percent of its coal resources are located in the remote western region. The Chinese authorities maintain that under current conditions the cost of one kilowatt-hour of electricity transmitted from Yunnan to the southwest to Guangdong city, near Hong Kong, will be 1,120 yuan (US$135), which is less than the cost of one kilowatt-hour of electricity generated by Guangdong's own coal-fuelled power plant.

China has three major areas through which power from the west is currently transmitted to the east. In the north, power is transmitted from Shanxi and Inner Mongolia to Beijing, Tianjin and Tangshan. In the central region, electricity produced by the Gezhouba hydropower station in Hubei Province goes to Shanghai. In the south, electricity is sent from Guizhou and Yunnan to Guangdong.

It is reported that during the current Tenth Five-Year Plan, China will mainly speed up the construction of power source and power transmission and transformation lines running from Guizhou to Guangdong, Yunnan to Guangdong, and the Three Gorges to Guangdong, which will involve a total investment of 30 billion yuan (US$3.6 billion).

Beijing is also planning to build two main grids for the distribution of power. The first grid will be located at the Three Gorges Dam, and the second at the new hydro-electric project (with eight power stations) under construction in Yunnan Province.

The rivers on which these mammoth dam projects are located originate in Tibet. The Drichu (Yangtze), for example, originates at Mt. Tang-la (Ch: Tanggula) in the centre of the Tibetan plateau and flows through Eastern Tibet, near Derge and Markham, before making its way to Lichang in the Chinese province of Yunnan. From Yunnan, it passes
through Chongqing city and other counties in Sichuan Province, Yichang, Shashi and Wuhan in Hubei Province, and finally reaching Nanjing and Zhenjiang in Jiangsu Province. Similarly, the Dzachu (upper Mekong or Langcang) originates at Mt. Tang-la, and passes through the eastern part of Tibet, near Chamdo town and Dechen county, and then to Boashun, Jianggu and Jiangcheng counties in Yunnan Province.

**Gormo-Lhasa Railway Project**

China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan has recently launched an ambitious plan of connecting Lhasa City by railway. The project of laying a 1,118-km-railway track from Gormo to Lhasa was flagged off on June 29, 2001 and is expected to be completed in six or seven years. Tibetans and experts, including Chinese, have raised grave concerns over the devastating impact of the project—including the eco-system of the Tibetan plateau. [The rail project is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.]

**Impacts: Benefactor vs Beneficiaries**

The Chinese leadership has stated that like the 56 projects launched shortly after the founding of new China in 1949, these four new projects will “open a new chapter” in the history of China by redrawing its economic division map. There is no doubt that the implementation of these mammoth projects will intensify resource exploitation in the western region, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet, and will result in adequate resources to fuel the train of China’s economic growth. However, the Western Development Program will have a devastating impact on the people of the western region.

First of all, China’s hunger for the exploitation of natural resources will escalate the degradation of the natural environment. The people in the region will be compelled to face such consequences as desertification, frequent dust storms, water and air pollution, and chronic water shortages. The situation in Tsaidam Basin has already reached a critical stage. In a paper presented to the 1998 International Symposium on the “Qinghai-Tibet Plateau”, two Chinese environmentalists reported that half of Tsaidam Basin’s primitive forests had been destroyed, and the rate of deforestation was greater than that of planting. There were few measures, they reported, taken to prevent pollution, with the result that wastes poured into the rivers endangered livestock and contaminated lakes downstream. They also reported chronic leakage from the oil pipelines.15

Recently, commenting on the Western Development Program, environmental scholars of the Arid Lands Studies at the University of Arizona have said: “…It is important, if not imperative, that planners take the time to seriously consider many of the potential obstacles they are likely to face and that could derail their western development goals.”16
Secondly, the programme’s water-diversion and urbanization projects will encourage a massive displacement and movement of population, which will have a devastating social impact.

Thirdly, as pointed out by The Economist, the programme—which is obsessed with gigantic and correspondingly expensive projects—neglects spending on schools and health, and cheap, local roads that tie isolated communities to the broader market that are urgently needed to alleviate the poverty of the region.17

Fourthly, the programme is designed to destroy the very characteristics of the Uighurs, Mongolians, Tibetans and other ethnic peoples. A minister of China’s State Nationality Affairs, Li Dezhu, stated that the “development” of China’s minority nationality region is “extremely significant” in “solving China’s current nationality problems”.18 As commented by the London-based Tibet Information Network, the Chinese leadership views the culture, religion and identity of the ethnic communities in the western region as a serious “problem” to be dealt with and overcome rather than as aspects of cultural dynamism and development that should be protected and promoted.

Beijing’s current strategy of placing importance on “hard infrastructure” in the west, its moves of nurturing Chinese cadres to govern Tibet and Xinjiang and its direct interference in the affairs of the so-called autonomous regions through its Central Working Committee, clearly indicate that the Chinese leadership is bent on wiping out any remaining special characteristics of Uighurs, Mongolians, and Tibetans. It may not be long before these people lose even their superficial autonomous status granted on paper.

To sum up, the actual benefits from the expensive and ambitious Western Development Program will be to the benefactors and certainly not the beneficiaries. This future is best visualized in an upbeat Chinese official statement:

...In just a few years to come, Wuhan will use electricity from Sichuan, Shanghai will burn natural gas from Xinjiang, people from the eastern regions will arrive at Lhasa or the “sunshine city” by train, and people of North China will drink sweet water from the Yangtze River.19
In the late nineteenth century, China resisted the European colonial powers’ railway programmes in Asia.¹ To show its scorn for railways, the Qing Administration, in 1877, bought the first foreign-built railway line in Shanghai—only to tear up the tracks and ban future constructions. In 1900, the Boxer Rebellion mobs attacked railway and telegraph lines between Beijing and Tianjian. In 1911, there was a revolt in Sichuan over the construction of railway lines, which ultimately culminated in the collapse of Qing Dynasty. The Chinese Empire and its populace then saw foreign railways as a threat to the survival of their culture and sovereignty. Today—a century later—history is repeating itself on the Tibetan plateau.

China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) decided to bring the railway to the heart of Tibet, sparking concerns among Tibetans. In the late 1950s Beijing built railway lines to connect the north-eastern Tibetan area of Amdo (now designated as Qinghai Province) with China. This, Tibetans maintain, is primarily responsible for the colonization of Tibet by accelerating the influx of Chinese settlers and resource exploitation in Amdo. They also point to Xinjiang, where the construction of railway lines in the late 1950s resulted in Chinese predomination in the areas north of Urumqi city.

The Chinese authorities stress that the railway is absolutely necessary to “consolidate national defense and unity of nationalities” as Tibet is located to the southwest border of the
“motherland” with a boundary stretching over 4,000 km. In his interview with the New York Times on August 10, 2001, China’s President Jiang Zemin clearly said that, “it is a political decision, and we will make this project succeed at all costs, even if there is a commercial loss...” Experts and diplomats believe that the railway will allow Beijing to deploy troops rapidly to quell unrest in the region and handle perceived threats on its borders.

The general pattern of Communist China’s railway development shows that Beijing has paid relatively little attention to economic considerations; national defense and security have been its chief concerns. During the First and Second Five-Year Plans (1953-1957 and 1958-1962), most of the railway development was focused on environmentally hostile and geo-politically sensitive areas such as Xinjiang, Yunnan, Guangxi, Fujian, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu, and Amdo.

Railway in Tibet: Historical Review

China’s design for a railway network on the Tibetan plateau was conceived first by the Nationalist Government (1911-1949). In his blueprint for the reconstruction of China through the development of rail transport, Dr. Sun Yatsen, the then Director-General of National Railway, proposed to connect Lhasa with China. However, many people then thought the proposal “fanciful and insurmountable.”

In the early 1950s, Communist China revived the idea of building a railway network on the Tibetan plateau when the Korean War and the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations forced the Communist government to move its military industries to Central China. Perceiving threats from “imperialist America” and the “revisionist Soviets”, Mao ordered the speedy construction of railway lines in Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan even if this involved the taking out railways tracks in other parts of China.

The urgent need for a railway became more acute when the Communist government decided to explore and exploit natural resources in Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Zhou Enlai articulated China’s needs for the natural resources of these regions in 1957 when he stated:

In the Han-inhabited regions there is not enough land available for reclamation, and underground natural resources in areas are not so abundant as elsewhere. Development of the natural resources in areas populated by the fraternal minority nationalities provides popular support for the nation’s industrialization. However, these natural resources have remained untapped for lack of labour power and technological expertise. Without mutual assistance, especially assistance from the Han people, the minority peoples will find it difficult to make significant progress on their own.

By then, thousands of Tibetan and Chinese prisoners were already incarcerated in a chain of large labour camps spread across Amdo. The prisoners were engaged in road
construction, exploitation of mineral resources, building of nuclear research centres and in running state farms for the People’s Liberation Army.8

From 1956 the population of forced immigrants in this northeastern Tibetan region increased dramatically following Mao’s “Rustication” campaign. Millions of Chinese from the urban areas of eastern China were forced to the remote, sparsely-populated minority regions in the north and west of China.9 In the first two years of the campaign, some 600,000 people were sent to Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.10

It is against this backdrop that we have to look at China’s programme to expand the railway network on the Tibetan plateau.

**China’s First Rail Project in Tibet:1958-1961**

The first railway project to connect the Tibetan plateau with China was implemented during China’s Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962). In May 1958 Beijing began the construction of the 121km Lanzhou-Siling railway line. The line was completed in October 1959 and became operational in March 1961. This was the first time in history that the Tibetan plateau was connected to China by a rail link.

During the same period, China also constructed the line connecting Jiayuguan in Gansu Province with Urumqi, the provincial capital of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and another connecting Lanzhou, the provincial capital of Gansu, with Baotou in Inner Mongolia.

The work to extend the railway line from Siling to the strategic town of Gormo was also launched in 1958 to coincide with the establishment of the Northwest Nuclear Weapon Research and Design Academy at Xihai City, the capital of “Tsojang Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture”.11

The Siling-Gormo Railway Line project was halted in 1960 due to the intense famine caused by Mao’s Great Leap Forward. This agricultural fiasco cost Amdo Province alone 900,000 lives and led to the dismissal of the province’s over-zealous ultra-leftist Party Secretary Gao Feng.12

The project was revived after 17 years in 1977 and was completed in 1979.13 However, it was only in 1984 that the 845 km railway line became operational.

