

Beijing's How to Win Friends and Influence People

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China's Propaganda Strategy Since the 1990s

One area where the Tibet issue has seriously damaged the image of China is in external publicity. In terms of international media coverage Dharamsala has made significant advances with Beijing fighting a rear-guard campaign.

This vulnerability has been noted by the Chinese authorities. In 1993, on the anniversary of the March 10 Uprising, "Old Tibet Hands" and experts met in Beijing to rectify the situation by devising a propaganda offensive on the issue of Tibet in an attempt to regain lost ground.

The meeting was attended by Zeng Jian-hui, Vice-Minister of the Propaganda Ministry, who articulated significant guidelines. The recommendations the group made had a critical impact on the formulation of the decisions made at the Third Work Forum on Tibet held the following year in Beijing.

The foremost concern of the group who met in 1993 was the realization that China was losing the propaganda war over the situation in Tibet. The dilemma which confronted Chinese officials was the western media's consistently positive—and often outraged—coverage of the Tibetan tragedy. The Beijing authorities noted that the Western media's repeated depiction of China as the big, bad bully in regard to Tibet undermined China's image and proved a major irritant in China's global diplomatic dealings.

The mandate of the group was to reverse this damaging trend by coming up with new and fresh ideas which would be translated into concrete and supposedly imaginative policy guidelines.

A history of war of words

A brief survey of the history of the war of words between the Tibetan movement and Beijing reveals the ground lost by the Chinese and gained by the exile Tibetans. This is illustrated by the apocryphal conversation that Mao Zedong had with Nikita Khrushchev when the Chinese leader briefed his Soviet counterpart on China's successful crackdown on the 1959 Tibetan Uprising and the mopping-up that followed. After Mao's glowing briefing, couched in communist rhetoric, about dealing a blow for the socialist world, Khrushchev asked Mao, "And what happened to the Dalai Lama?"

"He escaped," Mao replied smugly, with an air that said good riddance.

"Then you lost the war," said Khrushchev.

This conversational fragment comes down to us as an insight into the myths and legends that surround the Cold War era; most importantly it illustrates the extent to which the Tibetan refugees were able to make their voices heard in the world within a matter of several decades and change international public opinion in their favour on the vexed question of Tibet.

Earlier, when the PLA invaded the plateau in 1949, China was considered the new beacon of the socialist world—especially for countries which suffered western colonial domination. Because of Tibet's isolation, and its absence from influential global fora, international media coverage of the invasion became almost an afterthought and was ill-informed.

At the same time Communist China's propaganda machinery worked overtime to successfully put a spin on the event, depicting the invasion as a "liberation" of long-suffering "serfs" and "slaves". China was also, to some extent, successful in portraying those who

oppose the invasion as “running dogs of the capitalists” bent on wrecking the socialist camp. Tibet was projected as a Cold War issue which succeeded in silencing the socialist camp.

At the same time China could tell the world what it wanted the world to believe about Tibet, without any effective Tibetan response.

Beijing was largely helped in its monopoly of positive international news coverage of its rule in Tibet by leftist intellectuals and writers who sang praises of the new socialist Tibet. The avalanche of books by fellow-travellers was started by Roma and Stuart Gelder with their *Timely Rain* which put a positive spin on Chinese rule in Tibet and ended with Han Suyin's *Lhasa: the Open City* which painted a glowing picture of a progressive socialist Tibet.

In all this journalistic hype, the destruction which was inflicted across the plateau during Mao's “democratic reforms”, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution went unreported and was therefore a historic blank for the outside world. Autobiographical statements made by exile Tibetans describing the atrocities that were rife in Tibet were dismissed as “refugee statements” with the implication that refugees would naturally have a vested interest in saying bad things about China to justify their exile existence.

China's success over Tibet—both on the ground and over the airwaves—was complete. The invasion of Tibet was largely forgotten by the international community and the Chinese occupation of the roof of the world was hailed as a victory for the “liberated” toiling masses. In short, the international community considered the issue of Tibet a non-issue. In this vein some commentators described the Tibetan exiles' efforts to keep the issue alive as “beating a dead yak to life”.

But then international media coverage slowly reversed itself as Tibet became more known. Several factors were responsible. One was the frequent world tours of His Holiness the Dalai Lama since 1979. He was able to tell the Tibetan side of the story with great persuasiveness. His winning personality and transparent honesty instantly made powerful friends and supporters. The sustained efforts of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and the unwavering courage and determination of the Tibetan people kept the issue alive. The increasing western fascination with Tibetan Buddhism turned individuals' attention to Tibet's political fate—many of whom became vocal Tibet supporters.

China's limited opening up of Tibet to the outside world with liberalization attracted a flood of tourists in the early 1980s. The impact of Tibetan good cheer made an indelible impression on early tourists. They returned to their countries and formed Tibet Support Groups—working doggedly to see that the suffering undergone by Tibetans was accurately reported in the media.

The Tibetan official fact-finding delegations from Dharamsala—which China accepted into Tibet from 1979 to 1985—brought out evidence on still and movie films of the appalling conditions in Tibet and the depth of loyalty Tibetans still felt for His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

In the midst of this, a book appeared which helped to significantly change international opinion on the issue of Tibet. John Avedon's path-breaking *In Exile from the Land of Snows* gave the world the first detailed account of the Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule. It carried graphic accounts of horror stories during the Cultural Revolution and in the prisons and labour camps and of the strength of the Tibetan spirit to endure.

This book, written with elegance and with an insider's knowledge of people and events, triggered the trend of the present growing Western fascination with Tibet. Hollywood noticed this expanding market and decided to join the bandwagon by producing *Seven Years in Tibet* and *Kundun*, two films on pre-invasion Tibet, which reached out to millions of viewers around the world.

In the late 1980s a monitoring agency was launched in London which disseminated precise news of events unfolding inside Tibet. Tibet Information Network greatly enhanced the outside world's knowledge of political upheavals and sentiments inside Tibet. On top of this, thanks to US Congressional legislation in the early 1990s, a Tibetan language service of Voice of America was able to beam news directly to Tibet. It was later reinforced by the establishment of Radio Free Asia and Voice of Tibet's Tibetan language broadcasts. All three stations address Tibet directly and those living under China today describe these broadcasts as "medicine for a sick person".