The Siling-Gormo Railway line provided access to the strategically important Ninth Academy in Xihai city, the military airbase of Gangca, and the nuclear missile bases of Terlenkha and Xiao Qaidam (Tsaidam). The Ninth Academy was connected to the Siling-Gormo Railway Line by a 40 km link track. Terlenkha City—521 km by rail from Siling and half way between Siling and Gormo—is an artificial Chinese outpost developed originally to serve as the hub of a vast penal network and later as an industrial centre geared primarily for mineral exploitation.14 Now raised to the status of city, Terlenkha was the first place on the Tibetan plateau to be
Railway to Lhasa City

In 1994, Beijing's leaders discussed a project linking Lhasa City—the heart of Tibet—with China by rail. China's Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) conducted route survey and feasibility studies. As a result, the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) allocated a budget for the construction of a railway line between Gormo and Lhasa.

Route Survey (1996-2000): China's Ninth Five-Year Plan earmarked a budget to undertake a series of studies on the feasibility of this project. The Number One Survey and Design Institute of China's Ministry of Railways was instructed to prepare blueprints for a Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa Route and a Lanzhou-Nagchu-Lhasa Route, and the Number Two Survey and Design Institute for a Chengdu-Nagchu-Lhasa Route and a Dali-Nyintri-Lhasa Route. In September 2000, the two institutes submitted their blueprints to the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee and the State Council.

Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa Route: This route stretches from Nanshankou in Gormo city in Amdo (Ch: Qinghai Province) to Lhasa city via Nagchu. The total length of track is 1,118 km, out of which more than 960 km will be at or above an altitude of over 13,000 feet above sea level. More than 560 km of the railway track will be laid on permafrost earth. The annual average air temperature at this altitude is minus one to two degrees Celsius, the lowest temperature being minus 40 degrees Celsius.

The line will pass through “Yushu/Kyegudo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture”, Nagchu Prefecture, and Damshung and Teolung Dечен in Lhasa district before reaching Lhasa city.

The rail line will pass through 30 tunnels and bridges, covering a total distance of 37.5 km, and run parallel to Gormo-Lhasa Highway. Permafrost, the rarified atmosphere, and high elevation will be the major geographical constraints. The project, scheduled for 2001-2007, will cost 19.4 billion yuan (US$2.34 billion), according to the 1995 static evaluation.

The first survey for this route was carried out in 1956-1960. Another study was conducted in the mid-1970s and a preliminary report was submitted in 1976. However, in 1984 the plan was abandoned due to financial and technological constraints.15

Lanzhou-Nagchu-Lhasa Route: This 2,126-km route stretches from Yongjing County near Lanzhou—the provincial capital of Gansu—to Lhasa city, via Nagchu Prefecture in the “Tibet Autonomous Region”. The line will pass through “Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” in Gansu Province, “Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” in

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turned into a labour camp and settlement for forced Chinese immigrants.
Qinghai, the northern edge of “Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” in Sichuan and “Yushu/Kyegudo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” in Qinghai before joining Gormo-Lhasa Railway Line at Nagchu.

The line will pass through approximately 60 tunnels and bridges, covering a distance of 438.69 km, with the longest tunnel being 8.8 km. The project, scheduled for 2001-2038, will cost 63.84 billion yuan (US$ 7.7 billion), according to the 1995 static evaluation.

Permafrost areas and the rarified atmosphere are cited as the major geographical constraints of this project.

Dali-Nyingtri-Lhasa Route: This 1,594.4-km route stretches from Dali station in Yunnan to Lhasa, via Nyingtri town. The line will pass through the “Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” in Yunnan, Zayul town in Chamdo Prefecture of “TAR”, and Nyingtri town before reaching Lhasa city.

It will pass through 65 tunnels and bridges, covering a total distance of 710.65 km, the longest tunnel being 1.53 km. The project, scheduled for 2001-2038, will cost 63.59 billion yuan (US$ 9.27 billion), according to the 1997 static evaluation.

Chengdu-Nagchu-Lhasa Route: This route stretches from the Dujiangyan station near Chengdu to Lhasa city via Nagchu. The total length of this route is 1,927 km, of which 1,243 km will be inside the “TAR”. The line will pass through “N gapa Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” and “Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures” in Sichuan Province before joining with the Dali-Lhasa Railway Line at Zhongshaba near Nyingtri.

This route will incorporate approximately 70 tunnels and bridges with a total distance of 819.24 km, the longest one being 19.5 km. The project, scheduled for 2001-2038, will cost 76.79 billion yuan (US$ 9.27 billion), according to the 1995 static evaluation. It will run parallel to the Chengdu-Lhasa highway, which is characterized by mountainous and rugged terrain.

The line will have tremendous strategic importance as Chengdu is the headquarters of South-West Military Command under whose jurisdiction falls the People’s Liberation Army of the “Tibet Autonomous Region”.

Route Selection: In December 2000, China’s Railway Ministry spokesperson, Ren Xigui, said: “In the past years, a lot of work has been done, including the geographic location, detailed programmes, and feasibility studies as well as technological and economic studies.” In February 2001, the Central authorities in Beijing reviewed the plans for the four optional routes and gave top priority to the Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa Railway project.

It is the shortest route linking Tibet’s capital to China and requires the lowest investment, running as it does through large swathes of flatlands, thus necessitating only 37.5 km of tunnels and bridges, which is only 2.8 percent of the total distance of the line. It
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has the added advantage of proximity to Beijing (3,952 km) and Shanghai (4,326 km). The distance between Lhasa and Beijing is 4,063 km via Chengdu, and 5,204 km via Yunnan. Similarly, the distance between Lhasa and Shanghai is 4,366 km via Chengdu, and 5,089 km via Yunnan.

Furthermore, major research work has been undertaken on this route over the past four decades, whereas no such studies have been undertaken for the other three routes. Cheng Guodong, Director of the National Laboratory for Permafrost Engineering and member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) says:

Through decades of effort, we have discovered laws and special characteristics of the frozen earth. During this period, we have participated in the construction of many engineering projects on the plateau, including the Qinghai-Tibet Highway and Qinghai-Tibet Oil Pipeline. Practice has proven that our technologies and measures for permafrost engineering are feasible.  

Once the Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa route is completed, the second project to connect this line to Yunnan via Shigatse and Nyingtri will begin. According to the official People’s Daily:

The above-mentioned four formulas [routes] each do have their advantages, as phased long-range plans, they are all feasible. They are all very important in terms of road network planning and traffic layout. The Yunnan-Tibet line and the Qinghai-Tibet line, in particular, both have their respective construction significance and role; they can't replace each other. Both the No. 1 and No. 2 Institutes of the Ministry of Railways agreed that it is quite difficult to build a railway leading to Tibet and so the matter should be taken with great care.

But judged from the actual conditions, including initial stage preparation, the degree of difficulties involved in the project, the amount of investment, the working period for the project and the State's present financial and material resources, the No. 1 Institute is of the opinion that it is appropriate to take the Qinghai-Tibet line as the first choice at present. The 1,080 km-long Qinghai-Tibet line is currently the shortest among the four lines leading to Tibet. It will require less investment.

The No. 2 Institute stressed that the construction of the Yunnan-Tibet Railway will fundamentally change the communications and transportation conditions of Tibet and western Yunnan, and is of great political, economic and military significance to accelerating the regional economic development of Tibet and western Yunnan Province and to strengthen ethnic unity and national defense.

Budget Allocation: China's Tenth Five-Year Plan has committed an estimated 100 billion yuan (US$12.1 billion) to large- and medium-size railway projects in West China. These projects are to increase the rail line coverage in western China from the present 14,858 km to about 18,000 km by 2005—a net increase of over 3,000 km.

The primary objectives of the extension of the railway link in western China are to consolidate Beijing's control in restive
"minority areas" and to secure access to the oil-rich Central Asian Republics of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, where the United States has already invested billions of dollars in oil exploration. The Ninth Five-Year Plan had invested 6.3 billion yuan (US$ 725 million) on extending the railway link from Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, to Kashgar (southern Xinjiang) through Korla. This line became operational in December 1999.

The Tenth Five-Year Plan gave high priority to the construction of a railway line to Lhasa City; this is one of the four most important projects highlighted by the Plan. All the four major projects are aimed at the exploitation of natural resources to serve the power-hungry industries in China's prosperous eastern regions. This becomes clear from the following official Chinese statement:

The distribution of China's energies is seriously unbalanced. On the one hand, the expansive western areas have rich deposits of natural gas, petroleum, hydro-electric power and other important resources, huge volume of hydro-electric power is wasted there; on the other hand, the rapidly developing eastern region needs the import and supplement of various resources and energy.

This situation of energy distribution has caused rising production costs in the southeastern region dominated by an export-oriented economy. And yet the energy-rich western region is leading a poor life. Construction of the two major projects: west-to-east power transmission and west-to-east gas transfer will rationalize China's energy distribution, and will greatly improve the overall economic benefits of the State economy.

Addressing the Western Forum in Chengdu on October 22, 2000, Sun Yonfu, China's Vice Minister of Railways, said that China would build a railway to Lhasa "to promote the economic development of the Tibet Autonomous Region and to strengthen national defense". Although Lhasa City is already connected with the rest of China by four major highways, it is only the Siling-Tibet (Qinghai-Tibet) Highway that operates year-round, carrying 80 percent of the cargo and passengers to the "Tibet Autonomous Region".

Beijing Review (5/14/2001) reported that the Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa Railway will "help improve transport conditions and the investment environment" on the Tibetan plateau, and will "accelerate Tibetan resource development and economic growth".

The amount earmarked for this project represents a substantial portion of the planned 100 billion yuan investment in railway construction in the western region during the plan period. It is widely believed that mere economic considerations can hardly justify the enormous cost and technical difficulties of the project. Political and military considerations are suspected to be the key factor in China's determination to construct the rail link to Lhasa.

**Implementation Strategy:** The project will be executed in two phases. The first phase will involve upgrading the existing
845-km Siling-Gormo Railway Line. Work on this started in June 2000 and is expected to be completed by October 2001.

The second phase is the actual undertaking of laying railway tracks from Gormo to Lhasa City. This phase was flagged off in Gormo on June 29, 2001. It is not yet apparent when the actual work will commence. According to some reports, the construction of test sections of 14 km and another 150 km, which form the easier section of the project, was to start in July 2001. The rest of the project will most likely begin in April 2002. In an interview with the South China Morning Post's correspondent, Josephine Ma, the vice-chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Qunpei (Tib: Chonphel) said: “If the study can be completed early, perhaps we can start construction this year. But if it takes more time, the construction will probably begin early next year”.

The Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa Railway will have two main junctions (Gormo and Lhasa), eight stations and 20 other exit points. Three stations (Lungdho, Wutaolen, Thogthen River) will be in “Yushu/Kyegudo Tibetan Autonomous Region”, two (Amdo D zong and Nagchu) in Nagchu Prefecture and three (Damshung, Yangpachen and Zechu) in the Lhasa District.

Of the 20 exit points, 15 will be in Amdo and the remainder in the “Tibet Autonomous Region”. The 15 exit points in Amdo are Khunu Bridge, Donglung, Wonkhu, Nagri Chunak-kha, Chumar, Mugsei Soglam, Luma Chu, Artao-lung, U-li, Thongthen River, Dichu-toe, Toema, T hangla, and U-nyok Chu. The five exit points in the “TAR” are Thoe-gyu La, Lenthung Tsangpo, Gacha, Yuru, Sulu, U-ma Thang, and Dhachu-go.

The line will cross over the five major passes of Kunlun, Hoh-Xil, Fung-ho, Thang-la and Nyenchen T hangla. The highest pass (La-nyag) is 5,072 meters above sea level. It will also pass through eight well-known basins or flatlands, such as Shingta-T hen, Chumar, Thogthen, Chutsen, Nagchu, Damshung, Yangpachen, and Lhasa.

According to Chinese Government sources, the project involves the permanent employment of 67,000 Chinese technicians and labourers and another 16,000 labourers seasonally employed locally.

Problems in implementing the project: The Chinese authorities have identified geological impact, permafrost, low temperatures and oxygen shortage at higher altitudes as the major problems. The Tibetan plateau is believed to be warming and drying, resulting in degradation of permafrost along the eastern part of the landmass. This is a significant problem given the fact that 550 km of the railway line will pass through permafrost regions, of which 190 km is “not stable” and 100 km is “not at all stable”. Landslides, mudflows, karst rocks, earthquakes and thunderstorms are other impediments. While reporting on the problems, the South China Morning Post, quoting Knight Ridder,
reported that:

The railway, part of it started last month and scheduled for completion in 2007, may be the most difficult attempted. High altitudes, steep grades, plummeting temperatures, howling winds and soils that can rise or sink more than a metre depending on the season all present enormous technical challenges.

Beyond those engineering issues lies environmental concerns for the region's fragile ecosystem, which could be badly damaged if promised protective measures fail...

The high altitudes, exceeding 4,545 metres above sea level at one point, will require special train engines that can function with little oxygen as well as pressurized cars to keep passengers from suffering altitude sickness.

Some stretches would include the steepest grades climbed by a train, Mr Zhang [Zhang Xiuli is the project's senior engineer] said, and others would pass over ground that rises in winter and sinks in summer. Fierce winds buffet some spots more than 170 days a year, while other places are vulnerable to landslides and earthquakes.

The above problems were also highlighted in the information brochure of a seminar on the “Qinghai-Tibet Railway Project”, organized in Beijing in May 2001 by Construction Industry Manufacturers Association (CIMA) from Milwaukee, USA, and China's Ministry of Railways. The brochure indicated that the Chinese Government was still earnestly looking for technology, including earth-moving machinery, foundation construction machinery, tunnel boring and drilling machinery, and specialist equipment for use at high altitude and in low temperatures.

**The rail's implications and impacts**

China's policy-decision of bringing the railway to Lhasa city and then to the southern corridor of Tibet will have far-reaching effects. The project will lead to extensive damage to the fragile eco-system of the Tibetan plateau, damaging wildlife, contaminating waterbodies— particularly the Dri-chu (Yangtze), Gyamo-Ngochu (Salween), and Dzachu (Mekong) rivers— and inducing deflation and soil erosions as a result of escalating resource exploitation. The project will also encourage a massive influx of Chinese settlers, which will lead to the marginalization of Tibetans, stigmatizing them on the basis of race and language, and ultimately eroding the foundations of Tibetan culture and identity. Apart from these hazards, the project will escalate the military build-up on the Tibetan plateau which will gradually invite an arms-race in South and South-East Asia.

**Environmental Impact:** The Chinese authorities and experts have assured that appropriate measures would be taken to prevent ecological damage to the areas along the Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa Railway Line. China's Number One Survey and Design Institute and State Environmental Protection Administration have assured protection of
soil, vegetation, animal and plant resources, and water resources in the region. However, a number of independent experts have raised serious concerns over the ecological impact of the project. The Southern Weekend newspaper, published from Guangdong, quoted the concerns of experts and stated that, “given the harsh climate, the vegetation cover in this region has come out extremely slowly and if the vegetation is damaged [by engineering works], it will be very difficult to recover”. Environmentalists have expressed concerns over the impact on the existing wildlife on the plateau, particularly in Hoh Xil Nature Reserve in Amdo and Chang Tang Nature Reserve in the “TAR”. These reserves are the habitats of many endemic wildlife species, including Tibetan antelope and wild yak. Ran Li, chief engineer of the Number One Survey and Design Institute, assured on 15 February 2001 that, “more bridges and passages for animals will be built” in the nature reserve zones to protect animal and plant resources. Nevertheless, many experts believe that the railway line is certain to affect the migratory pattern of wildlife in the reserves, no matter what arrangements are made.

Furthermore, the population pressure that the railway will bring to the areas will increase illegal poaching in the reserves and pollution of the sources of the Yangtze, Yellow and Mekong Rivers.

One of the most serious concerns is the acceleration of natural resource exploitation and the resulting large-scale environmental destruction on the plateau. Over the past four decades, the arrival of highways and railways has completely changed the environment of northern and western parts of Amdo. The Tibetan autonomous prefectures of Tsonub and Tsojarg cover an area of 377,787 sq km, which is more than half of Qinghai. The once-sparsely populated pastoral land of these prefectures has now become a busy site for mineral exploitation. Prisoners, forced immigrants and the PLA have all contributed to the exploration and extraction of mineral resources in the region. In 1992, “Tsonub Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” was hailed as “the only ethnic minorities-inhabited prefecture in the country that turns over revenues to the higher authorities”.

The Tsaidam Basin in Tsonub Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture is “a treasure house of mineral resources” to the Chinese Government. The basin holds 42 billion tonnes of oil reserves, 1,500 billion cubic metres of natural gas, rich deposits of potassium chloride and several other resources. As early as 1956, the authorities built settlements in Da Tsaidam and Mengya with road links to Tsakha (Ch: Chaka). Thousands of forced immigrants from eastern China and prisoners were moved there to work on road construction, mines and production facilities. To support the burgeoning Chinese population, the traditional grasslands of the Tibetan and ethnic Mongolian nomads of Amdo were turned into croplands.
This story will most certainly be repeated in the “TAR” in the coming years. The impact of the railway on the “TAR” is best described by the authors of Tibet Outside TAR as early as 1997. They then wrote:

When and if the tracks are extended beyond the Taggula into the TAR, it is reasonable to expect it will be the most significant event for the TAR since the arrival of the PLA there in the 1950s. The effects of Chinese-style development and population influx will be pervasive and can be expected to mirror those seen today in formerly Tibetan and Mongolian zones such as Tsolho (Ch: Hainan) and Inner Mongolia.

Currently, 70 percent of China’s energy is consumed by its eastern and central regions, whereas some 90 percent of hydropower resources and 80 percent of coal reserves lie in western and northern China respectively.33 In the year 2000, the construction of the Sebei-Siling-Lanzhou gas pipeline was selected as one of the nation’s 10 most important projects and the work was commenced in April 2000. In the “TAR”, emphasis is being placed on the construction of water conservancy projects. The Tenth Five-Year Plan proposes to see the construction of a conveyance system in the Menla, Phenpo and Yarlung irrigation areas. Similarly, it wants to see the early commencement of the construction of nine “backbone projects”, including the Pangduo irrigation hub.34

Chinese geologists have recently found oil and natural gas reserves in the “TAR” in Lhunpo-la/Chang Thang Basin. As of now, these reserves are not drilled commercially, but the prospect of commercial drilling will be greatly enhanced once the railway line is constructed. The advent of rail links will make natural resource exploitation more attractive and profitable, as the cost of transportation to China will be drastically reduced. Thus, the overall impact of the railway on the environment of the plateau will be far-reaching.

Social and Economic Impacts: Chinese State planners and media have given assurances that the railway project will “boost” the region’s economy by “linking the plateau’s economy with inland economies” and “making accessible its industries and products to various part of China and even the world”.35 However, Tibetans in Tibet express strong misgivings about this project. In classic colonial mode, the Chinese Government regards the resource-rich western region—including Tibet—merely as a provider of raw materials and energy for the industries in eastern and central China. In return, the western region is expected to receive “skilled, managerial and technical personnel” from the Chinese provinces to create a vibrant market for consumer goods from the east.36

The exploitation of natural resources in Tibet will have a minimal effect in boosting the local economy. This is because all the primary industries are owned by the State and the revenues of these industries go straight to the Chinese Central Government. Article
Nine of the Chinese Constitution states that, “All mineral resources, water, forests, mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land, beaches and other natural resources are owned by the State, that is, by the whole people.” This is precisely the reason why the regional government in Tibet is so dependent on “subsidies and financial aid” from the Chinese Central Government.

Not only will the railway will make it cheaper, easier and quicker to transport raw materials—such as medicinal plants, forestry and other products—from the Tibetan plateau to China, it will also have a similar advantage in bringing Chinese migrants and consumer goods to Tibet. This will only widen the existing economic gap between China and Tibet. According to Chinese scholars:

The current distribution of labour and industrial structure are irrational and at a low level. When we compare the distribution of labour between the east and west, this shows that there is a division between raw material production and preliminary processing in the west and production of processed raw materials and goods with high added value in the east. The west suffers a dual profit loss through this kind of distribution, by the export of raw materials and by the import of processed products, weakening the western regions' capacity to accumulate their own funds.37

A similar concern was raised by other Chinese scholars. A Beijing-based researcher, Zhang Keyun, stated that the biased price structure has created “dual profit-loss” (losing profit due to cheap exports and losing profit due to having to pay comparatively high prices for processed goods) for the western region, particularly Tibet and Xinjiang. This lopsided system is the main cause of the existing income disparity between China’s east and west.

Undoubtedly, the construction of the railway line will provide temporary and token job opportunities to a limited number of Tibetans. As Chinese planners have predicted, Tibetans living in the areas along the railway line will get temporary, menial, labouring jobs to build decks of rocks in the unstable areas on which the railway line will be laid. But the major proportion of employment opportunities will go to engineers and other semi-skilled labourers from China. Already, a large contingent of Chinese contractors and nearly 70,000 labourers were camped in Gorno to undertake the project. The employment of Tibetans will be sidelined with the excuse that they lack “proper skills and technical know-how”.

The Chinese authorities and media point out that the railway will promote tourism to the “TAR”, bringing in 5.64 million tourists over the next five years.38 If the past experience in the “TAR” is any indication, it is doubtful whether the local Tibetans will derive any benefit from the expected tourism boom in the region. Over the past five years, the “TAR” has received over two million tourists from China and overseas countries, bringing in 1.96 billion yuan. In the same
In July 2000, Beijing announced a policy designed to make it easier for Chinese immigrants to exploit economic opportunities in Tibet and other minority areas in the west. Xinhua (July 14, 2000) reported that the Ministry of Public Security issued a notice stipulating that all “investors and professionals” working in western China can be registered where they work, and that if they wish to return to where they came from, they can have their new residence registration transferred. Xinhua emphasized that: “The new policy is aimed at proving a better environment for the country to carry out Western Development strategy and encouraging a reasonable and orderly population immigration [sic]”.

The new rail-link to Kashgar, Xinjiang, is a striking example of who will benefit from the railway projects.

The terminal itself speaks volumes for Han intentions in the area. Designed for a majority Chinese clientele, Chinese kiosks, Chinese signs and Chinese staff predominate. One Uighur restaurant hidden in a far corner of a 40-strong Chinese café-complex, exists as a sop to the eating preferences of Uighurs who refuse to eat with the Chinese. But in fact Uighur faces are a rare commodity on the trains. Most cannot afford the luxury of train travel and prefer to haggle on the bus. The train, hot off the Chinese press, with Chinese signs, Chinese staff, 24-hour piped Chinese music, Chinese announcements and Chinese food, is not to the likes of the average Uighur citizen. “These trains are for Chinese and
foreign tourists,” said Ibrahim, an Uighur tour guide. “The Chinese are the rich ones round here. Our people like to negotiate a fare but there’s no negotiation on the train. The only Uighurs you find at the station are touts buying up tickets to re-sell, but even that’s being knocked on the head by the Chinese authorities.”

In all probability, this scenario will be reenacted in Tibet. Tibetans today face the prospect of losing control over their lands and becoming a powerless “minority” and “cultural relics” for Chinese and foreign tourists. There are already reports of Tibetans being displaced from the site of the railway terminus in Nê’u township, near Lhasa City. Lhasa and other towns in Tibet will become warehouses and transit points to dump cheap Chinese consumer goods on the Nepalese and Indian markets.

**Regional Security Implications** In 1959, when China completed the occupation of Tibet, an Indian statesman said that the Himalayas had now ceased to exist. For the first time in history, India had to fight a bloody war against China in 1962; the trauma of that war still lingers in the minds of Indians. Analysts suggest that the 1962 attack on India was only the opening shot in a confrontation, whose later stages have to wait for China’s surer grasp on Tibet.

However, the lack of reliable transport facilities has greatly restricted China’s military maneuverability on the plateau until now. The advent of the railway will allow China to surmount this obstacle. An Indian scholar, Dr. Subhash Kapila, said that the arrival of the railway would, at least, double China’s military deployment in Tibet and the Indo-Tibetan border region, and Beijing would be able to effectively sustain it logistically. He added that the new rail link and offshoots from the proposed oil pipeline could increase the deployment of China’s airforce and missiles.

The Chinese media indicate that the PLA base in Gormo may be expanded manifold once it is connected to Lhasa by the rail. It will also facilitate the expansion of PLA bases in Kongpo and other parts of south-western Tibet. This will become a real possibility when the second phase of extending the rail line from Lhasa to Dali in Yunnan is completed.

This, along with China’s naval base development on Burmese territory, will pose serious threats to the Indian sub-continent and Southeast Asia. George Ginsburg and Machiel Mathos said, “He who holds the Himalayan piedmont threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all of Southeast Asia within its reach, and all of Asia.”

**The Threat to Asia**

In the 1950s, the Chinese Government extended its rail network to the Tibetan plateau from its northern corridor to reinforce China’s national defense and colonize Tibet.
Four decades later, Beijing is in the process of bringing the railway to the heart of Tibet to consolidate its military presence in the southern corridor of the plateau and increase the efficiency of its natural resource exploitation. This project will exact a heavy price from Tibet and its southern neighbours. As far as Tibetans are concerned, the Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa Railway and China’s Western Development Program will only serve to implement China’s population policy and complete the Sinicization of their country. For Tibet’s southern neighbours, these projects will bring an even more serious military threat right to their doorstep and ultimately escalate the arms race on the Asian continent.
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When China's People's Liberation Army invaded in 1949, Tibet was an independent state in fact and in law. This military takeover constituted an aggression on a sovereign state and clearly violated international law. Today's continued occupation of Tibet by China, reinforced by a strong military presence, constitutes an ongoing violation of international law and the fundamental right of Tibetans to self-determination.

Beijing claims "ownership" of Tibet. This assertion is not based on its armed conquest, starting in 1949, or its draconian control over Tibet since then, or even since 1959. Neither does the Chinese Government base its "ownership" claim on the so-called "Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet", which it forced upon Tibet in 1951.

China's claim relies upon historical relationships, primarily between Mongol or Manchu rulers of China and Tibetan lamas or—to a lesser extent—between Chinese emperors and Tibetan lamas. The pertinent events cited today by Beijing occurred in bygone centuries: during the height of Mongol imperial expansion, when the Yuan Dynasty (1240-1350) extended its political supremacy throughout most of Asia and large tracts of Eastern Europe; and again when Manchu Qing emperors ruled China (1639-1911) and expanded their influence throughout East and Central Asia, including Tibet—largely during the 18th century.

It is beyond dispute that at various periods
in its long history Tibet came under differing degrees of foreign influence: the Mongols, the Gorkhas of Nepal, the Manchu emperors of China and the British rulers of India all played their parts. At other periods in plateau's history, it was Tibet which exercised power and influence over its neighbours—including China. It would be hard to find any state in the world today that has not been subjected to foreign domination or influence at some era in its history. In Tibet’s case the degree and duration of foreign influence and interference was relatively limited. Moreover, the relationship with Mongol, Chinese and Manchu rulers, to the extent that they exerted any political significance, was personal in nature and did not at any time imply a union or integration of the Tibetan state with—or into—a Chinese state.

Whatever the ins and outs of Tibet’s early history, its status at the time of the Chinese invasion must be decided on the basis of its position in recent history, especially its relationship with China after 1911 when the foreign Manchu rulers were overthrown and the Chinese resumed control of their own country. Most states can hark back to a period in history to justify territorial claims on neighbouring states. Such claims are unacceptable in international law and practice.

China’s propaganda chooses to gloss over Tibet’s status in the first half of the 20th century. This is because, from 1911 to the completion of China’s military occupation of the plateau in 1959, there is no evidence of Chinese authority or influence in Tibet to support Beijing’s “ownership” claim. The preponderance of evidence shows precisely the opposite: that Tibet was to all intents and purposes a sovereign state, independent of China. This is the conclusion of most legal scholars and experts on the subject.

As early as 1960, the International Commission of Jurists’ Legal Enquiry Committee on Tibet reported in its study on Tibet’s legal status: “Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law. In 1950 there was a people and a territory, and a government which functioned in that territory, conducting its own domestic affairs free from any outside authority. From 1913-1950 foreign relations of Tibet were conducted exclusively by the Government of Tibet, and countries with whom Tibet had foreign relations are shown by official documents to have treated Tibet in practice as an independent State.”

Forty years of independence is clearly sufficient time for any country to be recognized as such by the international community. Many members of the United Nations today can claim a similar, or even shorter, period of independence. But in Tibet’s case, even ancient history has been selectively distorted and re-written by the Chinese propaganda machine to justify China’s “ownership” claim. The following brief overview of both the 20th century and early
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Tibetan history focuses on the salient periods which Beijing has misrepresented.

**Tibet's Status: 1911-1951**

It is indisputable that on the eve of China's military invasion, which started at the close of 1949, Tibet possessed all the attributes of independent statehood recognized under international law: a defined territory, a population inhabiting that territory, a government, and the ability to enter into international relations.

The territory of Tibet largely corresponds to the geological plateau of Tibet, which consists of 2.5 million sq km. At different times in history wars were fought and treaties signed concerning the precise location of boundaries.

The population of Tibet at the time of the Chinese invasion was approximately six million. That population constituted the Tibetan people, a distinct people with a long history, rich culture and spiritual tradition. Tibetans are a people distinct from the Chinese and other neighbouring peoples. Not only have the Tibetans never considered themselves to be Chinese, the Chinese have also not regarded the Tibetans to be Chinese (hence, for example, the references to "barbarians" in Chinese historical annals).

The government of Tibet was headquartered in Lhasa, the nation's capital. It consisted of a Head of State (the Dalai Lama), a Cabinet of Ministers (the Kashag), a National Assembly (the Tsongdu), and an extensive bureaucracy to administer the vast territory. The judicial system was based on that developed by Emperor Songtsen Gampo (seventh century), Lama Changchub Gyaltsen (14th century), the Fifth Dalai Lama (17th century) and the 13th Dalai Lama (20th century), and was administered by magistrates appointed by the government.

The government of Tibet levied taxes, minted its own currency, ran the country's postal system and issued postage stamps, commanded Tibet's small army, and generally conducted all affairs of government. It was an ancient form of governance which had served the needs of Tibet well in the past, but was in need of reform for the country to keep pace with the great political, social and economic changes that were taking place globally in the first half of the 20th century. The Tibetan form of government was highly decentralized, with many districts and principalities of Tibet enjoying a large degree of self-government. This was, to a large extent, inevitable due to the vastness of the territory and the lack of modern communication systems.

Tibet's international relations were focused on the country's neighbours. Tibet maintained diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with countries in the region, including Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Mongolia, China, British India, and, to a limited extent, with Russia and Japan.