Learning from Dharamsala

The purpose of the meeting of China's spin doctors in Beijing on March 10, 1993 was to ponder the factors which enabled the Tibetan leadership and people in exile to take a true great leap forward in stealing international public opinion in their favour under the very nose of China.

The media czar and propaganda chiefs met in Beijing to devise counter-strategies to win public opinion back. With typical Chinese logic they relied on Sun Tzu's classic *The Art of War* and also on some tricks learned from the Tibetan exiles' media strategy. "Know your enemy" is one of the injunctions of *The Art of War*.

Beijing was also concerned about the Tibetan exiles' successful efforts in "internationalizing the issue of Tibet". Because of the support drawn to the nonviolent appeal of the Tibetan struggle, the Chinese authorities realized that winning over international public opinion must be a key factor in the success of their own efforts.

"Our struggle against the Dalai Clique and the international enemy force is to a large degree carried out through propaganda and public opinion. External propaganda plays an outstanding and special role... Looking at it in a larger picture, the external propaganda work on the question of Tibet has a bearing not only on the development of Tibet, but also on the image of China as a whole in the world, as well as the creation of a good international environment for reform, open policy and the construction of the modernization of all China."¹

In reaching their objective, the officials—in a throwback to Cold War rhetoric—identified three areas as China's main problems. The first was the Dalai Clique; the second, hostile western forces and the third, foreign reporters. The officials suspected very strongly that there was a definite collusion between the three forces to destabilize China.

The other policy which was outlined in Beijing was to make a sustained effort to win over Tibetans living aboard and in this way isolate the establishment in Dharamsala headed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The officials also recommended that propaganda work in Tibet amongst the general populace be intensified.

The official identification of His Holiness the Dalai Lama as a problem, and heaping abuse upon him, became a major departure in policy. Even at the height of the demonstrations which rocked Lhasa in the later 1980s, Chinese officials were measured in their criticism of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. This is no longer so. The policy today is to "expose" the Dalai Lama and undermine his credibility not only as a religious leader and spokesperson for the Tibetan people, but importantly as a major voice on global affairs which Beijing sees as tarnishing its image.

In this regard Zeng Jian-hui, Vice-Minister of the Propaganda Ministry, said, "Fourthly, the strategy of their struggle continues to be double-faced. On the one hand, he (the Dalai Lama) stops at nothing in labelling himself as "a fighter for international human

rights”, “fighter for peace” and an “advocate of nonviolent struggle”. On the other hand, he secretly masterminds turbulence... Our external propaganda work should write articles in this respect to expose him.”²

World support alarms Beijing

Many recommendations made at the Beijing propaganda meeting were incorporated into decisions of the 1994 Third Forum on Work in Tibet. All the issues which hurt Beijing’s image were spelt out in the extensive comments Raidi made on the outcome of the Third Work Forum in Lhasa in 1994:

“By attacking the Dalai Clique we must try to gain support throughout space and in people’s hearts... By raising the standard of planning and anticipation, by improving the efficiency of propaganda work abroad, by using well our policies and tactics, and by improving our ability to carry out propaganda work abroad, we must gradually change the international point of view. We must boldly do propaganda work showing that Tibet is a part of China...”

“We must reveal the true colours of the Dalai Clique and the dark side of the serf system of old Tibet... The Western countries are supporting and encouraging the Dalai Clique and using the so-called Tibet issue to interfere in our country’s internal affairs... By working hard we must defeat their hope of internationalizing the Tibet issue.”³

One alarming trend for China is the growing grassroots support for Tibet. China’s alarm is revealed in the phrase “Western enemy forces”. Invention of this phrase is not only a contribution to China’s already rich vituperative vocabulary, but reveals Beijing’s nervousness when faced with the vital force of this support.

“Western enemy forces” covers everything from individual Western supporters to Western parliaments, human rights groups, aid organizations, NGOs and countries which routinely support tabling of human rights resolutions at the annual UN Human Rights Commissions in Geneva.

To counter this, Beijing’s propaganda team recommended that China’s publicity must focus on “overseas people”. The 1993 meeting recommended, “Multi-level and different forms of vivid and lively propaganda should be carried out regarding sovereignty and human rights record. Its aim is to promote the further understanding on the part of the overseas people of the question of Tibet so as to eliminate the impact created by the Dalai Clique and the international enemy forces through their distortions and attacks against us... and to win the support and sympathy of the overseas people for us.”⁴

To follow up on this recommendation Beijing has hosted a long list of parliamentarians, UN officials, foreign leaders, reporters and businessmen in Tibet. From 1997 to 1999 over 20 foreign delegations visited the plateau.⁵ Despite the VIP nature of these visits; China was unable to hide its atrocities. In May 1998, during an EU troika delegation’s visit to Lhasa, the inmates of Drapchi prison staged a protest demonstration to attract the delegates’ attention to the worsening plight of the Tibetan people. The guards reacted by torturing ten prisoners to death and executing the leader.

In changing the opinion of influential people on the situation in Tibet, China is successful to an extent. For example, in September 1999 the Australian National Party Member of Parliament, Garry Nehl, visited Tibet and told the Australian media. “I did not

see any roadblocks, checkpoints or any other signs of restrictions on freedom of movement. Equally, there were no restrictions on people entering monasteries or temples and throughout Lhasa there were a great many people perambulating themselves with prayer wheels and freely prostrating themselves on the ground in prayer.”⁶

However, China has focussed its greatest efforts on foreign correspondents in an attempt to make them rehash the Chinese side of the Tibet story. Official Chinese documents are unusually frank on this issue.