Tibet's independent foreign policy is perhaps most obviously demonstrated by the
country's neutrality during World War II. Despite strong pressure from Britain, the USA and China to allow the passage of military supplies through Tibet to China when Japan blocked the strategically vital “Burma Road”, Tibet held fast to its declared neutrality. The Allies were constrained to respect this.

China today claims that “no country ever recognized Tibet”. In international law, recognition can be obtained by an explicit act of recognition or by implicit acts or behaviour. The conclusion of treaties, even the conduct of negotiations, and certainly the maintenance of diplomatic relations are forms of explicit recognition. Mongolia and Tibet concluded a formal treaty of recognition in 1913; Nepal not only concluded peace treaties with Tibet and maintained an ambassador in Lhasa, but also formally stated to the United Nations in 1949, as part of its application for UN membership, that it maintained independent diplomatic relations with Tibet as it did with several other countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, India and Burma.

Nepal, China, Bhutan, British-India and later independent India maintained diplomatic missions in Lhasa. Although China claims in its propaganda that its mission in Tibet was a branch office of the so-called Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the Guomindang Government, the Tibetan Government only recognized this as a diplomatic mission. Its status was on a par with the Nepalese Embassy (Nepal had a full ambassador or “Vakil” in Lhasa) or the British Mission.

The Tibetan Foreign Office also conducted direct relations with the United States when President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent emissaries to Lhasa to request assistance for the Allied war effort against Japan during the Second World War. Also, during the four UN General Assembly debates on Tibet in 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1965, many countries expressly referred to Tibet as an independent country illegally occupied by China.

Relations with Nationalist China:1911-1949

China's position was ambiguous during this period. On the one hand, the Nationalist Government unilaterally announced in its constitution and in communications to other countries that Tibet was a province of the Republic of China (one of the “five races” of the republic). On the other hand, it recognized that Tibet was not part of the Republic of China in its official communications with the Government of Tibet. China's then president repeatedly sent letters and envoys to the Dalai Lama and to the Tibetan Government asking that Tibet “join” the Republic of China. Similar requests were sent by China to the Government of Nepal. Both Tibet and Nepal consistently refused to join China.

In response to the first letter from Chinese President Yuan Shikai, the 13th Dalai Lama rejected his invitation to join the republic, explaining courteously but firmly that Tibet-
ans did “not approve” of the Chinese Government due to past injustices. He stated:

The Republic has only just been proclaimed and the national foundations are far from strong. It behooves the President to exert his energies towards the maintenance of order. As for Tibet, the Tibetans are quite capable of preserving their existence intact and there is no occasion for the President to worry himself at this distance or to be discomposed.3

Conversely, China’s propaganda quotes the 13th Dalai Lama as having told the “envoy” sent by “Beijing” in 1919 that, “It is not my true intention to be on intimate terms with the British... I swear to be loyal to our country and jointly work for the happiness of the five races.”4

In that year an unofficial Chinese delegation went to Lhasa, ostensibly to present religious offerings to the 13th Dalai Lama, but in reality to urge the Tibetan leader to negotiate an agreement with China. However, the Dalai Lama rejected the overture outright and, instead, called for tripartite negotiations in Lhasa.

Liu Manqing, a woman of mixed Tibetan and Chinese parentage, did arrive in Lhasa in 1930. But her visit was described as personal. During that purportedly personal visit, she tried to approach the Tibetan government with communications from the Chinese President, but the Tibetans gave her no encouragement.

China’s re-writing of history claims that the 13th Dalai Lama, in his communications through her, expressed his belief that Tibet is a part of China. The Dalai Lama is quoted as having said, “My greatest wish is for the real peace and unification of China”, etc.5 There is no historical record of the Dalai Lama having made such a statement in 1930. On the contrary, the official record of the Dalai Lama’s reply to the Chinese President in 1930 contradicts this statement. The record refers to a list of eight questions submitted to the Dalai Lama on behalf of the Chinese President and contains each of the Dalai Lama’s responses.

On relations with China and the question of Chinese influence in Tibet, the Dalai Lama said: “For the stability of Tibet’s religio-political order and the happiness of its subjects, it may be better to hold negotiations and conclude treaties as this will result in dependable arrangements.”6

On Tibet’s independence and the border territories Tibet wanted returned from China, the Dalai Lama said: “Under the teacher-patron (more widely known by the misnomer priest-patron) relationship that prevailed so far, Tibet has enjoyed wide independence. We wish to preserve this. We feel that there will be long-term stability if the territories we have lost to outsiders are returned to us.”7

Other Chinese envoys to Tibet, such as General Huang M usung (1934), and Wu Zhongxin (1940), were also told in no uncertain terms by the Tibetan government...
that Tibet was, and wished to remain, independent. It may be stated here that neither the Chinese Government, nor its “special envoy” (Huang Musung), had any role, as China claims, in the appointment of Reting Rinpoche as the Regent after the death of the 13th Dalai Lama in 1933.

Huang Musung was the first Chinese to gain entry to Tibet in an official capacity since 1911. The Tibetans gave permission because he purportedly came to offer religious tribute and condolences for the late Dalai Lama—an act for which Tibetans hardly refused permission to anyone. Huang Musung arrived in Lhasa in April 1934, three months after Reting Rinpoche became Regent.8

China claims that Tibetan Government officials were sent to Nanjing in 1931 and 1946 to participate in China’s National Assembly sessions.9 In fact, in 1931, Khenpo Kunchok Jungne was appointed by the Dalai Lama to set up a temporary liaison office in Nanjing and maintain contact with the Chinese Nationalist Government. Likewise, in 1946 a Tibetan mission was sent to Delhi and Nanjing to congratulate Britain, the United States and China on the Allied victory in the Second World War. These emissaries had no instruction or authority to attend the Chinese National Assembly. Speaking about this on August 29, 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama said, “They [Tibetan delegates in Nanjing] had no official part in the Assembly. When the propaganda came to the knowledge of our government they were instructed by telegram not to attend.”10

As for the establishment of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission by the Nationalist Guomindang Government, that too served only to bolster a mythical claim of jurisdiction not only over Tibet, but also over the whole of Mongolia, including Outer Mongolia, whose independence has been internationally recognized since 1924. The fact of the matter is that this Commission was neither recognized by the Tibetan Government, nor did it have any authority with respect to Tibet.

United Nations Debates

When Chinese Communist armies started marching onto the Tibetan plateau in 1949, the Tibetan Government sent an urgent appeal to the United Nations to help Tibet resist the aggression. The General Assembly was advised by Britain and India not to take any action for the time being in order not to provoke a full-scale attack by China. But, to most countries, China’s invasion of Tibet was aggression.

This became especially evident during the full debates on the issue in the United Nations General Assembly in 1959, 1961 and 1965, when many governments echoed the sentiments expressed by the Ambassador of the Philippines who referred to Tibet as an “independent nation” and added: “(I) t is clear that on the eve of the Chinese invasion in 1950, Tibet was not under the rule of any foreign country.” He described China’s
occupation as “the worst type of imperialism, and colonialism past or present.” The Nicaraguan representative condemned the Chinese invasion of Tibet and said: “The people of America, born in freedom, must obviously be repelled by an act of aggression ... and particularly when it is perpetrated by a large state against a small and weak one.” The representative from Thailand reminded the Assembly that the majority of states “refute the contention that Tibet is part of China.” Similarly the government of the United States condemned and denounced Chinese “aggression” and their “invasion” of Tibet.

Irish Representative Frank Aiken stated: “For thousands of years, or for a couple of thousand years at any rate, (Tibet) was as free and as fully in control of its own affairs as any nation in this Assembly, and a thousand times more free to look after its own affairs than many of the nations here.”

During those four UN debates it was only the Communist bloc which openly sided with China. Official statements made during those debates refute China’s assertion that no country ever recognized Tibet’s independence, or considered its military intervention to be aggression.

It is only by falsifying history that the Chinese Government can deny that Tibet was independent between 1911 and 1951. Even the Guomindang’s last Head of Mission in Lhasa, Shen Tsung-lien, wrote after leaving the country in 1948 that “since 1911 Lhasa [i.e. the Tibetan Government in Lhasa] has to all practical purposes enjoyed full independence”. M ao Zedong himself, when he passed through the border regions of Tibet during the Long March, and was given food and shelter by local Tibetans, remarked: “This is our only foreign debt, and some day we must pay the Mantzu (sic) and the Tibetans for the provisions we were obliged to take from them.” [Emphasis added, ed.]

The origin and position of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama

In its 1992 White Paper, Tibet—Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation, China says: “In 1653 and 1713, the Qing emperors granted honorific titles to the Fifth Dalai Lama and the Fifth Bainqen (Panchen) Lama, henceforth establishing the titles of the Dalai Lama and the Bainqen Erdini and their political and religious status in Tibet. The Dalai Lama ruled the bulk of areas from Lhasa while the Bainqen Erdini ruled the remaining area of Tibet from Xigatse [Shigatse].” This assertion is total fiction.

The Tibetan monk scholar and sage Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) founded the Gelug tradition which became the fourth major school of Tibetan Buddhism. Panchen Gedun Drup was Tsongkhapa’s principal disciple. Panchen Gedun Drup’s third incarnation, Sonam Gyetso, was invited to the Mongol Court of Altan Khan and conferred the title of “Talai (Dalai) Lama”. The title was applied retroactively to his two previous incarnations, making Gedun Drup the first Dalai Lama and
foundling the lineage of the Dalai Lamas. It is thus not true, as Chinese propaganda claims, that the title “Dalai Lama” was first established by a Manchu emperor a century later.

The relationship established by the Third Dalai Lama with Altan Khan was a spiritual one, but it would have political repercussions two centuries later, in 1642, when the Mongol prince, Gushri Khan, helped the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) to become the supreme political and spiritual ruler of Tibet. The Fifth Dalai Lama, in his turn, conferred the title of “Choekyi Gyalpo” (Dharma Raja) on his Mongol patron. From that time on, successive Dalai Lamas ruled Tibet as sovereign heads of state. The political position of the Dalai Lamas was, therefore, not created by a Manchu emperor of the Qing Dynasty, as claimed in Beijing’s 1992 White Paper, but by the Fifth Dalai Lama with the help of his Mongol patron, two years before the Qing Dynasty was even established.

Tashilhunpo Monastery was established in 1447 by Panchen Gedun Drup, retroactively considered the First Dalai Lama. Successive abbots of Tashilhunpo monastery were given the title “Panchen” (“Pan” from the Sanskrit “Pandita” and “Chen” from the Tibetan “Chenpo”, meaning great) because of their scholarship. The Fifth Dalai Lama gave his teacher, Panchen Lobsang Chokyi Gyaltse (1570-1662), ownership of Tashilhunpo monastery and some additional estates. After that, the Panchen Lamas were selected on the basis of reincarnation, each successive Panchen Lama retaining ownership of the monastery and estates. But their roles had absolutely no political significance.

Contrary to Beijing’s propaganda, the Panchen Lamas and other high lamas exercised religious authority only and were not involved in the political administration of any part of Tibet. In fact, the political authority of Shigatse and Tashilhunpo lay with the district governor appointed by Lhasa. Thus, the Manchu emperor played no role in the establishment of the religious or political status of the Dalai Lama, and none with respect to the Panchen Lama’s position either.

The PRC government claims, as did past Guomindang governments, that it played a decisive role, through its envoy Wu Zhongxin, in the selection and installation of the 14th Dalai Lama in 1940 and states that “the simple reality that the installation of the 14th Dalai Lama needed the approval of the (Chinese) national government is sufficient proof that Tibet did not possess any independent power during that period (1911-1949).”

In reality, the Dalai Lama was selected according to time-honoured Tibetan religious beliefs and no approval from the Chinese Government was needed or sought. Regent Reting announced the name of the present Dalai Lama to the Tibetan National Assembly in 1939, one year prior to Wu’s arrival in Lhasa.

During the enthronement ceremony on
February 22, 1940, Wu—like envoys from Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and British India—played no special role. Sir Basil Gould, the Political Officer who represented British India, explains that the official Chinese version of events was a fiction which had been prepared and published ahead of the enthronement. That fictitious account by Wu Zhongxin, which China continues to rely on, reflected what the Chinese had intended to happen. But repetition has enshrined it in Beijing’s historic distortions.

The PRC propaganda also uses a Chinese news report carrying a photograph of the Dalai Lama with Wu Zhongxin, captioned as having been taken during the 1940 enthronement ceremony. But according to Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China, this photo was taken during a private audience between Wu and the Dalai Lama in the days following the enthronement.

“Wu Zhongxin’s claim of having presided over the enthronement ceremony on the basis of this photograph is a blatant distortion of historical facts,” Ngabo said.16

**Early Recorded History**

According to Tibetan annals, the country’s first monarch ruled from 127 BC, but it was only in the seventh century AD that Tibet emerged as a unified state and a mighty empire under Emperor Songtsen Gampo. This golden era of political and military supremacy and territorial expansion lasted for three centuries. Both the King of Nepal and the Emperor of China offered their daughters to Songtsen Gampo in marriages of alliance.

The Nepalese and Chinese consorts of the king are of primary importance, because of the roles they played in bringing Buddhism to Tibet. Beijing propaganda always refers to the alleged political implications of Gampo’s wedding to the T’ang imperial princess, conveniently ignoring the Tibetan ruler’s other consorts—particularly the more senior Nepalese queen, whose influence was, if anything, greater than that of her Chinese counterpart.

Tibetan Emperor Trisong Detsen (reign: 755-797) expanded the Tibetan empire by conquering parts of China. In 763 China’s capital, Chang’an (modern day Xian), was invaded and China had to pay an annual tribute to Tibet. In 783 a treaty was concluded which demarcated the borders between Tibet and China. A pillar inscription on a stele still standing at the foot of the Potala Palace in Lhasa records some of these conquests.

The peace treaty concluded between Tibet and China in 821 is of particular importance in illustrating the nature of relations between these two great powers of Asia. The text of this treaty, both in Tibetan and Chinese, was inscribed on three stone steles: one was erected in the extreme east at Gungu Meru to demarcate the border between the two nations, the second in Lhasa where it still
stands, and the third in the Chinese capital of Chang'an. Passages from the stele inscription quoted in Beijing propaganda are inaccurate and deliberately taken out of context—thereby creating the impression that some sort of "union" resulted from this ninth-century treaty. Nothing is further from the truth. The principal passage of the treaty states: "Tibet and China shall abide by the frontiers of which they are now in occupation. All to the east is the country of Great China; and all to the west is, without question, the country of Great Tibet. Henceforth, on neither side shall there be waging of war nor seizing of territory."

China chooses to interpret these historic events as showing that "the Tibetans and Hans (Chinese) had, through marriage between royal families and meetings leading to alliances, cemented political and kinship ties of unity and political friendship, and formed close economic and cultural relations, laying a solid foundation for the ultimate founding of a unified nation." Conversely, both Tibetan and Chinese historical records contradict this interpretation and refer to quite separate and powerful empires.

By the mid-ninth century Tibet fragmented into several principalities and Tibetan attention shifted towards India and Nepal from where a strong religious and cultural influence was bringing about a major spiritual and intellectual renaissance.

**Relations with Mongol Emperors: 1240-1350**

Genghis Khan and successive Mongol rulers conquered vast swathes of Asia and Europe, creating one of the largest empires the world has ever known. At its height, it stretched from the Pacific Ocean to eastern Europe. In 1207 the Tangut Empire to the north of Tibet fell to the advancing Mongols and, in 1271 the Mongol's Yuan Dynasty was established to rule the eastern regions of their empire. By 1279 the Chinese Sung Dynasty in southern China fell before the advancing armies and with this the Mongols completed their conquest of China. Today, Beijing portrays the Yuan as a Chinese dynasty and, thereby claims "ownership" of territories which lay in the eastern half of the farflung Mongol Empire.

Prince Goden, grandson of Genghis Khan, despatched an expedition to Tibet in 1240 and invited one of Tibet's eminent spiritual hierarchs, Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyaltsen (1182-1251), to his court, thus establishing an enduring Tibetan-Mongol relationship. This was the beginning of a cho-yön (priest-patron) relationship. Kublai Khan, who succeeded Goden Khan, embraced Tibetan Buddhism and adopted Drogon Choegyal Phagpa, nephew of Sakya Pandita, as his spiritual mentor.

This cho-yön relationship resulted in Kublai adopting Buddhism as his empire's state religion, and appointing Phagpa as its...
highest spiritual authority. In gratitude, Kublai Khan offered his Tibetan lama political authority over all Tibet in 1254, conferring various titles on him.

These early chö-yön relationships were followed by many parallel connections between Mongol princes and Tibetan noble families or Tibetan lamas. This uniquely Central Asian interdependence also formed the basis of later relations between the Manchu Dynasty and successive Dalai Lamas. The chö-yön relationship itself was purely a personal one arising from the religious devotion of the patron for the teacher and continued to exist even if the political status of the patron changed. This was evident in the Mongol-Tibetan relationship, which continued to exist even after the fall of the Yuan Dynasty.

An essential element of the chö-yön relationship was the protection that the patron provided to his lama in return for religious teachings and blessings—not for his allegiance. Some chö-yön relationships acquired important political dimensions and the patron was expected to provide military support to protect the lama and his teaching or "church". Superiority of the protector was not implied—as Chinese propaganda suggests—since the lay patron was the disciple and worshipper of his lama.

When Buddhism became the state religion in the eastern regions of the Mongol empire, and the Sakya Lama (Phagpa) its highest spiritual authority, the Mongol-Tibetan relationship could best be described as mutual interdependence. This concept provided for dual political and religious paramountcy of the worldly emperor and the spiritual leader on the basis of equality and interdependence. While the spiritual leader depended on the emperor for protection and backing in ruling over Tibet, the conquering emperor depended on the lama to provide legitimacy for his rule of the Mongol Empire.

It is undeniable that Mongol emperors spread their influence over Tibet. But, contrary to China's assertion that, "In the mid-13th century Tibet was officially incorporated into the territory of China's Yuan Dynasty"¹⁸, none of the Mongol rulers ever made any attempt to administer Tibet directly. Tibet did not even pay taxes to the Mongol empire, and it was certainly never considered a part of China by the Mongol emperors.

Tibet broke its political relationship with the Mongols in 1350 when the Tibetan king, Changchub Gyaltse (reign: 1350-1364), replaced the Sakya lamas as the most powerful ruler of Tibet. Changchub Gyaltse eliminated Mongol influences from the Tibetan administrative system and introduced a new and distinctly Tibetan one.¹⁹ He also enacted a Code of Law (Trimyig Shelchey Chonga; “the 15-Article Code”) for the administration of justice in the kingdom. The Chinese overthrew Mongol rule and established the Ming Dynasty 18 years later.
Relations with Chinese emperors: 1368-1644

Beijing claims that the Chinese Ming Dynasty “replaced the Yuan Dynasty in China and inherited the right to rule Tibet.” But there is no historical basis for this assertion. As shown above, the relationship between Mongol khans or emperors and Tibetan lamas pre-dated the Mongol conquest of China. Additionally, Tibet broke with the Mongol emperors before China regained its independence from them. The Chinese Ming emperors inherited no relationship from their predecessors, the Mongols. On the other hand, Mongol khans continued to maintain their profound religious and cultural ties with Tibetans over later centuries—often in the form of the chö-yön relationship.

Even if the Mongols did exercise an influence in Tibet, it is too presumptuous on the part of China to claim inheritance of Tibet through erstwhile Mongol rulers of China when today the Republic of Mongolia exists as the legitimate representative of the Mongolian people and nation.

Contacts between Tibet and Ming China were spasmodic and largely limited to visits by individual lamas from various—sometimes rival—monasteries to China, and the granting of honorific imperial titles or gifts by the Chinese emperor to them. These visits are recorded in Tibetan annals of the fifteenth to seventeenth century, but there is no evidence whatsoever of the political subordination of Tibet or its rulers to China or the Ming emperors. Beijing now alleges that these contacts with individual lamas demonstrate Ming authority in and over Tibet. But since none of those lamas ruled Tibet, their contacts with China—of whatever nature—could not affect the independent status of Tibet.

From 1350 Tibet was ruled by the princes of Phagmodru and then, from about 1481, by the Rimpung dynasty. In 1406 the ruling Phagmodru prince, Dakpa Gyaltsen, turned down an imperial invitation to visit China. This clearly shows the sovereign authority of Tibetan rulers at that time. From about 1565 until the rise to power of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1642 (two years before the fall of the Ming Dynasty), the kings of Tsang ruled Tibet. There are indications of sporadic diplomatic relations between some of these rulers and Ming emperors, but the latter exercised neither authority nor influence over the former.