“We should reinforce the work of utilizing the power of foreign propaganda... Therefore, we should be more open-minded in our external propaganda work on Tibet. By arranging foreign journalists and other people to go to visit Tibet we should be able to use foreign forces to carry out our external propaganda and gradually change their minds about us through what they have seen with their own eyes.”⁷

Currently, China is pursuing this 1993 media policy with greater vigour. Beijing’s official news organ, *People’s Daily*, reported the visit on September 3, 2000 of a media delegation to Lhasa. The news item was headlined “Tibet Welcomes Foreign Journalists for Objective Reporting”. It reported that Raidi, Deputy Secretary of the “TAR” CCP, told the Thai media delegation that “The Dalai Lama, under the pretext of religion, engages in activities at splitting the country. His cheating and hypocrisy goes against the doctrine of Buddhism.” The news report stated that the Thai media group agreed with the Lhasa official’s observation. Tulaya Sirikulpipatana, head of the Thai delegation, allegedly told Raidi, “The purpose of the Dalai Lama to bring Tibet back to a society of surfs (sic) goes against historical trends.”

Furthermore, in July 2000 China invited N. Ram, the editor of *Frontline*, a weekly published from the south Indian city of Chennai, for a week-long visit to Tibet. His regurgitation of Chinese communist propaganda was splashed over 36 pages of the September 15 edition. Unusually for a professional journalist, N. Ram makes his bias clear right from the first sentence. He describes himself as an “Indian... who has no sympathy for the Dalai Lama’s separatist, revanchist and backward-looking agenda.”⁸

On September 7, 2000 the Taipei-based *New China News Agency* reported that a 17-member delegation, comprising representatives of major Taiwan media left Taipei that day for a “news coverage mission” to Tibet. They were joined in Chengdu, capital of Sichuan province, by Mainland Chinese media representatives. The news report said a total of 40 reporters from television companies, news agencies, newspapers and radio stations on both sides of the Taiwan Straits left for Tibet the next day on a 10-day visit.

The report stated that this was the first time that Taiwanese journalists have been allowed to provide coverage from Tibet. The NCNA further stated: “Mainland sources said the visit is a part of Beijing’s drive to publicize Tibet’s cultural, economic and human rights development over the past half-century under communist Chinese rule.”

In Lhasa the Taiwanese and Mainland journalists met with Raidi, who is increasingly prominent as the “TAR” spokesperson. Raidi delivered the standard line and said, “We firmly oppose any people, any group and any nation to interfere in China’s internal affairs by using the Dalai Clique and the so-called Tibet issue.”⁹

This imaginative initiative to venture into new—and what is still enemy territory—was decided by the 1993 Beijing meeting. The high-level resulting document called “Guidelines and Content of the External Propaganda Work on the Question of Tibet” said, “This year, on the premise of thoughtful planning and careful arrangement, we shall choose

the right time to properly arrange for foreign journalists and those from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan to visit Tibet.”¹⁰

Behind this savvy media strategy is Zhao Qizheng—a nuclear physicist brought to Beijing from Shanghai in 1998 to head the Information Office of the State Council, who thus in effect became China’s foremost spin doctor.¹¹ Zhao Qizheng doubled the frequency of media briefings and urged officials to be more accommodating to journalists. In June 2000 he called a meeting of Tibetologists and urged them to package Beijing’s propaganda in sound academic theories so that it becomes more palatable to western public opinion. Zhao unveiled Beijing’s strategy to infiltrate western academic circles under the guise of non-governmental organizations of Tibetologists in Tibet and China. This strategy, he said, would lure western academics to lend their voices to China’s propaganda on Tibet. As a matter of fact, Zhao is behind the new and refurbished charm offensive of Jiang Zemin, China’s President. During Jiang’s recent visit to New York to attend the millennium UN summit of world leaders, Zhao ventured into the lion’s den and addressed more than 100 reporters at the National Press Club, where he wondered aloud, “Why is the mainstream US media against China? Why should the US keep interfering in issues concerning China’s Taiwan, Tibet and religion?”¹²

However, despite the efforts of Zhao Qizheng—who has the backing of Washington’s powerful China lobby, the prestigious PR firm, Hill and Knowlton, and Henry Kissinger, it will take years for Beijing to enjoy good coverage on the issue of Tibet as long as China remains a one-party totalitarian system.

Rather than relying on media strategies, China will need to significantly improve the lot of the Tibetan people before its tarnished image is restored to greatness the Chinese people deserve.

NOTES:

1. Excerpted from a statement by Tenzin, Deputy Secretary of “TAR”, and published in “China’s Public Relations Strategy on Tibet”. Classified Documents from the Beijing Propaganda Conference, published by International Campaign for Tibet, Washington, D.C., 1993
2. Excerpted from a guidelines outlined by Zeng Jian-hui, Vice-Minister of Beijing’s Propaganda Ministry, Published *ibid*.
3. Excerpted from comments made by Raidi, Deputy Secretary of “TAR”, at the annual “TAR” Communist Party Committee meeting in Lhasa, September 5, 1994. These documents are now published as *Cutting Off the Serpent’s Head –Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995*, by the London-based Tibet Information Network and Human Rights Watch/Asia, New York, 1996
4. “China’s Public Relations Strategy on Tibet”— Classified Documents from the Beijing Propaganda Conference, published by ICT, Washington, DC, 1994
5. “Tibetan Stake in China-West Relations”, an article by Kalon Tempa Tsering. *Tibetan Bulletin*, November-December, 1999

6. “Australian Parliamentarians in Tibet: the Credibility Gap” in *Australia Tibet Council News*, October 1999
7. China’s Public Relations Strategy on Tibet: Classified Documents from the Beijing Propaganda Conference, published by ICT, D.C., 1993
8. *Frontline*, September 15, 2000
9. As quoted in *People’s Daily*, Beijing official organ, September 14, 2000
10. China’s Public Relations Strategy on Tibet, ICT., 1994
11. *Asiaweek*, September 22, 2000
12. *ibid*

Beijing Calls on Tibetologists to Support its Propaganda War

This is the translation of Zhao Qizheng's statement in Beijing at the conference on national research in Tibetology and external propaganda on Tibet. Zhao made this statement on 12 June 2000. He is minister in charge of the Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China. The original Chinese text of the speech follows this translation.