In 1644 the Chinese emperors were once again overthrown by foreign conquerors. The Manchus succeeded in establishing their own Qing Dynasty, ruling over a vast empire the most important portion of which was China.

Relations with the Manchus: 1639-1911

In 1642 the Great Fifth Dalai Lama, with the military backing of his Mongol patron Gushri Khan, became the supreme political and religious ruler of a unified Tibet. Tibetans regarded him as their “Gongsa Chenpo” or “Supreme Sovereign” and his prestige was recognized far beyond Tibet’s borders. The Great Fifth not only maintained a close
relationship with the Mongols but also
developed intimate ties with early Manchu
rulers.

In 1639, before the Dalai Lama assumed
supreme political power and also before the
Manchu conquest of China and the
establishment of the Qing Dynasty, Emperor
Tai Tsung invited the Dalai Lama to his
capital, Mukden (present-day Shenyang).
Unable to accept the invitation personally, the
Dalai Lama sent an envoy who was treated
with great respect by the emperor. Thus the
chö-yön relationship between the Dalai Lama
and the Manchu rulers was established.

Just as in the case of the Tibetan
relationship with Mongol emperors, the links
developed between Tibetans and Manchu
emperors did not involve China. As the
eminent Sinologist Owen Lattimore points
out in reference to the Qing Dynasty, “what
existed in fact was a Manchu Empire, of
which China formed only one part.”

Having conquered China and annexed it to
the larger Manchu Empire, Emperor
Shunzi invited the Fifth Dalai Lama for a state
visit to the imperial capital in 1653. In an
unprecedented show of respect, the Manchu
emperor made a four-day journey beyond his
capital (Peking) to receive the Tibetan
sovereign and foremost spiritual leader of
Central Asian Buddhists. Commenting on the
Dalai Lama’s visit, W.W. Rockhill, an
American scholar and diplomat in China,
wrote: “(The Dalai Lama) had been treated
with all the ceremony which could have been
accorded to any independent sovereign, and
nothing can be found in Chinese works to
indicate that he was looked upon in any other
light; at this period of China’s relations with
Tibet, the temporal power of the Lama,
backed by the arms of Gusri Khan and the
devotion of all Mongolia, was not a thing for
the Emperor of China to question.”

On this occasion the Fifth Dalai Lama and
Emperor Shunzi bestowed unprecedented
high complimentary titles upon each other
and the chö-yön relationship was reaffirmed.
Beijing only cites the honorific title then given
by the emperor to the Dalai Lama, but fails to
mention the equivalent honorific title granted
by the Dalai Lama to the emperor. Chinese
propaganda infers that it was this deed by the
Manchu Emperor which conferred the legal
right to the Dalai Lama to rule over Tibet.
This interpretation intentionally misses the
point of the event— namely that titles were
exchanged by two sovereign leaders. If the
Dalai Lama was dependent on his imperial
title for the exercise of his authority, then so
was the Manchu Emperor dependent on the
title granted by the Dalai Lama for the
exercise of his authority.

Throughout the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911) relations between Tibet and the
Manchu rulers remained formally based on
the chö-yön relationship. In 1720 the Manchu
Emperor readily responded to the appeals for
help to drive out invading Dzungar Mongols
and escort the newly-discovered Seventh Dalai
Lama to the Tibetan capital.
Manchu forces entered Tibet on three more occasions in the 18th century; once to protect Tibet against an invading Gorkha force from Nepal (1792), and twice to restore order after civil wars (1728 and 1751). Each time they came at the request of the Tibetans, and each time the chö-yön relationship was invoked.

The Manchus did succeed in establishing some degree of influence in Tibet during those periods of crisis. But their influence declined rapidly afterwards, rendering them unable to play any role when Tibet dealt with incursions from Jammu (1841-1842), Nepal (1855-1856), and British India (1903-1904). By the mid-19th century the Manchu emperor’s role (and the related role of the amban or ambassador) was only nominal.

China’s propaganda often invokes Emperor Qianlong’s so-called 29-article edict, or regulations, of 1793 concerning Tibet, and the appointment of ambans (ambassadors). It presents the “regulations” as if they were an imperial order proving extensive Manchu authority in Tibet. In reality, the 29 points were suggestions made by the emperor for certain reforms of the Government of Tibet following the Gorkha invasion the year before. The ambans were not viceroyos or administrators, but were essentially ambassadors appointed to look after Manchu interests and to protect the Dalai Lama on behalf of the emperor.

In 1792, when Nepal invaded Tibet following a series of disputes, the Dalai Lama appealed to the Manchu emperor for assistance. The emperor sent a large army which helped Tibet in driving out the Gorkhas, and mediated a peace treaty between Tibet and Nepal. Since this was the fourth time the Qing emperor had been called upon to send troops to defend the Tibetan Government, he wanted some say in Tibetan affairs in order to prevent Tibetans from becoming involved in conflicts which might again precipitate requests for the Manchu court’s military involvement. Qianlong’s “regulations” were suggestions made in the context of the emperor’s protector role, rather than an order from a ruler to his subjects. This emerges clearly from the statement made by the imperial envoy and commander of the Manchu army, General Fu K’ang-an, to the Eighth Dalai Lama, which reads:

The Emperor issued detailed instructions to me, the Great General, to discuss all the points, one by one, in great length. This demonstrates the Emperor’s concern that Tibetans come to no harm and that their welfare be ensured in perpetuity. There is no doubt that the Dalai Lama, acknowledging his gratitude to the Emperor, will accept these suggestions once all the points are discussed and agreed upon. However, if the Tibetans insist on clinging to their age-old habits, the Emperor will withdraw the Ambans and garrison after the troops are pulled out. Moreover, if similar incidents occur in future, the Emperor will have nothing to do with them. The Tibetans may, therefore, decide for themselves as to what is in their favour and
Rather than accepting or rejecting the emperor's suggestion, Tibetans adopted some of the 29 points which were perceived to be beneficial to them, and disregarded those they found to be inappropriate. As Panchen Choekyi Nyima, predecessor of the late Panchen Lama, said: “Where Chinese policy was in accordance with their own views, the Tibetans were ready to accept the amban's advice; but... if this advice ran counter in any respect to their national prejudices, the Chinese Emperor himself would be powerless to influence them.”

Among the major suggestions in this “29-point edict” was the emperor's proposal for the selection of great incarnate lamas, including the Dalai Lamas and the Panchen Lamas, by drawing lots from a golden urn. This important task, however, remained the responsibility of the Tibetan Government and high lamas, who continued to select reincarnations according to religious traditions. The important thing in this case was to recognize a boy who was the true incarnation of the departed lama's consciousness. Sometimes, when two or more candidates displayed equally promising spiritual signs, making it impossible to decide as to who was the right reincarnate, the Tibetans used the golden urn as the last resort. This happened in the cases of the 10th, 11th and 12th Dalai Lamas. However, the ninth, 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas were recognized without using the golden urn.

Another important point of this “edict” was the role of ambans. The amban's role resembled that of an ambassador, at times, and that of a resident in a classical protectorate relationship, at other times. This is best defined in the explanation Amban Yu Tai gave in 1903 to Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India (as reported by him), “he was only a guest in Lhasa—not a master—and he could not put aside the real masters, and as such he had no force to speak of.”

The unprecedented invasion of Tibet by Manchu troops in 1908 was a turning point in relations between Tibet and the Manchu emperor. Previous imperial military expeditions had come to assist the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government at their invitation. But this time, the Manchu emperor attempted to establish his authority in Tibet by force, largely to remove increasing British influence in Tibet. In 1910 the Dalai Lama fled to neighbouring India, but the occupation of Tibet was short-lived. When the Manchu Emperor tried to “depose” the Dalai Lama in 1910, the Dalai Lama declared the termination of the chö-yön relationship. The protector had attacked his lama and, thereby, violated the very foundation of their relationship.

Resistance to the invasion succeeded when the Manchu Empire collapsed in 1911 and Tibetans forced the occupation army to surrender. That summer Nepalese mediation
between Tibet and China resulted in the conclusion of the “Three Point Agreement” providing for formal surrender and the expulsion of all remaining imperial troops. After returning to Lhasa, the 13th Dalai Lama issued a proclamation reaffirming the independence of Tibet on February 14, 1913.

**Relations with British India: 1857-1911**

Since the end of the 18th century, Britain developed a keen interest in establishing trade with Tibet. Seeing that all the Himalayan states which were closely linked to Lhasa had gradually been tied to British India by means of treaties and other agreements, Tibet feared it would also lose its independence if it did not resist British efforts to gain access to Tibet. The 13th Dalai Lama steered Tibet on an independent course. This policy frustrated the British who feared, more than anything, that a Russian infiltration into Tibet would tip the balance of power in Central Asia. Unable to communicate effectively with Tibet, Britain approached the Manchu court for assistance in forcing Tibet to cooperate. The result was the conclusion, without Tibet’s participation or knowledge, of two treaties (1890 and 1893) between Britain and China which had provisions regarding Tibet. The Tibetan Government rejected these treaties as ultra vires, and this precipitated the British invasion of Tibet in 1903. The Manchu emperor did not then come to the assistance of Tibet and, as noted by Amban Yu Tai, disclaimed any responsibility for the action of the Tibetans. British troops left Lhasa within a year, after concluding a bilateral treaty, the Lhasa Convention, with the Tibetan Government.

The provisions of the Lhasa Convention necessarily pre-supposed the unrestricted sovereignty of Tibet in internal and external matters, otherwise Tibet could not legitimately have transferred to Britain the powers specified in the treaty. The Lhasa Convention did not even acknowledge the existence of any special relationship between the Manchu Emperor and Tibet. The very act of concluding this Convention constituted an implicit recognition by Britain of Tibet as a state competent to conclude treaties on its own behalf without having to consult any external power.

In an effort to persuade China to cooperate, Britain convinced it to sign the Adhesion Agreement in 1906, once again, without the participation and knowledge of Tibet. That agreement and the 1907 agreement concluded between Britain and Russia, confirmed the existence of a sphere of British influence in Tibet and introduced the concept of Chinese “suzerainty” over Tibet — something neither Tibet nor the Manchu court accepted.

In 1908, during Tibet’s brief invasion by the Manchu army, Britain again signed a treaty concerning trade with Tibet with the Manchus, with no independent Tibetan participation.
Referring to the British concept of suzerainty, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, observed: “Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is a constitutional fiction — a political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties. ... As a matter of fact, the two Chinese [i.e. Manchu] Ambans at Lhasa are there not as Viceroyos, but as Ambassadors.”

Relations with independent India

When India became independent in 1947, it took over the British diplomatic Mission in Lhasa, and inherited the treaty relations of Britain with Tibet. Its recognition of Tibet was clear from the official communication the Indian Government sent to the Tibetan Foreign Office: “The Government of India would be glad to have an assurance that it is the intention of the Tibetan Government to continue relations on the existing basis until new arrangements are reached on matters that either party may wish to take up. This is the procedure adopted by all other countries with which India has inherited treaty relations from His Majesty's Government.”

It is thus clear that China never exercised active rule over Tibet at any period of her history. All the countries with whom Tibet had relations treated its government as independent from China. There were times when Britain and Russia, unable to contact the Tibetan Government directly, signed treaties with China in order to secure privileges in Tibet. On their part, the Manchu rulers of China were too happy to grant such privileges as these treaties supported their pretension to sovereignty over Tibet. However, Tibet ignored those treaties, forcing these governments to deal directly with Tibet.
Traditional Tibetan society—like most of its Asian contemporaries—was backward and badly in need of reforms. However, it is completely wrong to use the word “feudal” from the perspective of medieval Europe to describe traditional Tibetan society. Tibet before the invasion, in fact, was far more egalitarian than most Asian countries of that time. Hugh Richardson, who spent a total of nine years in Tibet as Britain’s last and independent India’s first representative, wrote: “Even communist writers have had to admit there was no great difference between rich and poor in [pre-1949] Tibet.” Similarly, the International Commission of Jurists’ Legal Inquiry Committee points out that: “Chinese allegations that the Tibetans enjoyed no human rights before the entry of the Chinese were found to be based on distorted and exaggerated accounts of life in Tibet.”

In terms of social mobility and wealth distribution, independent Tibet compared favourably with most Asian countries of the time. The Dalai Lama, head of both the spiritual and secular administration, was found through a system of reincarnation that ensured that the rule of Tibet did not become hereditary. Most of the Dalai Lamas, including the 13th and the 14th, came from common, peasant families in remote regions of the plateau.

Every administrative post below the Dalai Lama was held by an equal number of monk and lay officials. Although lay officials hereditarily held posts (however, the posts
themselves were not hereditary), those of monks were open to all. A large proportion of monk officials came from non-privileged backgrounds.

Furthermore, Tibet's monastic system provided unrestrained opportunities for social mobility. Admission to monastic institutions in Tibet was open to all and the large majority of monks, particularly those who rose through its ranks to the highest positions, came from humble backgrounds, often from far-flung villages in Kham and Amdo. This is because the monasteries offered equal opportunities to all to rise to any height through their own scholarship. A popular Tibetan aphorism says: “If the mother's son has knowledge, the golden throne of Gaden [the highest position in the hierarchy of the Gelugpa School of Tibetan Buddhism] has no ownership.”

The peasants, whom the Chinese propaganda insists on calling “serfs”, had a legal identity, often with documents stating their rights, and also had access to courts of law. Peasants had the right to sue their masters and carry their case in appeal to higher authorities.

Ms. Dhondub Choedon comes from a family that was among the poorest social strata in independent Tibet. Reminiscing on her life before the Chinese occupation, she writes: “I belong to what the Chinese now term as serfs of Tibet... There were six of us in the family... My home was a double-storeyed building with a walled compound. On the ground floor we used to keep our animals. We had four yaks, 27 sheep and goats, two donkeys and a land-holding of four and a half khel (0.37 hectares) ... We never had any difficulty earning our livelihood. There was not a single beggar in our area.”

Throughout Tibetan history, the maltreatment and suppression of peasants by estate-holders was forbidden by law as well as by social convention. From the time of the seventh century Tibetan Emperor Songtsen Gampo, many Tibetan rulers issued codes based on the Buddhist principle of “Ten Virtues of the Dharma”. The essence of this was that the rulers should act as parents to their subjects.

In 1909 the 13th Dalai Lama issued a regulation conferring on all peasants the right to appeal directly to him in case of mistreatment by estate holders. As a matter of fact, Tibetan society frowns upon unkind acts. The Tibetan Buddhist belief in compassion acts as a check on uncharitable deeds—not only against fellow human beings, but even against animals.

Capital punishment was banned in Tibet, and physical mutilation was a punishment that could be inflicted by the Central Government in Lhasa alone. In 1898, Tibet enacted a law abolishing such forms of punishment, except in cases of high treason or conspiracy against the state.

All land belonged to the state which granted estates to monasteries and to individuals who had rendered service to the state. The state, in turn, received revenues and
service from estate holders. Lay estate holders either paid land revenues or provided one male member in each generation to work as a government official. Monasteries performed religious functions for the state and, most vitally, served as schools, universities and centres for Tibetan art, craft, medicine and culture. The role of monasteries as highly disciplined centres of Tibetan education was the key to the traditional Tibetan way of life. Monasteries bore all expenses for their students and provided them with free board and lodging. Some monasteries had large estates; some had endowments which they invested. But other monasteries had neither of these. They received personal gifts and donations from devotees and patrons. The revenue from these sources was often insufficient to provide the basic needs of large monk populations. To supplement their income, some monasteries engaged in trade and acted as money lenders.

The largest proportion of land in old Tibet was held by peasants who paid their revenue directly to the state, and this became the main source of the government food stocks which were distributed to monasteries, the army, and officials without estates. Some paid in labour, and some were required to provide transport services to government officials, and in some cases to monasteries. Land held by the peasant was heritable. He could lease it to others or mortgage it. He could be dispossessed of his land only if he failed to pay the dues of produce or labour, which were not excessive. In practice, he had the rights of a free-holder, and dues to the state were a form of land tax paid in kind rather than rent.

A small section of the Tibetan population, mostly in U-Tsang Province, were tenants. They held their lands on the estates of aristocrats and monasteries, and paid rent to the estate-holders either in kind or by sending one member of the family to work as a domestic servant or agricultural labourer. Some of these tenant farmers rose to the powerful position of estate secretary. (For this, they were labelled by the Chinese as “agents of feudal lords”). Other members of these families had complete freedom. They were entitled to engage in any business, follow any profession, join any monastery or work on their own lands. Although they were known as tenants, they could not be evicted from their lands at the whim of estate holders. Some tenant-farmers were quite wealthy.

The present 14th Dalai Lama attempted in his youth to introduce far-reaching administrative and land reforms. He proposed that all large estate holdings of monasteries and individuals be acquired by the state for distribution amongst peasants. He created a special reform committee which reduced land taxes on peasants. The reform committee was authorized to hear and redress complaints by individuals against the district or local authorities. He approved the proposal for debt exemption submitted by this committee. Peasant debtors were categorized into three groups; those who could not pay either their
accumulated interest or repay capital were freed from debt altogether; those who could not pay the interest out of their annual earnings, but had saved up enough to repay the capital, were ordered to make repayments in instalments and those who had become wealthy over the course of years were made to pay both capital and interest in instalments. The Dalai Lama ordered that in future no transport service should be demanded without the special sanction of the government. He also increased the rates to be paid for transport services. 32

Famine and starvation were unheard of in independent Tibet. There were, of course, years of poor harvest and crop failures. But people could easily borrow from the buffer stock held by the district administrations, monasteries, aristocrats and rich farmers. Sadly, Tibet has seen little development over the past few decades as far as the quality of life of its people is concerned. In fact, when Hu Yaobang, former Communist Party Secretary, saw the extent of the poverty in Central Tibet in 1980, he stated that the living standard should be brought up at least to the pre-1959 level. On the other hand, most Asian and African countries have since then developed immensely as a result of decolonization and improvement in the level of people's education.

Democracy in the exile community

In 1959, soon after his flight from Tibet, the Dalai Lama re-established his government in India and initiated a series of democratic reforms. A popularly-elected body of people's representatives, the parliament-in-exile, was constituted. In 1961 the Dalai Lama prepared a draft constitution for future Tibet and sought the opinion of Tibetans on this matter. In 1963 a detailed draft constitution for future Tibet was promulgated. Despite strong opposition, the Dalai Lama insisted on the inclusion of a clause empowering the Tibetan parliament to revoke his executive powers by a majority of two-thirds of its total members in consultation with the Supreme Court if this was seen to be in the highest interests of the nation.

On March 10, 1969 the Dalai Lama announced that on the day Tibet regains its independence the Tibetan people must decide for themselves what system of government they want.

In 1990 further democratic changes were introduced by increasing the strength of the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies (ATPD) from 12 to 46. It was given more constitutional powers such as the election of kalons (ministers), who were previously appointed directly by the Dalai Lama. The Supreme Justice Commission was set up to look into people's grievances against the Administration.

In 2001 the Tibetan parliament, on the advice of the Dalai Lama, amended the exile Tibetan constitution to provide for the direct election of the Chief Kalon (in effect the prime minister) by the exile population. The
Chief Kalon, in turn, is to submit a list of his cabinet colleagues for the approval of the Assembly. Thus, the exile Tibetan community has now become democratic in the full sense of the word.

Looking to future Tibet, the Dalai Lama, in February 1992, announced the Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity and the Basic Features of its Constitution, wherein he stated that he would not “play any role in the future government of Tibet, let alone seek the Dalai Lama’s traditional political position”. The future government of Tibet, the Dalai Lama said, would be elected by the people on the basis of adult franchise.

The Dalai Lama also announced that during the transition period, between the withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Tibet and the final promulgation of the Constitution, the administrative responsibilities of State would be entrusted to the Tibetan functionaries presently working in Tibet. During this transitional period, an interim president will be appointed to whom the Dalai Lama will delegate all his political powers. The Tibetan Government-in-Exile will ipso facto cease to exist.

The Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity also states: “Future Tibet shall be a peace-loving nation, adhering to the principles of ahimsa (non-violence). It shall have a democratic system of government committed to preserving a clean, healthy and beautiful environment. Tibet shall be a completely demilitarized nation.”

The Tibetan struggle is not to resurrect the old Tibetan social system as Beijing claims. The relentless Chinese attempts at personalizing the Tibetan issue to make it hinge upon the Dalai Lama’s own status is a subterfuge to mask the main issue: the people’s own enduring national struggle for their right to determine their own destiny.

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