The specialists, scholars and comrades,

This conference is summoned to discuss our national Tibetology and external propaganda works on Tibet. The aim is to discuss how we, under the new situation, can make our Tibetology work more effective for external propaganda on Tibet. This is the first meeting to which we have invited you to discuss ways of improving Tibetology work from the point of view of external publicity. This is also the first meeting to discuss ways of improving our external publicity on Tibet from the perspective of Tibetology. At the outset, I, on behalf of the Central Government's Propaganda Department and State Council's Information Office, would like to ardently welcome the specialists and scholars to this meeting. I would also like to pay my respect to the specialists and scholars for their many years of efforts and exceptional achievement in Tibetology and external propaganda on Tibet.

External publicity on Tibet is an important element of our country's external propaganda. It is also a very important element of our struggle against the Dalai clique and hostile western forces. We need to carry out result-oriented and pinpointed research on Tibet issue. We also need to carry out diligent external propaganda on Tibet. These efforts are related not only to national and nationalities unity, but also to the open-door reform, progress and stability of our country. Therefore, this is the common responsibility of our propaganda department and cultural institutes.

Here, I would like to raise some points regarding the current situation of the struggle on the issue of Tibet and ways of improving our external propaganda on Tibet for the reflection of comrades.

The current situation of Tibet-related struggle:

The so-called issue of Tibet is the main pretext for western countries, including the United States, to westernize and split our country. Western countries, including the United States, want to topple our country and further the cause of their own social and value systems and national interests. In order to achieve this, they will never stop using the Tibet issue to westernize and split our country and weaken our power. The Dalai clique has never changed its splittist nature; it has never stopped its activities to split our country. Therefore, our struggle against the Dalai clique and hostile western forces is long-drawn, serious and complicated.

Presently, the struggle between us and the Dalai clique has taken a new turn. Since last year, western countries, mainly the United States, have started military intervention in the affairs of the Yugoslavian federation. This successful intervention in the name of ethnic

religion led to a serious development of a new culture of interventionism, which, in turn, has resulted in an increase in the use of Tibet issue. The US Administration is employing a double-faced strategy, by which it combines the pressure for Sino-Tibet dialogues with open support to the Dalai. The US support for the Dalai clique is becoming ever more pronounced. The Dalai clique, by strengthening its unholy alliance with international anti-China elements and powers, combines clamour for dialogues with activities to internationalize the Tibet issue. It employs carrot-and-stick policy to openly oppose and split China. Indications of its renewed violent activities are becoming more apparent.

First: The Dalai clique has taken one full forward step to increase its activities to push for the internationalization of the Tibet issue. It does this in the following manners:

One: the Dalai attends international conferences in the guise of personal visits. He frequently visits different countries in the name of spiritual teaching. In this way, he advertises Tibetan independence and consolidates his base in Europe and the United States. At the same time, he increasingly infiltrates the developing countries of South America, Asia and Africa, and lobbies high-level UN human rights experts for their concerns on Tibet issue. The ultimate aim is to put the issue of Tibet once again on the UN table. The Dalai clique's strategy is to split the Motherland, win political support and UN actions.

Western leaders cooperate with each other to offer ever more elaborate receptions to the Dalai and to upgrade the reception status for him. They make every possible effort to enhance the Dalai's image and make him an international figure. During their high-level meetings and courtesy calls, they tell each other about the Dalai and make joint attempts to put pressure on our nation and gain the position of mediator for themselves. In 1999 the Dalai paid 17 visits to 14 countries, a record in the last few years. Most remarkably, his 1999-itinerary included—apart from the United States and Europe where he travels frequently—major developing countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa, such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Israel, etc. This year the Dalai, more than ever before, has made efforts to visit southeast Asian countries like Thailand and South Korea around China through his contacts. The Tibet Support Group Conference, held some time back, openly proposed increasing the Groups' effectiveness in Latin America and Africa. It is possible that they will make every effort to establish Tibet Support Groups in many Asian countries.

Two: Organised splittist campaigns against China have accelerated with more openness and greater urgency. Over the past few years, the Dalai clique has taken advantage of anniversaries and UN-sponsored international conferences to repeatedly undertake varying commemorative campaigns and demonstrations in order to raise hullabaloo over Tibet issue in all directions. During every foreign visit of our leaders, last year, the Dalai clique, with covert incitement and help from western countries as well as Tibet Support Groups, interfered and created disruption through protest rallies. In this way, they gained the highest-level international platform and intervention. This year, the Dalai clique has made detailed plans to take advantage of every UN-sponsored international meeting to create publicity and generate pressure. In addition, the Dalai clique launched an unprecedentedly-strong campaign against China at the 56th UN Human Rights Commission.

Three: The Dalai clique has increased its activities to cement ties with other ethnic splittist forces and anti-China forces. In order to achieve the aim of Tibetan independence,

the Dalai clique has strengthened interdependent ties among different domestic and international splittist and anti-China forces, such as the independence movements of Taiwan and Xinjiang, democracy movements, Falung Gong and conservative elements. In this way, the Dalai clique tries to create a united anti-China force. When Chen Shuiben was elected the new leader of Taiwan, the Dalai and the exile Tibetan parliament sent congratulatory messages. Moreover, chairpersons of the exile government's parliament and cabinet were sent to attend his induction ceremony. This year, the Dalai has made every effort to visit Taiwan. Just five days after the swearing-in ceremony of Chen Shuiben, the Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan announced the establishment of Taiwan-Tibet Alliance. Moreover, in the name of external human rights relationship, the Taiwanese gave US\$ 120,000 to the Dalai clique. Furthermore, the Taiwanese in Los Angeles decided to observe every June as the Tibet Foundation month. They made statements and collected donations, and invited the Dalai to give a talk. At the same time, relationship between the Mongolian independence movement, Xinjiang independence movement, democracy movement, anti-China Tibet Support Groups in different countries and the Dalai has strengthened. The third Tibet Support Group Conference, held in May, decided to set up an International Network of Tibet supporter. The conference revised the strategy of the Dalai clique and Tibet Support Groups.

Secondly, with one full forward stride, the Dalai clique has intensified the splittist campaign of Tibetan independence movement. The Dalai said that whether the Tibetan independence movement succeeded or not would depend ultimately on the Tibetans in Tibet. The best course, he said, is for all Tibetans to take the responsibility of their own development. In the last few years, the Dalai clique has openly focussed its splittist campaign on weakening China's economic power and interfering in our nation's economic relations with other countries. Since last year, the Dalai groups, with support from anti-China western forces, have undertaken campaigns to cut off the World Bank loan to our population movement program in the Tulan county of Qinghai province, to disrupt PetroChina's entry into the American stock market, to prevent our entry into WTO, to obstruct the granting of US permanent trade relations status to China, and to get people in different countries to boycott our goods. Under the pretext of environment and development issues, they submitted petitions, openly targeting our economic interests.

The action plan of the third Tibet Support Group Conference, organized not very long ago, was focussed on strategy. It openly proposed international campaigns to obstruct or completely stop the Chinese government projects and joint-venture foreign investments that do not benefit the people of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Also, in the recent years the Dalai clique, with the help of western non-governmental organizations, has deepened its infiltration into the western cultural and educational circles, thereby, establishing a broad base for Tibetan independence. By recruiting the youth, the Dalai clique gives Tibetan independence the nature of cultural grassroots level movement. At the same time, the Dalai clique has formed the so-called football club to infiltrate the international sports circle.

Thirdly, the Dalai clique's activities have become more beguiling than ever before; they have intensified their pressure tactics through apolitical propaganda. Following the direction of the United States and other western countries, the Dalai clique has recently changed its strategy. During public gatherings, the Dalai portrays himself as a humble spiritual teacher and pretends to be seeking dialogues and autonomy. He lays pretence to

non-violence and makes utmost efforts not to mix politics in his talks. He speaks on religion, ethics, culture, democracy, freedom and human rights. This has gained him unprecedented international support and solidarity.

One: In tune with the international trend for resolving conflicts through dialogues and discussions, the Dalai clique clamours everywhere for dialogues and puts public opinion pressure on our country.

Two: Since western countries recognize Tibet as an inalienable part of China, the Dalai states that he has given up independence in favour of autonomy. In this way, he mobilizes the public opinion in favour of joint intervention and pressure for dialogues.

Three: Waving the banner of democracy and human rights, the Dalai publicizes that he does not want to revive Tibet's old social system. Instead, he expresses the need to have democracy in Tibet. By using democracy and human rights to gain western favour, the Dalai tries his best to westernize and split our country.

Four: The Dalai says all kinds of things in the name of religion and culture. He accuses our country of destroying the religion and culture of Tibet; he claims that he is seeking autonomy to protect Tibetan culture and religious freedom. Taking advantage of this opportunity, he tries to gain the solidarity and support of international community.

Five: The Dalai makes public opinion about his own reincarnation. He shouts that his reincarnation will be born outside China in a free, democratic country. He has created the theory that a reincarnation can be born even while the lama is alive; the hidden agenda is the perpetuation of the long-drawn, complex issue of Tibet. At the same time, the Dalai clique infiltrates our country through a number of secret means, such as by using the religious issue. For example, he masterminded pressure tactics on the Shugden issue. He incited the Karmapa, spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, to turn against his country and flee to the foreign country. In this way, he disrupts Tibet's security.

The world media is monopolised by westerners. The Dalai clique's long deceptive propaganda, having taken a lead, has a good standing in the world public opinion. In addition, they use modern media facilities like Internet, films, television, etc. to carry out massive propaganda in a number of imaginative ways. As a result of this, lies advocated and spread by them are considered as reliable facts on the issue of Tibet. The westerners' powerful machinery for making public opinion has created a lot of misunderstanding about our country in the minds of foreigners. Similarly, there are lots of biased views. On top of this, the eastern and western views on human rights are different. Our value system is different from that of the west. Our historical development, religion, and level of economic development are also different from theirs. This makes our thinking different. Therefore, there are numerous reasons why we cannot afford to take lightly our struggle against the Dalai clique and our external propaganda work on the Tibet issue. We must take this work very serious. The coming period will be very crucial for our struggle against the Dalai clique. In a short time, it is difficult to reverse the present situation where the enemy's fortune on the international arena is running high and ours low. Our struggle for the international public opinion will be more rigorous and complicated than ever before. Our external propaganda work on Tibet will be very difficult. Therefore, we must work hard and make improvements.

At the same time, we must know the overall benefit of our external propaganda on Tibet and favourable conditions for carrying this out.

First of all, reflecting the importance attached to this work by the Communist Central Government, President Jiang Zemin himself has in the recent years given systematic guidance on struggle against the Dalai and on external propaganda on Tibet. The Central Government has decided the major political strategies. Our most important political responsibility is to publicize our work in Tibet and to struggle for international public opinion.

The second condition is that Tibet is part of China. This is a fact accepted by the governments of all countries. Basically, ours is a just struggle against the splittists while the Dalai clique's splittist campaign is unjust and has few friends.

Thirdly, Tibet is under the effective control of the Central Government. We have implemented the Party's benevolent nationality religious policy in Tibet and made its people rich. The progress and development of Tibet is apparent to all. We have the truth and others' support on our side. Therefore, we need not fear any ideology or argument. This is the most favourable condition on our side.

Fourthly, our political security, economic development, social progress, nationality unity, and ever-increasing international prestige are favourable conditions for the success of our works.

Fifthly, the Dalai is nearing his end, and the exile Tibetans' internal differences are becoming more acute. Therefore, we have time on our side.

Sixthly, we have had considerable experience in the field of external propaganda on Tibet. For the first time, we have formed a group of well-trained Tibetologists. More importantly, under the overall leadership of the Central Government, all our concerned agencies are able to struggle unitedly as one entity. All of these are new opportunities for strengthening and improving our external propaganda on Tibet.

Tibetology institutes and specialists must use their potential, as this is an indispensable part of our external propaganda on Tibet in the new era:

Since 1991 the Central Government's External Propaganda Department has organized a series of annual meetings to review, plan and organize our external propaganda work on Tibet. Our external propaganda against the Dalai clique and hostile western forces has continued to make improvements over the past decade. With the passage of time, our propaganda has become more effective, and our target and goal clearer. We have formed a special group to carry out external propaganda and have succeeded in protecting our national interests and improving our image. We have made relentless efforts over the past decade to publicize Tibet's progress and development. We have pin-pointed and exposed their, mainly the Dalai's, crime, refuted their claims and created public opinion on Tibet issue. We have published two White Papers, entitled *Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation*, and *New*

Progress in Human Rights in Tibet Autonomous Region. In addition, under the direction of the Central Government's External Propaganda Department, we have published over 500 news reports and made nearly 100 films and television programs, exposing the Dalai clique's crime, which were distributed in over 100 regions. We have also published and distributed over 2 million copies of more than 60 types of Tibet-related information material, such as articles, translations, booklets, flyers, posters, etc. We have sent 23 groups of artistes to give performances at international cultural and experience-sharing fora in more than 80 cities of over 40 countries. They have given more than 400 performances to over 800,000 people. Different types of exhibitions from over 50 countries, including France, Italy, India and Australia, were held successfully. We have invited over 400 foreign delegations—consisting of over 2,000 journalists, in addition to government officials, members of upper and lower parliament houses and other dignitaries—for visits to Tibet. These programs were very effective in making the international community understand the true situation of Tibet, in clearing up the concerned foreign dignitaries' misunderstanding on Tibet, in challenging the Dalai clique and hostile western forces' rumours, and in undermining the influence of hostile international elements. In this way, we have made a fairly good beginning in building favourable international public opinion.

However, our propaganda has not progressed enough to meet the expectations of the Communist Central Government and requirements of the struggle on Tibet issue. And, it is out of tune with the reality of Tibet. We still do not have many avenues of external propaganda; our achievement is unsatisfactory. We have not been able to translate the truth and resources at our disposal into international propaganda advantage. Therefore, our voice in the international arena is still modest.

That is why the ninth meeting on Tibet-related external propaganda, held in the early part of this year, gave us a vision by proposing a study of changing times as a base on which to build a coordinated, idea-oriented, focussed and effective external propaganda to thoroughly expose the Dalai's crime. It also proposed creating websites on the issue. We have made efforts to this effect too. One noteworthy part of our effort was the formation of the group of Tibetology institutes and specialists in tune with the trend of time. We have to channelize the truth, resources and huge contingent of Tibetologists at our disposal to obtain special result that are greater than ever before.

As you all know, since the end of the cold war, non-governmental organizations have proliferated and become an important force with influence on international relations and development. The world is known as a global village. Statistics show that there are now 30,000 non-governmental organizations, playing active roles throughout the world. Out of them, 1,500 are recognized by the United Nations. The number of western non-governmental organizations with connections to Tibet is extremely large; most of them serve the political interests of western anti-China forces and the Dalai clique. The Dalai forces and their voice dominate the non-governmental organizations with Tibet connections. Most members of these organizations are intellectuals and specialists. Books and commentaries written by them, as renowned grassroots level scholars, have strong influence on the western public and international fora.

Therefore, as stressed by the ninth meeting on Tibet-related external propaganda, we should maximize the use of our 50 Tibetology centres and 1,000 Tibetologists to carry out

external propaganda work on Tibet. Under appropriate banners of non-governmental organization, they should form a national force of Tibetologists and participate in Tibet-related activities of international non-governmental organizations. Our Tibet specialists should make well-planned visits to foreign countries. Similarly, foreign Tibetologists should be invited to our country for conferences on Tibet. In this way, we should promote cultural exchange, discussion, cooperation, and friendship with foreigners. We should enhance our influence on international Tibetologists. By means of cultural exchange, we should enhance our influence on western community and its opinion. By means of culture, we should promote effective struggle for favourable public opinion regarding our work in Tibet.

We should develop suitable research projects by using our Tibetologists, particularly those of Tibetan nationality, as well as our historical relics, cultural scriptures and other resources, which are not available to others. Specialists and scholars should work together and support serious research works on important issues in order to produce heart-winning scholarly arguments. Effective scholarly arguments must be made available for our external propaganda on Tibet. We should appreciate the unique value of renowned writers' works for the promotion of external propaganda on Tibet. With far-sight, determination and proper planning, we should organize projects to publish foreign language books on the deeper issues that have wide interest, but are misunderstood, in foreign countries. We should participate in western intellectual activities and promote our views in the western community through their own intellectuals.

Tibetology work must produce maximum results in external propaganda on Tibet:

Westerners are waging a protracted and overall war on us on the issue of Tibet. This is a well-planned public opinion and psychological war. In this urgent war for our basic national interests and international prestige, comrades involved in ideological and scholarly works, particularly the specialists and intellectuals in this meeting, have a special role to play. For this, we need to have a long-term strategy and mental preparation. In addition, we need to plan and organize ourselves to fight each battle carefully.

The external propaganda on Tibet issue is a very complicated matter. The Dalai clique and hostile western forces have a history of several decades of anti-China activities and propaganda. As well as having complete experience and expertise, they command an army of specialists in this field. They have also developed a complete network of cooperation between nations, between organizations, between parliaments and governments, between governments and peoples, between grassroots level organizations, between media and governments, between non-governmental organizations and media, etc. In this way, they launch their campaigns under various guises and through different methods. In the struggle for public opinion on the issue of Tibet, our adversary is an organized international anti-China force. To counter this united force, we have to build an effective organization and network. The external propaganda struggle for public opinion should be treated as an important work, requiring relentless attention. We should launch a coordinated assault on different fronts.

In this overall struggle for public opinion on the Tibet issue, Tibetology institutes should become an effective army. In our Tibet-related external propaganda, we should use

our departments of foreign affairs, information, security, law, nationality, religion, culture, etc. We need specialists with knowledge on our internal and external affairs as well as those with experience in undertaking campaigns. In addition, we need Tibetology scholars and professors from the academic departments of nationality, religion, philosophy, political science, law, history and archaeology. Effective use of Tibetologists and specialists is the core of our external propaganda struggle for public opinion on Tibet.

To sum up, the main responsibilities and potential of Tibetology research in our external propaganda on Tibet are to produce ideas, results, intellectuals, and confrontation strategies. To put it in other words, Tibetology research, in consideration of the needs of our external propaganda, must support our propaganda for public opinion by producing scholastic arguments, handy materials and consummate intellectuals for external propaganda. Tibetologists should develop confrontation strategies and approaches. They should produce effective articles, ideas and materials for external propaganda.

To begin with, Tibetology centres and experts must lend powerful scholastic arguments to our external propaganda and struggle for public opinion on Tibet-related issues. The basic aims of our external propaganda are to provide true information on Tibet, to counter the Dalai clique and anti-China western forces' rumours, criticism and smear campaigns against our policies in Tibet and to foil their subterfuge to split the motherland. The development of academic research and knowledge on Tibet issue is an indispensable precondition and foundation of our external propaganda for public opinion on Tibet. Academics have a responsibility to provide powerful, scholarly argument in support of our external propaganda for public opinion on Tibet. The work of external propaganda on Tibet should be carried out politically, imaginatively and artistically. It should be built on the foundation of in-depth, systematic research. If our argument were built on the foundation of unreliable scholarly research, our external propaganda would be like a lake whose source has dried up; it will never be effective. Propaganda's aim is to convince people, win their hearts and influence them. Our external propaganda on Tibet should clear up the confusion of the so-called Tibet issue, created by the Dalai clique and hostile western forces. It should educate the international community to the truth of the so-called Tibet issue, and convince them of the real situation in Tibet and of the legitimacy of our policies in Tibet. On the issue of Tibet, the truth is on our side. The point is to use our imagination to explain the truth, expose their lies and win the hearts of the audience.

This is what we mean by imaginative and scholastic external propaganda on Tibet. The Dalai clique and hostile western forces use deception to create anti-China public opinion; they distort the facts. More importantly, they have created a culture of false arguments. If we want to separate truth and myth about Tibet and conduct an effective propaganda on our works in Tibet, we have to develop an intellectual argument on issues of nationality, religion, human rights and culture. Such an argument should be understandable and acceptable to the international community. Most importantly, it should be based on the foundation of in-depth research, dovetailing China's history and its present situation. As well as explaining Tibet's history and present situation, the argument should drive home the benevolence of our policies in Tibet, and refute the disinformation of the Dalai clique and hostile western forces. The argument should prove that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, that the democratic reform was absolutely necessary, that the present autonomous arrangement for Tibet is the best and most effective way to protect the equality of

nationalities and to guarantee the right of autonomy to the Tibetan people, and that the atheist government of the Communist Party of China gives religious freedom.

If we do this, our external propaganda will be effective as we are confident that truth is on our side. Whether we are able to produce imaginative intellectual argument or not will depend on how diligently our Tibetologists work. In the last few years, our Tibetologist comrades have worked hard and made tremendous contribution to the unity of the Motherland and nationalities, to the preservation of Tibetan culture and tradition, and to the success of our external propaganda for public opinion on Tibet. However, considering the need and situation of our external propaganda, our research on Tibetology is still inadequate and ineffective, and lacks confrontational edge.

Our research activities and their impacts are still a bit scattered. They lack the required organization and planning. There is much research on Tibet's history, but little on the present situation and future development. There is much academic research, but little effort to use this to face the ground reality of international confrontation. There is much work on Tibet's history, but little research to build an intellectual argument to carry out our external propaganda. Lots of research materials have been published in Chinese and Tibetan languages, but not enough in foreign languages to influence international opinion. We have not been able to influence the international public opinion. We do not have enough internationally known Tibetan intellectuals. We do not have adequate intellectual arguments to carry out our external struggle.

Be that as it may, Tibetology research has its own characteristics and expectations. The entire Tibetology research need not concentrate on external propaganda work; one should not expect this. However, a section of Tibetologists should make considerable efforts to build an intellectual argument to meet the needs of our external struggle on Tibet issue. This is not the only need of external propaganda for public opinion on Tibet, but also an impetus to the development and modernization our Tibetology work.

Imagine, how can our scholars and intellectuals face the challenge of international academic exchange if our academic research does not show concern for the real issue of Tibet and international debates on Tibet issue, if it does not challenge the lies promoted by the Dalai clique and hostile western forces, and if it allows the demonized image of Tibet, as created by western forces, to remain for long in the international community? If we are unable to project the true image of changing Tibet, how can we claim that we have the right to speak on the issue of Tibet on the international forum?

We must recognize this issue from the most important political perspective. We must diligently promote academic research to suit the needs of Tibet's modern development and our external struggle. Such efforts should be built on the foundation of Marxist views on nationality, religion, culture, and human rights. By working hard on the development of intellectual argument on Tibet issue, we should develop our own all-round perspective, our own basic intellectual argument, and our own material on Tibet issue. We should gradually develop a complete body of intellectual arguments, which has the potential to attack others and defend our position on the international forum. We should produce very powerful ideas and intellectual arguments to support our external propaganda work for public opinion on Tibet.

I call on you to discuss whether this can be adopted as the future objectives of our Tibetology work. Towards this end, the Central Government's External Propaganda Department will give a considerable organizational support.

Secondly, our Tibetology institutes and specialists have become an effective army of external propaganda for public opinion on Tibet. As a matter of fact, the very act of writing and publishing books by the specialists of our Tibetology institutes is for external propaganda and public opinion. We should not underestimate the contribution of scholarly works to our external propaganda for public opinion; westerners have a lot of respect for this kind of works.

As we know, it is only a few books that have made such a deep impression on western perspective on Tibet issue. In the past few years, the western media has continued to sensationalize the Tibetan issue. At the same time, there has been an increase in the publication of books on Tibet in the west. Currently, 900 Tibet-related titles are available on the internationally known website, <amazon.com> Out of this, over 163 are Dalai-related titles. Last year, Tsering Gyatso (sic, translator), a Tibetan in UK, published a book, entitled *The Dragon in the Land of Snows*, in London. This book became very famous and was clamoured as a surprising work. John Knaus, a former CIA agent, published *Orphans of the Cold War: America and Tibet's Struggle for Survival*. This book also created clamour for some time. The Dalai-related books, such as *Art of Happiness*, *Ethics for the New Millennium*, and *Political Philosophy of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama* became the US bestsellers in 1999. We cannot underestimate the negative impact of these books on our nation.

Tibetology has become the object of international attention in the 20th century. The scope of Tibetology is expanding internationally; Tibetologists are mushrooming; Tibetology institutes are also multiplying. There are more than ten Tibetology institutes in America and Europe. Some well-known universities have established Tibet study departments and specialized programs. Of course, all of them do not serve western political interests; some of them are serious academic institutes. However, generally speaking, the majority of western Tibetology institutes and Tibet-related organizations have connections with western governments and the Dalai clique. Even if they do not have direct connections, they still have deep influence on western perspective and the Dalai clique. Their research on Tibet is politically biased and fraught with many mistaken views. A section of them serve western anti-China forces and the Dalai clique.

Under the pretext of research work on Tibet, they malevolently distort Tibet's history and the Central Government's policy in Tibet. The most famous of them is the Dalai-hired Michael van Walt of Dutch nationality. His work, *The Status of Tibet*, published in 1987, provides legal arguments in support of Tibet's independence. This book is extremely famous in the western academic circle. Without any regard to our objection, the Dalai clique makes every attempt to include him as advisor of their delegation for dialogues with the Central Government.

Therefore, if we publish books and articles that are geared to meet the confrontational needs of our struggle against the Dalai clique and hostile western forces, they will serve as material for our external propaganda and as weapons for external struggle.

Particularly, succinct and well-written works are as effective as missiles in the battlefield. However, such works should be factual with ability to strike the important views of foreign adversaries; the arguments should be clear and credible; sources quoted should be reliable; there should be footnotes and bibliographies. To sum it up in one sentence, they must be standard works, combining political and scholarly elements.

In the recent years, our Tibetologists have produced a fair amount of meaningful works. If we select some of them, make necessary adaptations, translate them into foreign languages and publish them, they will become effective tools of external propaganda. From now on, we will implement this in an organized manner. In the recent years, we have catalogued China's books on Tibet and have also compiled annexure. To the outside world, we introduced all Tibetology works that had been produced from the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas since the establishment of our nation. This has received the acclaim of foreigners and produced sufficient benefits.

In addition, we must produce some well-designed need-based research projects and mobilize specialists to produce specialized research works with strong confrontational character and high academic standards. These works should be in foreign languages to answer the needs of foreigners. They should then be printed and published to form a section of exceptional materials for our external propaganda.

Thirdly, Tibetology institutes and specialists should promote exchange programs and make important contribution by explaining away the misunderstandings and convincing people with our viewpoints. As a rule, the western public does not trust government propaganda so much. They put a slightly more faith in the statements of grassroots level experts, intellectuals and scholars. Therefore it is certain that Tibetologists and Tibetology institutes can make a tremendous impact in our external propaganda on Tibet.

Tibetology institutes—in the form of grassroots level institutes and in a well-planned, goal-oriented manner—should build connections with relevant foreign organizations and individuals, and organize exchange programs. At all fronts, they should build friendship and explain away misunderstandings. They should try to understand the manner in which foreigners create public opinion; they should propagate our government's policy in Tibet and progress of Tibet. They should also clear misunderstanding and create greater awareness on our nation. They should work hard and attain success in changing foreign public opinion on Tibet issue.

From now on, the Central Government's External Propaganda Department will annually organize well-planned, goal-oriented foreign visits by several groups of Tibetologists as a part of exchange program. We will also invite foreign Tibetology institutes and Tibetologists who are friendly to our nation. In addition, our Tibetology institutes should skilfully form a united international front of Tibetologists and organize conferences at appropriate times. At such conferences, we should build rapport with specialists and intellectuals, governmental representatives, officials of the United Nations and other international organizations, and with other reliable westerners, and discuss common issues. Gradually, we should create a favourable international forum.

If we do this, we will be able to receive timely information. We will also be able to raise our voice in time. Our experience shows that statements made by our specialists and intellectuals during their foreign visits bring good results. If we could encourage a considerable number of foreign specialists and intellectuals to speak on our behalf, we can achieve even better results. As a matter of fact, some of the western public opinions against our nation were made by the specialists of anti-China forces on Tibet. The best way to deal with these people is to let our Tibetologists, intellectuals and senior professors speak. Foreigners may readily listen to specialists and intellectuals, because of their non-governmental nature and reputation in academic affairs.

This task should be carried out for a long time. The seventh department of the Central Government's External Propaganda Department will draw a plan and gradually make efforts toward this end. The concerned Tibetology institutes should make efforts to form cultural exchange groups in order to reach outside. We should nurture several groups of hard-working people, who, as well as understanding our government policies and strategies, have good knowledge of Tibetology and foreign languages, and have expertise in external propaganda work. This is the need of our external propaganda.

Finally, Tibetology institutes and specialists should be able to give useful advice for our external propaganda on Tibet and for our struggle to win the international public opinion. The struggle for the international public opinion on Tibet is long and complicated. It should be carried out frequently. If we want to triumph in every battlefield of this struggle, we must know both others and ourselves; we must have a long-term strategy and mastery in the art of confrontation and struggle. We have a very large number of Tibetologists. Some of them are fairly conversant with international affairs, others very much so with internal affairs, and still others are well-experienced in the struggle of external propaganda for public opinion on Tibet. If they pool their expertise to a large extent and regularly make their expertise available to relevant departments, our external propaganda for public opinion on Tibet will be very successful. The Central Government's External Propaganda Department must diligently implement the recommendations of the ninth annual conference on external propaganda on Tibet. It should inform the Central Government leaders of the outcome of research activities, trends of the international public opinion on Tibet, progress of our Tibetology work, current developments, and recommendations on external propaganda strategy; it should notify the concerned departments as well. In this way, we should translate the recommendations into concrete action.

In short, we should make every effort to convert the Tibetology institutes and specialists into an effective army of our external propaganda for public opinion on Tibet. All of you should speak frankly during this two-day conference. I hope we will be able to make joint efforts for external propaganda. I made these suggestions and recommendations to serve as a basis for your discussion. If you find any inadequacies, you should make open criticisms.

Thank you.